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Traditional rules and practices for managing fisheries, customary fisheries 
management, have been practised for generations by communities in many 
countries. Most customary fisheries management is applied in the context of 
small-scale environments; customary fisheries management has not been 
implemented in large-scale marine environments, where there are substantial 
challenges due to the diversity of resource users, the migratory characteristics of 
fisheries and the dynamic nature of the environments. Nevertheless, to address 
the challenges of large-scale marine environments, government and non-
government organisations have established multilateral environmental 
agreements.  
 
Drawing on an institutional analysis and development framework, this research 
assesses the applicability of customary fisheries management to large-scale 
marine management regimes. This study begins by examining customary 
fisheries management’s characteristics to understand its compatibility with 
modern practices of natural resources management. Then, it assesses how 
customary fisheries management is being applied across government tiers and 
marine zones in pursuing the goals of multilateral environmental agreements. 
 
The empirical focus is on how customary fisheries management on Rote Island 
is applied in the Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area in Indonesia. This marine 
protected area is a goal of the Coral Triangle Initiative, an example of a 
multilateral environmental agreement, established in 2009 by six countries in 
the Indo-West Pacific region to manage fisheries. Data collection included an 
analysis of policy and other documents and interviews with key stakeholders 
across all government tiers in Indonesia.  
 
This study found that Rote Island’s customary fisheries, also known as hohorok, 
possess principles of modern fishing practices, justifying its revival and re-
application to the protected area. However, hohorok failed to address Rote 
Island’s fisheries problems. Changes in the local contexts, such as social and 
politics aspects, and in the new hohorok itself complicate hohorok applicability. 
The revived hohorok keeps the customary fishers happy, which facilitated the 
Indonesian government to gain customary fishers’ consent to manage fisheries. 
The national government used hohorok re-application to serve its interests: to 
re-gain control and hegemony over decentralised fisheries management, and to 
share costs of fisheries management with both global donors and customary 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Problem 
On most Sundays in the 1970s and 1980s when I was growing up on Rote 
Island, a small island in the Indonesian Sawu Sea, the beaches were crowded 
with locals. These were happy times because local community leaders opened 
fisheries to everyone after more than a week or so of closure. In the 1980s, on 
Rote Island, I recall, my friends and I always tried to get up early so that we 
could arrive when there were not many people. We tried to take as much fish, 
seaweed and shellfish as possible within the allowed coastal areas, but we could 
only use hands or simple tools. This was risky because of the possibility of injury 
from poisonous fish. It was taboo to catch fish using nets. Despite the physical 
risks and cultural constraints, we always came home with more than enough 
fish. 
 
However, much of the joy that used to be part of weekly fishing was lost when 
the national government allowed commercial ships to fish around Rote Island 
with trawl nets in the 1980s.  These vessels were enormous and had nets that 
were larger in size than the island. After just a few visits, these commercial 
fishers took away most of the fish and destroyed marine life around the islands. 
Competition and conflict between fishers intensified from the 1990s as a result 
of decreasing fisheries. Parents had to spend days at sea so that they could bring 
home the same amount of fish they used to catch within a few hours along the 
coastlines. Sunday mornings were no longer joyful moments, as what was 
known in the local language as the ‘haven of fish’ was now a deserted pool. Some 
marine areas became inaccessible to local fishers after the Indonesian 
government implemented new marine conservation measures in 2014.  Then, in 
2016 the government passed legislation banning foreign vessels and started 
strictly enforced laws to curb illegal fishing. Customary fishing communities in 
many countries, not just on Rote Island, who for generations managed fisheries 
using customary practices and rules, now had to comply with new government 
rules in accessing their traditional fisheries. Nevertheless, government also 
promoted the customary rules and practices for managing fisheries.  
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Customary norms and rules are practised not only by small-scale fishers on Rote 
Island; they are practised also by fishing communities in many developing 
countries,1 particularly in the Indo-West Pacific region. They are applied in 
managing both marine and terrestrial-based natural resources. Cinner et al. 
(2007, p. 202) define customary management as “ [indigenous] local norms and 
practices that regulate the use, access, and transfer of resources [fisheries]”.The 
role of customary fishing practices is as important as formal fisheries 
management (Berkes, 2006; Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Tucker, 1999).  
 
However, new challenges arise; commercial industrial fishing and scholars are 
divided about the effectiveness and adaptability of customary fisheries 
management (CFM) to meet these new challenges in managing fisheries. The 
applicability of CFM to small-scale marine environments has been widely tested 
and validated in many countries in the Indo-West Pacific region (Aswani, 2005; 
Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Friedlander, 2018). Some scholars (for example, 
Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2000; Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Harkes & Novaczek, 
2000) argue that CFM evolves over time with changes in indigenous knowledge, 
cultural beliefs and practices. This adaptability enables CFM to adopt principles 
and techniques of other fisheries management regimes (Berkes, Colding, et al., 
2000; Berkes, Kislalioglu, Folke, & Gadgil, 1998; Cinner & Aswani, 2007). Other 
scholars (Jentoft, 2004; Scott, 1993) acknowledge that sometimes CFM is 
unchangeable and it is only applicable to local level marine environments, and 
incompatible with formal fisheries management. 
 
Ability to extend CFM jurisdictions on a broader scale challenged by the 
dynamics and complexity of large-scale marine environments (Berkes, 2006; 
Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Jentoft, 2004). Due to their characteristics, most 
marine environments are not privately owned; instead, anyone can access them, 
influencing the quality of governance, known as governability (Bavinck et al., 
2005; Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2015; Kooiman, 2005). The marine environment 
                                                   
 
1 Customary fishing communities in some developed countries such as New Zealand and Canada 
are also practicing customary fisheries management but more at a larger scale, which make 
them different from small-scale customary fishers in developing countries who are associated 
with poverty and a lack of access to power (Béné, Hersoug, & Allison, 2010; Durette, 2018). 
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is dynamic and marine species are migratory, and the stakeholders, both as a 
system-to-be-governed, are diverse in their interests and values. As a result, 
governing system, such as CFM and small-scale formal jurisdictional-based 
rules, have limited capacity to shape the behaviours of resource users in other 
territories (Brown, 2003a; Chuenpagdee, Kooiman, & Pullin, 2008; Folke, 
Pritchard, Berkes, Colding, & Svedin, 2007). Some scholars (for example, 
Berkes, 2005) question whether CFM is applicable to managing large-scale 
marine environments.  
 
Furthermore, these marine ecosystems cross national borders, requiring 
coordinated management by states. Thus, many national governments have 
established collaborative initiatives such as multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) to manage large-scale marine environments. Examples of 
such initiatives include the Commission for the Conservation for Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources established in 1993, the Baltic Marine Environment 
Protection Commission established in 1974, the Caribbean Sea Initiative 
launched in 1998 and the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and 
Food Security (CTI-CFF), also known as CTI, in 2014 (Valman, Österblom, & 
Olsson, 2015). These MEAs enable states and non-state organisations to take 
part in governing marine resources and other environmental problems in 
general (Barrett, 2015; Mitchell, 2003). 
 
Central to this thesis is the CTI, which was established by Indonesia and five 
other countries 2 in Indo-West Pacific region. It aims to ‘‘address threats to the 
marine, coastal, and small island ecosystems, through accelerated and 
collaborative action’’ (Secretariat of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b, p. 
1). To achieve this aim, the CTI established five goals: designating priority 
seascapes, applying an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, 
establishing marine protected areas, achieving climate change adaptation 
measures, and improving threatened species status (Secretariat of Regional 
Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b).  
 
                                                   
 
2 The Philippines, Malaysia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the Salomon Island (Secretariat 
of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b) 
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These new ideas have implications for existing CFM and the problem of 
islanders’ food security, which are the characteristics of small-scale fishers in 
this region and other developing countries (Béné et al., 2010; FAO, 1997, 2015; 
Fidelman et al., 2012). Most of these fishers rely on fisheries to meet their needs 
of food but they have been marginalised from increased fisheries depletion by 
large-scale commercial fishers, by lack of law enforcement and by the 
government-sponsored of fisheries conservation. Thus, the fishers do not 
necessarily support such externally imposed new ideas. 
 
Although the international scale addresses the spatial scale challenges, the 
establishment of MEAs, however, does not necessarily solve environmental 
problems. Many scholars (Armitage, 2008; Berkes, 2006; Gruby & Basurto, 
2013; Libecap, 2014) argue that self-enforcement is not embedded in MEAs but 
instead in local informal rules. In his study of the effectiveness of various cross-
country environmental institutions, Mitchell (2003) confirms that, while some 
MEAs have gained wide support, many of them have involved lengthy and 
difficult negotiation processes and many others suffer from a lack of compliance 
from participating bodies. This weak compliance is related to a lack of self-
enforcing incentives, which is a typical characteristic of local rules (Young, 
2002a) and it is also due to the absence of “a superordinate authority that can 
enforce rules and sanction violators” at regional and global levels (Young, 2006, 
p. 20). Thus, it is suggested MEAs may not solve environmental problems as 
effectively as local rules.  
  
These problems have led scholars to propose integrating formal rules with local 
informal ones, but there has been no case that successfully implements this 
approach (Fidelman et al., 2012; Baker et al., 2013). In their investigation of 
European marine governance systems, Raakjaer et al. (2014) recommend a 
multi-level institutional arrangement. They argue that this approach enables 
various rules and practices across levels to co-exist and complement one 
another, rather than having hierarchical or domination arrangements. This view 
is supported by Cohen and Steenbergen (2015), who recommend the 
establishment of mixed institutional arrangements, in order to reconcile both 




However, studies that recommend the incorporation of CFM within MEAs, do 
not clarify how to establish it. In fact, some scholars (e.g. Baker et al., 2013; 
Fidelman et al., 2012)  have found that some national governments aim to 
integrate CFM with formal management, but often the effort reveals ignorance 
of local informal rules and results in their marginalisation. In their study about 
this integration effort in several countries in the Indo-West Pacific region, 
Cinner and Aswani (2007, p. 209) argue: 
… few countries have accomplished this successfully because there 
appear to be profound differences in the application, intent, and 
conceptual underpinnings of customary and modern practices. 
1.2 The Rationale for the Study 
The challenges in integrating CFM with fisheries management in developing 
countries are greater than in developed countries (Berkes, 2005). While 
developed countries have strong institutions and resources to manage fisheries, 
Ostrom (1990) highlights the lack of regulatory capacities of national 
governments in developing countries for defining and enforcing rules and rights 
related to resources. This situation is exacerbated because most marine 
resources in developing countries have been previously managed with 
customary rules and practices. Hilborn et al. (2005) add that national 
governments often impose formal rules and deny customary rules. This 
situation results in diminished de facto rules, overlapping claims of rights 
(Tucker, 1999), and  a lack of support from local people for fisheries 
management (Hilborn et al., 2005).  
  
In most instances, regardless of the context, a significant change resulting from 
MEAs is a shift of planning across tiers of government, for example, from 
community level to national level (Anderson & Grewell, 1999). According to 
Meadowcroft (2002), a change to the jurisdictional level at which marine 
environmental governance is exercised is about changing stakeholders’ access to 
power. Lebel et al. (2005, p. 1) add that these “scale choices can be a means of 
inclusion or exclusion” which can produce winners and losers. An example of 
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this can be found in the adoption of an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management.  
The introduction of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, however, 
can address the concern of customary fishers who mostly rely on fisheries to 
meet their need of foods. An ecosystem approach to fisheries management 
“strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking into account the 
knowledge and uncertainties about biotic, abiotic, and human components of 
ecosystems and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to 
fisheries within ecologically meaningful boundaries” (FAO, 2005). The whole 
ecological (multiple species) and social (human activities) aspects within an 
ecosystem boundary are managed by an integrated management, by multiple 
rules and knowledge systems in adaptive ways, and at multiple jurisdictional, 
spatial and temporal scales for both goods and services (McFadden & Barnes, 
2009; Pomeroy et al., 2015). The approach sees fisheries beyond “fish in the sea 
and people on the boats” to include features such as mangroves and coral reefs, 
coastal and marine activities, marine tourism, transport and mining (Pomeroy 
et al., 2015, p. 212). It “addresses the multiple needs and desires of societies’ in 
the whole ecosystem in integrated ways making it different from a conventional 
fisheries approach that not only focuses on managing fisheries but also 
particular target species” (FAO, 2005). The approach differs from “traditional 
management approaches which were focused on individual species, on a small 
spatial scale, lacked research, and were based on a short-term perspective” 
(Ansong, Gissi, & Calado, 2017, p. 65). Thus, the needs of customary fishing 
communities are included in the approach’s concerns. 
 
There are several critiques of this approach. Organising multiple stakeholders 
across tiers of government is difficult and costly (Fidelman et al., 2012; 
Kuperan, Abdullah, Pomeroy, Genio, & Salamanca, 1998). Pomeroy et al. (2015) 
highlight a lack of understanding and capacity to implement the concept; 
Berghofer et al. (2008) find that collecting and updating regularly, and 
integrating different practices of knowledge data is challenging. In their study of 
politics of scale in natural resource management, Lebel et al. (2005) show that 
governments tend to use a single uniform approach at a level or scale for all 
levels, excluding lower tiers of government from managing fisheries, which can 
diminish their involvement and support for customary fishing communities in 
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managing fisheries. This ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach fails to recognise that 
environmental problems are dynamic, transboundary and multi-scalar, and 
thus it requires multi-level institutional management to enable representation 
of interests across levels (Folke et al., 2002; Toonen et al., 2013). Scholars (for 
example, Cash & Moser, 2000; Libecap, 2014; Meadowcroft, 2002) argue that 
the mismatches in the level at which natural resources are managed fail to 
balance competing interests, diminish equity and weaken self-enforcing 
incentives at the local level. 
 
Earlier studies about the CTI have produced mixed findings about the role of 
member countries and local fishers in shaping the CTI’s direction due to 
competing interests. Pomeroy et al. (2015) argue that the CTI will recover 
fisheries and ecosystem services such as food needed by local fishers. However, 
Foale et al. (2013, p. 1) argue, “the links between biodiversity conservation and 
improved food security [in the CTI] are contingent on various assumptions, 
many of which may not be met in practice”. Fidelman et al. (2012, p. 48) 
highlight potential difficulty for the CTI reconciling competing goals of 
“sustainable development, poverty reduction and food security amidst a strong 
concern for biodiversity”. Fidelman et al. (2014) highlight the fact that local 
people’s voices were not reflected in the establishment of the CTI, which 
resulted in customary fishers being more disadvantaged than other 
stakeholders.  
 
The interests of international donors and NGOs have shaped the development 
of the CTI. Von Heland et al. (2014) highlight the central roles of donors and 
international NGOs to drive the development of the CTI. They add further, 
“while this [the CTI regional action plan] in itself represents an outcome of 
negotiations amongst the NGOs, and to lesser extent donors, it does not 
adequately reflect the visions of other actors [member countries and fishers]” 
(Von Heland et al., 2014, p. 57). Valman et al. (2015) raise the domination of 
science in decision-making in the establishment of the CTI, while Fidelman et 
al. (2014, p. 126) claim that the CTI “is largely unknown by sub-national and 
local actors”. Rosen and Olsson (2013) argue that regulatory policies used to 
achieve the CTI’s goals do not particularly recognise the rights of local fishers to 




These studies look at various elements of planning of the CTI, but none of them 
look at the integration of CFM within the management regime established by 
the CTI. While some scholars doubt the applicability of CFM, many MEAs have 
failed to gain support from local communities. Therefore, research needs to be 
undertaken that examines how CFM can be applied in large-scale marine 
environments, and specifically in implementing MEAs for large-scale marine 
environments. This study addresses the question: How applicable are 
customary fisheries management principles in developing countries to large-
scale marine management regimes.  It uses the example of the CTI and is an in-
depth study of the way in which the Indonesian government sought to apply 
customary fishing in the development and implementation of the CTI.  This 
detailed study focuses on Rote Island, which was directly affected by the 
establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, instituted in 2014 by the Indonesian 
government to pursue the CTI’s goals. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to assess the applicability of CFM principles for 
managing large-scale marine management regimes in developing countries. To 
achieve this aim, the research objectives are to: 
1. Review theories of and concepts related to the applicability of fisheries 
management for managing large-scale marine areas;  
2. Develop a framework to assess how CFM principles are applied in fisheries 
management; 
3. Apply the framework to investigate fisheries management and applicability of 
CFM principles to the CTI through a case study research;  
4. Assess whether the applicability of CFM principles in large-scale marine 
management is realistic; and  
5. Recommend mechanisms to enhance the applicability of CFM in large-scale 
marine environments within a developing country context. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 critically reviews literature on the common pool resources, their 
management approaches and the applicability of CFM in management of 
common pool resources. The review includes challenges in governing large-size 
marine environments, CFM’s right-based rules, adaptability in governing large-
scale marine environments, and the management of large-scale marine 
environments. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methods. The chapter explains the 
research design, the research framework, the rationale for selecting the case, 
research ethics, methods of data collection and analysis, and strategies for 
enhancing the credibility of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the contexts that shape fisheries management in Indonesia. 
The contexts include geographic and marine ecology, socio-economic 
characteristics, political arrangements, customary communities and their rights, 
and marine conservation development in Indonesia.  
 
Chapter 5 provides material on fisheries management in Indonesia. This 
chapter reviews the evolution of fisheries management at the national, 
provincial and district levels, which shapes measures to strengthen small-scale 
fishers and apply customary fisheries management into Indonesian fisheries 
management. The analysis covers fisheries management in Indonesia since its 
independence in 1945 to the recent effort to establish the CTI and the Sawu Sea 
Marine Protected Area (MPA) in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) province.  
 
Examination of customary fisheries management on Rote Island, an island 
within the Sawu Sea MPA in NTT province, is the focus of Chapter 6. This 
chapter aims to understand rules and practices associated with CFM on Rote, its 
attributes compared with modern rights-based resource management and its 
institutional design principles. The examination provides insights into how 
CFM has been applied in modern rights-based management and its suitability 
for governing large-scale marine environments. 
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Chapter 7 presents findings about how CFM on Rote Island is applied to the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA. Using interviews and document analysis, it 
presents findings across management at different tiers of government and 
marine zones of the Sawu Sea MPA.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses findings about the applicability of CFM in managing the 
Sawu Sea MPA around Rote Island. The chapter starts with a discussion about 
tensions between traditional and modern in applying hohorok, and the drivers 
for hohorok application. Then, it discusses the effectiveness of hohorok and 
factors shaping it. The last sections will be about both practical and theoretical 
implications of hohorok revival.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the study before it proposes a way forward for 
improving the applicability of hohorok and further research. 
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Chapter 2 Fisheries, Governing Challenges and the 
Applicability of Customary Fisheries 
Management in Large-Scale Marine 
Management Regimes 
2.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), 
although there is less focus on customary fisheries; the accommodation of 
customary fisheries within modern large-scale marine management regimes 
remains largely unexplored.  As a result, there is limited research highlighting 
the effectiveness of customary fisheries management (CFM) and lack of 
knowledge about the benefits of Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs) 
for customary fishers in developing countries. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of scholarly literature on the nature of 
fisheries as common pool resources. It explores a variety of governing 
approaches used for governing this common pool resource and identifies critical 
elements that determine the ability to integrate two very different property 
rights regimes.  In the second section, the nature of CFM, its characteristics, 
challenges and adaptability in managing fisheries across spatial scales is 
discussed. The third section outlines collaborative initiatives, particularly 
multilateral environment agreements and their challenges in managing 
fisheries. The chapter concludes with a summary of successful efforts to 
implement CFM in the management of large-scale marine management 
regimes. 
2.2 Managing Fisheries as Common Pool Resource 
Fisheries have long been regarded as an example of common pool resources, 
also known as commons, with unique characteristics, such as size, dynamics 
and complexity. Ostrom (1990, p.30), who has been very influential in the study 
of commons, defines commons as “a natural or man-made resource system that 
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is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use”. Ostrom did not refer to 
particular regimes, but fisheries have these characteristics.  It is costly and 
difficult to exclude beneficiaries (known as non-excludability) and prevent 
degradation (known as subtractability) of fisheries resources (Berkes, 2005; 
Ostrom, 1990), which can explain fisheries depletion. 
 
This section examines characteristics of common pool resources and the various 
challenges of governing approaches from property rights-based resource 
management, scalar challenges of institutions, decentralised fisheries 
management to challenges of collaborative large-scale marine governance.  
2.2.1 Challenges of Common Pool Resource 
A simple explanation about the challenges associated with commons, according 
to Berkes (2005, 2006), is Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’. In this 
metaphor, individuals are entrapped in a ‘collective action dilemma’ resulting 
from difficulties in excludability and subtractability. The dilemma refers to the 
tendency of individuals to exploit a resource at the expense of the whole 
community and the resource itself – and a lack of incentives for individuals to 
improve the resource that benefits the whole community (Acheson, 2006; 
Araral, 2014). As a result, Hardin (1968) adds that a focus on self-maximising 
behaviour is seen as a rational choice by community members. 
 
To address common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas, several scholars (for 
example, Araral, 2014; Berkes, 2005) agree that non-excludability and the 
subtractability of commons result from  ineffective institutions. The term 
institution is used to mean written laws, routines, customs, beliefs, knowledge 
and taboos that shape the rights, duties and relationships of community 
members in their interactions with their environments (Jentoft, 2004). North 
(1990, p. 3) defines institutions as ‘‘the rules of the game for society or, more 
formally humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions’’, choices 
and actions. Both formal rules such as policies, laws and regulation, and 
customary rules such as traditions, custom and taboos, defined as governing 
system play a central key in managing and solving natural, social and 
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organisational and problems (Koelble, 1995; March & Olsen, 1983). Other 
scholars (Bavinck et al., 2005; Chuenpagdee et al., 2008; Jentoft, 2007; 
Kooiman, 2005) define the former (institutions) as governing system, while the 
latter (social and natural aspects) as the system-to-be-governed. The interaction 
between the former and the latter, known as governing interaction, shapes the 
excludability and the subtractability of commons because they can provide both 
incentives and disincentives to influence people’s behaviours (Chuenpagdee et 
al., 2008; Kooiman, 2003).  
 
According to Ostrom (1990), the tragedy of the commons is the result of the 
absence of institutions in terms of property rights of the resources, where 
people see resource exploitation as a rational choice. However, these simple 
insights relate to commons in general. Berkes (2006) argues that literature 
about commons had started to focus on self-governing local institutions (for 
example, Ostrom, 1990),  but due to the complexity of large-scale commons, 
literature now focuses on the issues of multiple users across jurisdictional levels 
(from local to global environments). Therefore, the following subsections 
examine property rights-based resource management, scalar challenges of 
institutions, decentralised fisheries management, and the challenges of large-
scale marine commons leading to a review of collaborative large-scale marine 
governance. 
2.2.2 Property Rights-based Resource Management 
In line with arguments of early experts such as Bromley (1987), Soliman (2014, 
p. 253) defines property rights as “a bundle of rights, and that individual rights 
within this bundle can be separated, transferred, removed or added”. 
Fundamentally, there are three rights: to use (access or withdraw resources), to 
possess (manage and exclude from) and to dispose of (alienate) the property3 
(Guerin, 2003; Musole, 2009; Schlager & Ostrom, 1999). These rights can be 
                                                   
 
3 Access – right to enter and enjoy non-subtractive benefits 
Withdrawal – right to obtain units or products of a resource system 
Management – right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource through 
improvements 
Exclusion – right to determine who will have access rights and withdrawal rights, and how those 
rights may be transferred 
Alienation – the right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992, pp. 250-251) 
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separated and combined for particular purposes with key characteristics: 
excludability, controlled subtractability, transferability, duration, and security 
of title (Aswani, 2006; Guerin, 2003; Scott, 2000) (see Table 2.1 for their 
definition).  
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of modern rights-based resource management applied to 
fisheries 
Characteristics Definition (Example of fisheries) 
Excludability  Controlling fishers’ access to fisheries by limiting fishing 
methods, time, areas and fisheries’ size and catch. 
Subtractability  The catch taken by a fisher decreases stock of fish the 
available to other fishers. 
Transferability Transfers of fishing’s rights within and across members of 
social units such as families, tribes and communities 
Duration Whether the rights are permanent, or what the basis is for 
reallocation and whether the right holders would have any 
preference for future allocations of fisheries’ rights 
Security of title Enforceability, certainty, security, ease of establishing fishing 
entitlements. 
Source: Scott (2000, pp. 5-6) and Aswani (2005, p. 287) 
 
The structure of these rights varies across property rights regimes (Musole, 
2009).  Scholars (see, for example, Bromley, 1987; Hanna, Folke, & Mäler, 
1996) recognise four property right regimes: open access, private property, 
public property and common pool property. Each property regime has a 
different arrangement of rights (see Table 2.2). 
 
Under open access property regimes, there is an absence of rights, the resources 
belong to everyone or there is no excludability; anyone can access, use and take 
the resources, thus leading to their degradation (Acheson, 2006). Under private 
property, all the characteristics of property rights such as excludability and 
transferability can exist, which encourages investment to maintain or improve 
the resources (Stewart, 2004).  
 
Under public property regimes, individuals have the right to access and use the 
resources but there is no transfer of the rights. Governments can rent the 
resources, but Musole (2009) points out that often governments fail to assert 
their authority, which leads to de facto private property rights in which holders 
can possess and sell the right for a long period of time.  
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Finally, under common pool property regimes, members may access and 
withdraw the resources according to rules set by self-governing communities 
(Ostrom, 1990). Members can inherit and transfer their rights, but there is no 
right to trade the resources. As a result, Musole (2009) argues that common 
pool property rights are seen as less efficient, since members have disincentives 
to improve the resources but incentives to harvest the resources.  
 





Public property Open access 
Ownership Individuals Collective Government None 
Access Closed Member only All All 
Excludability High Low Low None 
Subtractability High High Low None   
Transferability  High  Low  High  None  
Source: Bromley (1987) and Hanna et al. (1996) 
 
Berkes (2006) adds that property regimes can be changed and combined for 
particular purposes such as managing conflicts. In line with this view, Young 
(2006) argues that property regimes can co-exist, co-evolve and constructively 
combine to complement one another. Thus, Scott (1995, p. 33) suggests a multi-
level institutional arrangement, similar to Ostrom’s (1990) nested principle 
(discussed below)  be applied to institutions at separate levels which, according 
to Young (2006), can avoid conflict between institutions and strengthen their 
harmony at large-scale commons (Berkes, 2006; Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, the 
following subsection focuses on identifying the challenges of institutions that 
shape their co-existence and conflicts.  
2.2.3 Institutional Design Principles 
Ostrom’s (1990) support for common property regime is based on institutional 
design principles, by which, she believes the tragedy of the commons can be 
averted. As a prominent researcher of commons, she outlines her argument to 
focus on the study of small scale common pool resources “because the process of 
self-organization and self-governance are easier to observe in this type of 
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situation than in many others.” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 29). She identified eight 
design principles for managing common property resources (Table 2.3), which 
she summarised from cases with strong collective action. 
 
Table 2.3: Institutional design principles for commons 
Operational principles 
1).  Clearly defined boundaries (Rules that are suitable to local ecological 
conditions, clearly identified individuals or households that have rights to 
withdraw the resource unit). 
2).  Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs (Rules specifying the 
amounts that a participant benefits are proportional to the distribution of 
labour, materials and other costs). 
Collective principles 
3).   Graduated sanction for violation (Ease in enforcement of rules; it starts with 
low sanctions that get stronger for repeated violations). 
4).  Locally and participatory rules, rule-making and modification (mixtures of 
institutions), inducing compliance with rules with various mechanisms. 
5).  Conflict resolution mechanism (Availability of rapid, low-cost, local-based 
conflict resolution mechanism for conflicts among participants, or with 
officials). 
6).  Accountability of monitors and other officials to users. 
Constitutional principles 
7).  Minimal recognition of rights to organize (Central government should not 
undermine the rights of local communities to establish rules). 
8). Nested enterprises (Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
conflict resolution is organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises). 
Source: Ostrom (1990, p. 90) 
 
Ostrom (1999b; 1994) argues that local-based institutions possess strong 
collective action: the value that holds community members together to pursue 
collective interests, instead of personal interests through free-riding (Marshall, 
1998). It is commonly found that the smaller the geographical size of a 
community, the stronger the trust and collective action among its members 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Marshall, 2008; Stern, 2011).  Collective action in 
small communities arises from, among others, a long-standing knowledge and 
trust through face-to-face communication, shared networks and identity, 
reliable norms, and solidarity and reciprocity among members of communities 
(Cox et al., 2010; Putnam, 2001). 
 
According to Soliman (2014), although property rights regimes have been 
studied widely, there are different perspectives on their application and 
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effectiveness. Hardin (1968) proposed imposing either a private property 
regime or a public property regime over resources. However, Ostrom (1990) 
favoured a common property regime to address the tragedy of the commons. 
This difference between scholars, according to Araral (2014), is acceptable, as 
Hardin’s case is applicable to large-scale commons, while Ostrom tends to focus 
on small-scale commons. This means that the regimes fit into different spatial 
and temporal scales of commons (Hardin, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). There is no 
superiority among them, as Acheson (2006, p. 118) states, “there is no 
agreement as to what institutions would do the job best”. Thus, both formal and 
informal rules with different property regimes can be equally effective in 
managing resources. 
 
While the institutional design principles have gained wide validation and 
support (Cox et al., 2010), experts are divided in its applicability in large scale 
environments without diminishing local-level collective action. Varughese 
(1999) confirms in his research in Nepal that it is neither the size nor the 
homogeneity of community members, but it is the heterogeneity in the rules 
applied in small communities with different characteristics that produces 
collective action. Stern (2011), a proponent of the design principles, proposes 
the modification of some principles. He notes that although the principles have 
rarely been tested in large-scale environments, this does not imply that they are 
inapplicable. On the contrary, Araral (2014) disputes the applicability of the 
principles to large-scale environments. He adds that high transactional costs, 
increasing complexity and uncertainty in large-scale environments and diversity 
and conflicting governance and institutions can lead to a similar tragedy of the 
commons. However, Araral built this argument from specific non-empirical 
cases without going into details. Thus, Fleischman et al. (2014) argue that it is 
difficult to determine if Araral’s argument is well supported.  
 
Some scholars find that the principles’ applicability is limited for managing 
large-scale environments due to complex and dynamic environments and 
resource users. Dietz et al. (2003, p. 10) consider that only three of the eight 
principles: ‘participatory rule making, enforcement and changes’, ‘diversity of 
institutions’ and a ‘nested system’ are applicable for large-scale marine 
management. They claim that these principles “provide necessary information 
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and infrastructures, deal with conflicts, induce compliance with rules and 
encourage adaptation and change”. They use the requirements for robust 
governance to examine the effectiveness of these principles. Duit and Galaz 
(2008, p. 329) see robust governance as having the ability “to perform well 
regardless of the certainty and rate of change” Therefore, Dietz et al. (2003) 
argue that these principles are effective in governing dynamic environments and 
the conflicting interests of resource users at large-scale marine commons. 
 
A recent study by Fleischman et al. (2014) notes that the principles have been 
applied to large-scale commons, but it has not been done systematically. Thus, 
“it is unclear which design principles from CPR theory can be applied at these 
larger scales, or whether the logic of collective action underlying CPR theory can 
be used to study cases involving large numbers of actors” (Fleischman et al., 
p.306). Some scholars have applied limited principles without trying to 
understand the complexity of the theory and undertaking an empirical 
comparison of theory with the cases (see, for example, Dietz et al., 2003; 
Keohane & Martin, 1995), while other scholars applied the theory at cross-scale 
commons but produced conflicting arguments (Armitage, 2008; Gruby & 
Basurto, 2013). Therefore, most scholars argue that the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ is not always associated with the scale of power. In general, therefore, 
Stern (2011) recommends some revision and the addition of principles such as 
integration of science with local knowledge and cross-scale collaboration but 
does not fundamentally rule out the applicability of Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles at large-scale commons.  
2.2.4 Challenges of Institutional Scale 
A review of institutions is important because they are “perceived as both the 
problem and the answer to sustainable fisheries” (Jentoft, 2004, p. 138). There 
are various types of institutions operating at different scales. Thus, the extent to 
which they can be reconciled and become effective in natural resource 
management depends partly on the scale they are applied to (Dahl, 1994).  
 
Cash et al. (2006, p. 3) define scales (also known as scalar dimension) as 
various dimensions of a phenomenon, while levels (also known as scalar levels) 
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are seen as parts of or units in a scalar dimension (Table 2.4). Temporal and 
spatial scales, for example, determine the effectiveness of institutions in shaping 
collective action. Moss and Newig (2010) argue that while at large scales such as 
the national (spatial) or annual (temporal), institutions often deliver 
effectiveness, they do lack participation. At the small scale, such as a local 
community (spatial), or daily (temporal), institutions increase participation, but 
they are not always effective in addressing cross-spatial problems. 
 
With regard to the scale of institutions, Ostrom (1990, p. 53) outlines a three-
level analysis for managing commons pool resources.  Firstly, ‘constitutional 
level’ relates to governing the resources; this includes rules about how to make 
rules at a collective choice level. Secondly, ‘collective level’ relates to the 
implementation of decisions at management level; rules about how to and who 
can change rules at the ‘operational level’. And lastly, the operational level 
relates to utilisation of the resources; rules about how to and who can access the 
resources. 
 
Table 2.4: Examples of institutional scales, dimensions and levels 
Scale Dimension Level 
Institutions  Formal  Constitutional Collective choice  Operational  




Short    
Annual 
   
 
Seasonal 
   
 
Monthly 
   
 
Daily 
   
Medium  
Long  






  Bay 
Lagoon 
Estuary 
Jurisdiction Regional  National  Provincial  Local 
Knowledge 
Formal  General Science    
Informal                           Indigenous 
Local 
Source:  Adapted from Cash et al. (2006), Gibson et al. (2000) & Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992) 
    
Institutions inherently have both temporal and spatial scalar mismatches, 
which shape conflicts and their effectiveness. While formal institutions can 
change in short temporal scale such as years and even days, informal or 
customary institutional changes tend to be incremental (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
North, 1990). A written law, for example, can be conceived and changed in a 
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year or less, but traditions and religions can last for centuries. This means that 
rapid changes in formal institutions do not necessarily bring changes to 
informal institutions. Hodgson (2006, p. 6) clearly explains, “for laws to become 
rules, … they have to become customary”. Scott (1993) argues that this 
mismatch between formal and informal institutions is the root of conflicts in 
many fisheries.  
 
Mismatches between formal and informal institutions shape their effectiveness. 
Formal institutions are more applicable at higher-level jurisdictions, such as 
regional and national levels, than informal ones and vice versa. However, this 
does not suggest that there is a hierarchy among institutions; informal 
institutions at the local level, for example, are not less significant than formal 
institutions. According to Young (2006), it is only the scalar applicability that 
distinguishes their roles; both formal and informal institutions can conflict but 
also co-exist and dynamically interact across spatial and temporal scales. 
However, at the large-scale commons, institutional interactions often lead to 
unequal and conflicting relationships, including in collaborative management 
(Fidelman et al., 2014; Mitchell, 2003). 
2.2.5 Challenges of Decentralised Fisheries Management 
Decentralised fisheries management has been seen as a way to empower local 
institutions and local people (Bene & Neiland, 2004; Pomeroy, 2003). Thus, 
studies (see, for example, Bene & Neiland, 2004; Ribot, 2003, 2005; Satria & 
Matsuda, 2004) about efforts to apply local institutions in natural resource 
management mostly focused on decentralisation reforms. In fisheries 
management Satria and Matsuda (2004, p. 1), for example, argue 
“decentralisation is considered the most appropriate form of fisheries 
governance in which to enable… a community-based fisheries management  
system”. These studies, together with pressure from development agencies and 
donors, have led many countries to decentralised fisheries management (Béné 
et al., 2010).  
 
Decentralisation has multiple meanings, and this has led to disappointment 
over its outcomes (Agrawal & Ostrom, 1999). Decentralised governance is 
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defined as “the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-
responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and 
local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity” (Work, 2002, p. 1). 
According to Work, decentralisation “related to the role of, and the relationship 
between central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, private 
or civic. This definition was based on Work’s (2002) study in many developing 
countries. He defines decentralisation as comprising other concepts such as the 
deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. By this definition, the focus of 
decentralisation is on building collaboration across tiers of government. 
 
The World Bank developed a similar understanding of decentralisation, 
referring to earlier works of Rondinelli (1981), Cheema et al.  (1983) and 
Rondinelli et al. (1989). However, other institutions, such as the OECD (1997), 
use devolution as the grand concept to refer to the transfer of authority. It 
recognises a continuum from centralisation to decentralisation with two 
fundamental forms of devolution: 1) decentralisation, where power is shifted 
from central government to democratically independent lower levels of 
government and (2) deconcentration, where power is shifted from higher levels 
to lower units of central government.  
 
Work (2002, p. 2) and previously Rondinelli (1999, p. 2) categorise the concept 
of decentralisation according to the form of power transfer as follows. First, 
administrative decentralisation, which comprises deconcentration referring to 
the transfer of rights to undertake certain implementing responsibilities within 
a department of national government from higher-level units to lower level 
units or agencies for a short time where accountability tends to go upward, and 
delegation referring to a transfer of rights to undertake certain responsibilities 
from a department of national government to any unit or agency, not always its 
subsidiary. This tends to be temporary, although accountability to local people 
is stronger than that of deconcentration. Second, political decentralisation in 
the form of devolution refers to transfer of power from national governments to 
sub-national governments or other units to undertake full responsibilities of the 
latter domestic policies and management that lead to autonomous and 
independent units of government. Third, fiscal decentralisation refers to the 
transfer of power from national governments to sub-national governments or 
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other units to manage the latter’s own sources of revenues to fund local policies 
and management. Finally, market decentralisation refers to transfers of 
authority and responsibility to the non-formal sector, where both private and 
civic sectors undertake planning, administrative and other functional 
responsibilities. 
 
The pursuit of decentralisation seeks to realise several benefits. The existence of 
power at a local level enables local institutions to respond and adapt to local 
voices effectively and enhances local initiatives (Bene & Neiland, 2004; Ostrom, 
1990; Pomeroy, 2003). In their study of decentralised natural resource 
management in many countries, Agrawal and Ostrom (1999, p. 473) support 
decentralisation “on grounds of increased efficiency, more thoroughgoing 
equity, and/or greater participation and responsiveness of government to 
citizens”. Similarly, political decentralisation enables local people to control 
officials that show less commitment (Shah, 1999), strengthens local democracy 
(Hadiz, 2004) and addresses economic inequality among regions, political 
instability, and ethnic and religious conflicts (Hill, 2008; Rasyid, 2004). 
Decentralisation in these contexts focuses more on power-sharing between 
elites than institution-building (Clement, 2009).   
 
Despite its promises, decentralisation practices have resulted in mixed 
outcomes (Clement, 2009). Ribot et al. (2006, p. 1865) underline the national 
government who design decentralisation to conserve and serve its interests 
through various strategies such as: “(1) by limiting the kinds of powers that are 
transferred, and (2) by choosing local institutions that serve and answer to 
central interests”. Purwanto and Pramusinto (2018) confirm these strategies in 
the decentralisation policy in Indonesia. Other scholars (see, for example, 
Duncan, 2007; Fleischman, Ban, et al., 2014) highlight a lack of institutional 
and financial capacity and support for local actors to manage decentralised 
responsibilities. In Indonesia, Adhuri (2004) found that decentralisation 
strengthened communal property rights, but  was captured by local elites for 
their personal benefit by trading with foreign fishers, an activity which Béné et 
al. (2010) found, was similarly undertaken by sub-national government 
officials; this was confirmed by Warren and Visser (2016). Newig and Fritsch 
(2008) argue that local-level institutions often have a greater incentive to 
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exploit natural resources than national governments. The interests of national 
and local elites often lead them to work together in exploiting decentralised 
natural resources (Agrawal, 2001; Bene & Neiland, 2004; Ribot, 2002). 
 
Some scholars (for example, Béné et al., 2010; Satria & Matsuda, 2004) 
highlight fragmented marine management as one of several consequences of 
decentralisation. Béné et al. (2010, p. 334) found in Indonesia, “decentralised 
management seriously impedes any attempt at controlling the intensity of 
fishing activity, and, in particular, that of foreign fleets” that worked with 
autonomous sub-national government. They argue that there was a lack of 
incentives among sub-national governments to prevent fisheries depletion and 
enforce the law on illegal fishers. Moss and Newig (2010) link these problems to 
mismatches in the jurisdictional scale of government. The mismatches create 
incentives for small government units to exploit fisheries (known as competition 
spillovers) but it produces no disincentives to pollute because pollutants move 
across jurisdictional boundaries (known as pollution spillovers).  
 
The failure of decentralisation relates to a lack of accountability of local officials. 
In his study of decentralised natural resource management, Ribot (2002, p. iii) 
notes that the outcomes of decentralisation are shaped by “representation - 
which is composed of powers and downward accountability - and management 
incentives”. Ribot (2002, p. v) adds that if responsiveness reflects the 
relationships between the power of the elites and the voice of local resource 
users, then accountability reflects the relationships between outcomes and 
available sanctions. Responsive and accountable elites are only possible if there 
is a balance between the power of local elites on the one hand and the 
sanctioning power of the other. Adhuri (2005) confirms that in decentralised 
fisheries management in Indonesia the transfer of power to the community was 
captured by non-elected customary leaders who exercised power in the 
community due to their traditional status as royal families.  
 
Lack of acknowledgement of customary management and exclusion rights is 
another common problem (Capistrano & Colfer, 2005). Larson and Soto (2008) 
found that most decentralisation reforms focused on acknowledging use rights 
(access and withdrawal of resources) of local people and failed to transfer 
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substantial power to local people through political and fiscal decentralisation. 
Agrawal (2001, p. 492) argues, “decentralisation can be said to have occurred 
only when governments devolve property rights over resources that conform to 
the collective choice and constitutional levels,” and is not limited to the 
operational level. Without having power at collective and constitutional levels, 
to determine how and who can exercise power, local people are only users; they 
do not have power to manage access to resources. These three levels of 
institutions correspond to the continuum of commons property rights according 
to Ostrom (1990). 
 
Therefore, while some developing countries implemented decentralisation in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, some other developed countries that had 
undertaken decentralisation since the 1980s, undertook recentralisation with a 
variety of arguments (De Vries, 2000). For example, a scalar problem of local 
rules is the lack of capacity to manage cross-boundary challenges of migratory 
fisheries and spills-over (Newig & Fritsch, 2008), discussed in the following 
section. 
2.2.6 Challenges of Large-Scale Marine Commons  
The challenges of managing fisheries intersect with the size of marine commons, 
which are spread horizontally across geographical and ecological spaces and 
vertically across levels of jurisdiction (Berkes, 2006; Young, 2002a). The 
challenges are institutional misfits, cross-scale linkages and external drivers 
(Berkes, 2006; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Young, 2003).  
 
Institutional misfit 
The term ‘institutional misfit’ refers to the misalignment of institutions with the 
scalar dimensions of a socio-ecological system (Cash et al., 2006). This system 
treats humans as an integrated part of nature, where both have linked 
relationships (Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 2000). Thus, the misalignment can 
happen between institutions in terms of the interrelationships with both 
humans and nature.  
 
The misfits are caused by, among other things, dynamic and complex 
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ecosystems - such as unpredictable future changes and poor understanding of 
natural phenomena - and divided political boundaries. Misfits can be the 
products of active human efforts such as the division of political boundaries and 
by natural events such as changes in the paths of migratory fisheries across 
different jurisdictions (Brown, 2003b; Folke et al., 2007; Young, 2002b).  
 
In some cases, misfits are products of political outputs resulting from efforts to 
pursue identity-building and political benefits. With respect to the particularity 
of ethnic identities and typical needs, for example, many governments have 
established ethnic-based autonomous districts. This policy has led to divided 
natural resource management, difficult coordination, and unequal distribution 
of costs and benefits or spill-overs (Cash et al., 2006; Moss & Newig, 2010; 
Satria & Matsida, 2004).  This misfit is shaped by short-term political cycles and 
outcomes which conflict with environmental planning in the larger and longer 
scale (Young, 2003). This suggests that efforts to incorporate local voices in the 
case of decentralised marine management and the creation of new jurisdictions 
based on ethnic jurisdictions can produce misfits. 
 
Misfits in environmental governance arrangements originate from conflicting 
objectives and interests among stakeholders in promoting environmental 
outcomes (Pittman, Armitage, Alexander, Campbell, & Alleyne, 2015; 
Schroeder, King, & Young, 2008). At the local level, misfits arise from uniform 
treatment of communities as homogenous units, which fails to address the 
uniqueness of certain groups  (Folke et al., 2007).  At the global level, misfits 
happen when efforts to bring global long-term potential benefits, fail to exert 
global supports to minimise local short-term costs that are mostly borne by 
local people, such as small-scale fishers. These misfits are common in marine 
conservation, which aims to bring the benefits of global scale, but often limits 
the fishing activities of small-scale fishers. 
 
These misfits limit the effectiveness of institutions as parts of the natural 
resource boundaries that exist beyond jurisdictional boundaries within which 
institutions are applied. Common examples are migratory fisheries, whose 
ecosystem is across countries. As a result, there are not only gaps between 
institutional and natural boundaries but also overlaps between institutions 
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(Meadowcroft, 2002).   
 
Existence of cross-scale linkage 
Challenges in managing fisheries originate from a close dependence and the 
causal relationships between marine environmental systems and resources 
(Cash et al., 2006). Transboundary externalities such as pollution from marine 
transportation in international waters and increasing marine temperature, for 
example, bring great impacts on ecosystems across spatial and temporal scales 
(Moss & Newig, 2010). However, because of the marine ecosystem multi-scalar 
characteristics, it is difficult to establish cause-effect relationships. These 
difficulties, according to Lemos and Agrawal (2006) lead to two implications for 
environmental governance: unequal distribution of costs and benefits and 
difficulties in fisheries management. 
  
The first implication relates to the unequal distribution of benefits and costs of 
environmental outcomes as the result of loose cross-scale causes and the 
consequences of environmental issues. Trans-boundary costs and benefits of 
marine pollution and marine protection add complexity to environmental 
governance (Berkes, 2006). However, it is difficult to identify and measure 
contributing factors, benefactors and impacts across spatial and temporal scales 
(Cash et al., 2006). Mitchell (2003) found that many global environmental 
initiatives have failed to gain strong support and thus have not delivered the 
expected outcomes because of these difficulties. 
 
Some institutional regimes have exacerbated existing inequalities among non-
state actors (Cash et al., 2006, p. 4). These regimes can be found in many 
externally-imposed marine institutional initiatives that often fail to incorporate 
the voice of local resource users such as sea-nomadic fishers (Cinner et al., 
2013; Crawford et al., 2004). Kusumawati and Visser (2014), for example, found 
that many donor-based projects in Indonesia tend to include local elites but 
exclude local resource users. This has resulted in the further marginalisation of 
local users and a lack of knowledge about the impact of projects on local people. 
This suggests that better information about the impact of an initiative on the 
stakeholders across scales can only be available through the involvement of the 
stakeholders.  
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Influences of external drivers 
External drivers such as global markets, climate issues and ecological policies of 
national governments influence the effectiveness of self-governance among local 
communities (Folke et al., 2007; Stern, 2011)  . Berkes (2006) argues that these 
are unavoidable as there is hardly any community-based management that is 
free from the influence of political, economic and natural drivers. The 
effectiveness of community-based management, therefore, partly depends on its 
ability to respond to these drivers.  
 
Identification of the drivers in some cases is easy, especially those that relate to 
harvesting activities and trade to meet global markets. However, Lebel et al. 
(2006) note that the dynamic and complex characteristics of marine resources 
and the lack of institutional connection, make it difficult to identify and 
influence how these drivers behave. For example, outsider fishers have been a 
common problem for local fishers in many Southeast Asian countries, making 
control and compliance at the local level difficult (Clifton, 2012). 
 
Other scholars (Blaikie, 2008; Mullins, 2004; Peluso, 1992) link environmental 
changes at the local level with the role of economic systems at the national and 
global levels. Fleischman et al. (2014, p. 310), for example, found in Indonesia, 
“the influence of macro-level historical and political-economic factors - such as 
governments seeking to extract rents or votes, large corporate interests, 
macroeconomic crises, and unequal power relations between communities and 
the state on local collective action”. This suggests that it is not only the level at 
which power is situated that matters in natural resource management, but also 
other external factors such as political and economic interests across 
jurisdictional levels. 
2.2.7 Collaborative Large-Scale Marine Governance 
The difficulties of applying local-level rules to manage large-scale commons 
have led to the development of various planning approaches to decision making 
such as collaborative planning, collaborative management and collaborative 
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011; 
Pomeroy, 2003). However, there are ambiguities about collaborative 
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governance because it has a variety of purposes and terminology, causing 
confusion among scholars and practitioners. This is because “collaboration 
evolves over time in response to different demands” (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007, 
p.104)  . In the Aotearoa New Zealand context, for example, Davies et al. (2018, 
p. 124) state, “MPA [marine protected areas] planning has evolved from 
previously adversarial processes into more collaborative ones that are 
accompanied by improvements in efficiency and broad support for MPA 
implementation”.  This new approach, like that in many other countries 
(Pomeroy et al., 2015), has been shaped by global changes in the management 
goals of MPAs to include social aspects, besides ecological aspects (Davies et al., 
2018). The practice of collaborative governance has evolved and differs across 
temporal scales. 
 
Despite the differences, Von der Porten and De Loë (2014) argue that most 
collaborative approaches have similar key ideas. They define collaboration after 
Gray’s (1985, p. 912) work as ‘‘the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible 
resources, e.g., information, money, labour, etc., by two or more stakeholders, 
to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually’’. This definition 
highlights the basic meaning, justification and purpose of collaboration - the 
differences in the resources of stakeholders across organisations that facilitate 
them to pool them for the same purposes - upon which scholarly literature has 
been developed along different paths. However, it does not elaborate on the 
decision-making approach that distinguishes planning approaches.  
 
Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 544) regard collaborative governance as collective 
consensus-based decision-making. Their definition of that collaborative 
governance has six key criteria: “(1) the forum is initiated by public agencies or 
institutions, (2) participants in the forum include non-state actors, (3) 
participants engage directly in decision-making and are not merely “consulted” 
by public agencies, (4) the forum us formally organized and meets collectively, 
(5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not 
achieved in practice), and (6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or 
public management” (2007, pp. 544-545). 
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However, this definition, according to Emerson et al. (2011), focuses on state-
led formal collaborative initiatives and does not involve multiple stakeholders.  
To address this deficiency, Emerson et al. (2011, p. 2), define collaborative 
governance broadly as “the processes and structures of public policy decision 
making and management that engage people constructively across the 
boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private 
and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise 
be accomplished”. 
 
Besides power-sharing, according to Armitage (2008), collaboration should 
focus on building collective capacity through inclusiveness, deliberation, joint 
decision-making, and learning and experimentation. Eppel (2013, p. 9) adds 
further that collaboration “means to co-labour, to co-operate to achieve 
common goals, working across boundaries in multi-sector relationships”. 
Berkes (2010, p. 492) argues that collaboration should be characterised by 
“inclusion, power-sharing and joint decision-making” with emphasis on the 
equality of relationship, instead of “a subject-object relationship”. This suggests 
that collaboration involves a fair sharing of resources such as funds and 
knowledge to empower one another.   
 
The process of collaboration is dynamic because of the diversity in the 
stakeholders (Pomeroy, 2003). It is shaped by the stakeholders’ socio-economic 
and political status, level of trust and conflict, organisational culture, 
operational methods, and the complexity of the resources and their problems, 
and changes across differed scales (O'Leary & Vij, 2012; Ferse et al., 2010; 
Hanna, 1995; Sen & Raakjaer-Nielsen, 1996). Collaboration can be constructed 
and changed dynamically as the collaborating parties start to learn, negotiate, 
and build trust (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009). 
 
Trust is a significant element in fisheries collaboration (Berkes, 2009; Harkes, 
2006). Stern and Coleman (2014)    argue that collaboration starts and evolves 
around building trust. A successful collaborative initiative between government 
and local resource users results in the later trusting that the government 
considers their voices. Similarly, the government trusts local resource users to 
comply with the agreement reached. Ameyaw (2017, p. 39) in his study of 
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fisheries conflict in Ghana found that “when parties trust each other they can 
more easily resolve conflicts but when they do not trust each other, their 
resolution is more difficult”. Trust strengthens collective action and decreases 
transaction costs (Ostrom, 2007) as people are willing to contribute, collaborate 
and comply with agreements. However, building trust takes time, particularly in 
post-conflict settings (Stern & Coleman, 2014). 
 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are examples of 
intergovernmental initiatives involving states and non-state organisations at the 
super-national level to address environmental problems (Lemos & Agrawal, 
2006; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002). Piñon Carlarne (2008, p. 455) adds that MEAs 
include “the broad domain encompassing the negotiating, agenda-setting, 
norm-creating, and rule-making” beyond a state level. According to Finkelstein 
(1995, p. 369), this governing mode is about “governing without sovereign 
authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers… doing internationally 
what governments do at home”. This mode of governance, Berkes (2010, p. 491) 
adds, lead to “politics, sharing of rights and responsibilities, and setting 
objectives and the policy agenda”. MEAs enable the member countries to 
address shared environmental challenges that cannot be addressed at the 
national level such as institutional misfits, cross-scale linkages and the influence 
of external drivers (Berkes, 2006).  
 
As supra-national institutions, MEAs can be seen as collaborative initiatives 
based on the Ansell and Gash’s (2007) definition, but according to Emerson et 
al. (2001), MEAs are only intergovernmental initiatives because they do not 
involve and/or marginalise the wider community. In fact, only a few 
intergovernmental initiatives adopt collaborative governing approaches or 
success to collaborate (Mitchell, 2003). In their study of fisheries governance, 
Davis and Ruddle (2012, p. 247) argue that many governments and 
international donors have misused power-sharing initiatives to “download 
responsibility and costs onto citizens”. White (1996) found in her study of 
participation in development in Bangladesh that the government and donors 
continue to dominate decision-making. The domination of these institutions 
strengthens market norms but weakens local community values such as a trust, 
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which is an important element for collaboration (Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002; Knox 
et al., 1998).  
 
From Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, the marginalisation of local people by 
either the state or global donors, or both, in governing natural resources results 
from “common sense” ideas through popular consent and consensus which 
justify the ideas of the dominant actors as acceptable to the whole society (Levy 
& Egan, 2003; Maxton-Lee, 2017). Hegemony and marginalisation can take in 
forms such as marine conservation areas and privatisation of fisheries to 
address the depletion of fisheries. This concept of hegemony sheds light on the 
persistence of exploitative economic relations between classes (Song, Bodwitch, 
& Scholtens, 2018)  and support for the formation of a hegemonic alliance 
through moral and intellectual ideologies by institutions of civil society such as 
the media, the church and the academia (Levy & Egan, 2003). Thus, it is not 
only economic but also non-economic forces that lead to the formation of 
hegemonic blocs involving the state, market and civil society on one hand and 
marginalised groups on the other hand. Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, as stated 
below, is reflected in the states domination and donors Davis and Ruddle (2012) 
highlight above: 
Hegemony is a way to conceptualise not just the importance of the 
material nature of the ruling class’s domination, and the evidence it 
does so, but the forms of class domination reproduced through ‘civil 
society’ in the form of norms, culture, thoughts, and ideas (e.g., the 
“ethical-political”) (Gramsci 2000: 189-199). 
 
The practice of collaboration, thus, has been criticised for promoting hegemony 
of the state and capital through popular consent (Maxton-Lee, 2017). In the 
context of natural resource management, it can facilitate the transfer of resource 
management to private institutions through a variety of regulatory policies, 
which are seen as acceptable ‘common sense”. Davis and Ruddle (2012) note 
that changes start by transferring responsibilities and costs to the fishers, 
labelled as users and stakeholders. It then imparts market-based principles into 
the resources and livelihoods and converts social and cultural contexts into a 
private-sector economic setting and logic concerned with property rights, 
economic efficiency, costs and incomes. In turn, (Davis & Ruddle, 2012) argue 
the fishers adopt market-based views as they have a limited capacity to resist 
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the common sense paradigm of market-based management and exploitation of 
resources and their livelihoods. As market principles become new values in the 
community, fishers start to view one another and their resources from a cost-
benefit perspective (Jentoft, 2004). Recent scholars (Bennett, Govan, & 
Satterfield, 2015; Pedersen et al., 2014) label any policies, such as conservation 
and eco-tourism, that re-allocate marine space and resources away from their 
initial users and right holders as “ocean grabbing”. 
 
Collaborative governance in fisheries has been shaped by the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management, which is seen as the appropriate approach 
for managing fisheries because it requires a comprehensive management of 
socio-ecological, economic and political aspects. As a result, collaboration 
involves many participants across government tiers, private sectors and non-
government organisations (Imperial, 1999) but does not necessarily solve the 
difficulties of local-level rules (Evans & Klinger, 2008). Biermann et al., (2009, 
p. 17) note that governance regimes in large-scale environments “consist of 
distinct parts that are hardly ever fully interlinked and integrated” which often 
produces low trust and weak collective action. Imperial (1999, p. 456) highlights 
transactional costs related to the increased number of participants, interactions 
and scope of management, and a low level of trust. He classifies the 
transactional costs in managing large-scale environments into information costs 
(such as collecting and managing information), coordination costs (such as 
planning, monitoring and enforcing agreements) and strategic costs (such as 
free riding and rent seeking). As a result, MEAs initiatives are not always able to 
solve ‘institutional misfits’ in local-level environments. 
 
Young (2002b) critiques the assumption that high-level institutions can address 
environmental problems more effectively than local-level institutions. He adds 
that “solving the tragedy of the commons at the local level is fundamentally a 
matter of self-regulation” but, at the high level, “regulation is a two-step 
process” involving law making and law enforcement (Young, 2002, p.152). This 
fact influences ownership, trust and free-riding across jurisdictional levels. A 
lack of participation can lead local people to “engage in a game of ‘cops and 
robbers’ with outside authorities” (Ostrom, 1999b, p. 281). Young (2002:149) 
cautions, “we should be particularly careful to avoid assuming unreflectively” 
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that high-level institutions can solve environmental problems in the same way 
as local institutions. The difficulty associated with regulating and coordinating 
high-level governance regimes has been noted by many scholars (Biermann et 
al., 2009; Raakjaer et al., 2014). Therefore, Najam (2005) rejects the idea of 
improving organizational approaches and highlights the benefits of having 
fragmented governance, that is, multiple governance regimes which, according 
to Biermann et al. (2009), can decrease differential gaps among participants, 
and facilitate progressive agreements.  
 
Mitchell (2003) confirms that many intergovernmental initiatives lack 
ownership and compliance due to the uncertainty and failure of sciences to 
understand the dynamics and uncertainties surrounding the environment. Cash 
et al. (2006) label this phenomenon as ignorance where, for example, the uses  
of science at the national level fail to recognise the contribution of local-level 
actions including indigenous knowledge for global long-term problems. 
Similarly, Berkes (2002) highlights the difficulty of translating science in large 
scale environments into practical and useful local actions. Galaz et al. (2012, p. 
22) add that cross-level “interactions are not well understood scientifically; and 
they are difficult to match or “fit” institutionally due to their multilevel (local–
global) interactions”. As a result, some institutional regimes in marine 
commons strengthen existing inequalities among stakeholders (Cash et al., 
2006, p. 4), leading to domination and lack of support (Young, 2006). Thus, at 
the global level, environmental governance has turned into long-lasting 
negotiating processes, with no meaningful implementation and outputs.  
 
In addition, intergovernmental initiatives, such as MEAs, can diminish 
democratic values, in which power does not derive from the people’s mandate as 
voters in elections (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Ribot, 2002). Ribot (2002, p. v) adds 
that while responsive representatives should have the ability to make decisions 
and take action, accountable representatives should enable users to make 
demands and impose sanctions on those failing to perform. However, 
collaborative initiatives shift the role of the people from “voters” to “co-creators” 
(Glavovic, 2014, p. 357), but often lead the government and non-state actors to 
dominate decision-making (Young, 2002), putting the people as agents, instead 
of principals (May, 2015; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). As the agents, people have 
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to comply with the decisions that are made by those who are not elected; they 
lose their democratic rights as the principals to hold those who exercise the 
power accountable. Fleischman et al. (2014) confirm from their research on 
several of large-scale commons that problems around democratic participation 
and representation in environmental governance has led to resistance from 
fishers. This leads to resource depletion because, as Jentoft (2000) points out, 
fishers see the involvement of other parties as illegitimate. These scholars 
reinforce the findings of other research (Colchester, 2001; Patlis, 2007) that 
concentration of power in high-level institutions has encouraged patronage 
between elites resulting in the abuse of power, exploitation of resources and 
denial of local institutions. 
 
Fleischman et al. (2014) argue that resource sustainability not only depends on 
the level at which power for managing the resources situate, it can also result 
from other factors such as a corruption which can be found across levels. 
Scholars highlight political and economic interests in the natural resource-
based policies of the national government, the demand from global markets for 
natural resources and the roles of civil society in empowering local people; all of 
which influence the sustainability of resources (Fleischman et al., 2014; Ostrom 
et al., 1999; Edwards & Steins, 1999).  This means that intergovernmental 
initiatives, like local institutions, can face difficulties governing commons.  
However, there is a lack of research on the effectiveness of intergovernmental 
initiatives, particularly in managing large-scale marine environments and their 
impact on CFM. 
2.3 Customary Fisheries Management 
Having reviewed the characteristics of marine commons and the challenges of 
governing approaches to fisheries, this section explores the characteristics of 
CFM and how it has been integrated into fisheries management to understand 
whether it can be applied within large-scale marine management regimes. Many 
scholars (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004; Cinner & Aswani, 2007) have studied the 
qualities of CFM that shape its efficacy in managing fundamental challenges of 
marine commons, in particular excludability and subtractability. Aswani (2005) 
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found in the Indo-West Pacific region that CFM is suitable for managing 
fisheries in local communities because of the existence and adaptability of 
property rights-based fisheries management. Cinner et al. (2012) confirm the 
existence and adaptability of CFM’s design principles across the region, which 
shape CFM’s applicability across scales of management and space. The next 
section discusses property rights-based resource management, design principles 
and their adaptability that shape CFM’s applicability.  
2.3.1 Property Rights-based Fisheries in Customary 
Fisheries Management 
The rules of CFM vary among communities (Aswani & Ruddle, 2013, p. 466) but 
generally include control of fish harvesting based on the areas and time, types 
and sizes of fisheries, and types of gear; and allocation and transfers of rights 
according to gender, sex, families, clans and tribes (Aswani, 2005; Cinner, 
Basurto, et al., 2012; Friedlander, 2018). These rules, according to Ruddle 
(1996), have characteristics such as excludability, transferability and security of 
title. This means, as Cinner and Aswani (2007) found in their study of CFM in 
the Indo-West Pacific region, that CFM shares some characteristics of modern 
rights-based resource management.  
 
Harkes and Novaczek (2000, p. 4), in their study of CFM in Indonesia, found 
that the rights-based fisheries rules could be categorised into three institutional 
levels. Firstly, operational rules regulate how fishing is undertaken. Collective 
rules establish decision-making processes regarding operational rules. 
Constitutional rules specify parties and their roles in “decision-making, conflict 
resolution, execution of ceremonies and enforcement”. These multi-level rules 
for fisheries management share similarities with rules outlined by Ostrom 
(1990). 
 
The rules of CFM, however, are not established for conservation goals only; the 
rules are associated with socio-cultural contexts, ethnicity and kinship, 
attachment to local places and cyclical events of local communities (Adrianto & 
Irving Hartoto, 2009; Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Friedlander, Shackeroff, & 
Kittinger, 2013). Pinkerton et al. (2014) found from observing communities in 
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British Colombia that these are some essential components for successful co-
management. Another major difference between CFM and state-based rules in 
regard to marine conservation, as Cinner and Aswani (2007) found in the Indo-
West Pacific region, is that while the former tends to be temporal, the latter 
recognises total closures. CFM is designed to meet the needs of the community 
during certain cycles such as ceremonies, celebrations, crises, and seasons. 
During these times, local people are allowed to harvest the resources. Thus, the 
function of conservation in CFM is not for the fisheries itself, but more for the 
needs of the community in dealing with needs of food, uncertainties and 
difficult seasons. 
 
These attributes of CFM have stimulated many studies and driven efforts to 
integrate CFM with modern property rights-based resource management in 
many countries (Aswani, 2005; Aswani & Hamilton, 2004; Aswani & Ruddle, 
2013; Friedlander, 2018). However, Cinner and Aswani (2007, p. 209) found 
that most efforts failed because of differences in their goals, a lack of 
understanding about fundamental characteristics of CFM and modern practices, 
and differences in application strategies. Cox and Elmqvist (1997) remind us 
that it is important to understand that CFM is different from modern property 
rights-based resource management in undertaking conservation. Equally 
important to understand is the qualities of CFM that explain its applicability in 
managing subtractability and excludability of large-scale marine commons.   
2.3.2 Institutional Design Principles of Customary 
Fisheries Management 
Studies of CFM and its application in the management of large-scale marine 
commons often start with Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principles for 
commons (Berkes, 2005; Cinner, Basurto, et al., 2012; Jones, 2012). These 
design principles have been widely tested and validated (e.g. Cox et al., 2010). 
Ostrom (1990) focused her research on small-scale self-governing community-
based institutions; she does not clarify and distinguish these institutions from 
CFM, but there have been many studies of CFM looking at its design principles.  
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The applicability of CFM to large-scale marine commons is also linked to its 
compatibility with an ecosystem approach to fisheries management (Aswani & 
Ruddle, 2013). This principle is in line with CFM, as Aswani and Ruddle (2013, 
p. 465) claim that CFM treats “territorial domains as being integrated, with 
terrestrial and marine spheres perceived as forming a continuum”. Similarly, 
Berkes et al. (1998) add that local people believe that there are linkages and 
dependencies between various socio-ecological changes across terrestrial and 
marine spheres. The belief shapes CFM rules such as access and withdrawal of 
resources; the decision to open or close access to fisheries, for example, is 
adjusted to the harvests of terrestrial farms. Aswani and Ruddle (2013, p. 465) 
conclude “all these are core management practices in [ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management] plans”. This suggests that CFM can be applied in large-
scale marine environments.  
 
The applicability of CFM to large-scale marine environments can be examined 
in the fishing activities of migratory fishers, also known as nomadic fishers, in 
many Indo-West Pacific countries (Clifton, 2012; Stacey et al., 2008). These 
fishers possess accumulated traditional ecological knowledge about the 
characteristics of marine environment and fisheries across boundaries, shaping 
their continuous migration and access to fisheries across marine areas and 
countries (Campbell et al., 2013; Clifton, 2012). Aswani and Ruddle (2013) 
confirm from their study in the Asia-Pacific region that CFM recognises 
ecological linkages that strengthen Ostrom’s (1990) nested system principle and 
facilitate implementation of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management.  
 
Despite the claims about the usefulness of CFM for managing large-scale marine 
resources, some researchers highlight difficulties implementing Ostrom’s (1990) 
institutional design principles for managing common pool resources. Berkes 
(2005) highlights the difficulty of traditional ecological knowledge to deal with 
certain fisheries issues such as a stock assessment of migratory fisheries. Jones 
(2012) argues that the dynamics of marine commons pose difficulties 
establishing Ostrom’s (1990) principles of ‘congruence between appropriation 
and provision of rules and local conditions’. It is also difficult to define and 
enforce property rights beyond the local level to include communities with 
different practices of CFM (Brown, 2003a; Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Folke et al., 
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2007; Musole, 2009; Soliman, 2014). Thus, principles of ‘proportional 
equivalence between benefits and costs’, ‘clearly defined boundaries areas and 
resource users’, ‘graduated sanctions’ and ‘accountability of rule monitoring and 
compliance’, cannot be achieved in the case of large-scale marine commons. 
This suggests that only some of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for commons 
are applicable for managing large-scale marine commons.  
 
The key challenge in managing large scale commons is in applying the design 
principles without diminishing collective action. Cinner et al. (2012) provide an 
interesting argument about the capacity of CFM in Indonesia to undertake 
institutional change. In their research examining the applicability of the design 
principles to numerous customary fisheries, they found that fishers lacked 
institutional linkages to organisations at the level of large-scale commons, but 
they had “flexibility and autonomy” which indicates that they nevertheless 
possess adaptive capacity to undertake institutional change and adjustment to 
large-scale commons (2012, p. 1). This suggests that although the principles 
were designed from small-scale commons, they can be adjusted to large-scale 
ones. However, they do not see how flexibility can work at large scales without 
losing the autonomy of local communities.  
2.3.3 Adaptability of Customary Fisheries Management 
Some critics of CFM have focused on its lack of adaptive capacity to cope with 
continuous changes in socio-ecological factors (Aswani, 2002; Kenneth et al., 
1992). Changes in CFM, like other types of informal institutions, are gradual 
within a long period, different from those of formal institutions which can 
change in the short time (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). In his study about 
institutions in fisheries and their change, Jentoft (2004, p. 141) argues:  
Institutions often change incrementally rather than through a grand 
design… Fisheries management systems may well follow this pattern 
[change incrementally]. They develop gradually, one step at a time. 
 
Customary fisheries management is criticised for its inadaptability with modern 
rights-based resource management in undertaking conservation. The 
arrangement of property rights in CFM, for example, as Berkes (2004 & 2005) 
states, focuses on maintaining continuous productivity of fisheries to meet 
 39 
fishers’ need for food. Customary fisheries management recognises temporary 
closure of access to fisheries but not a total closure for conservation, as 
highlighted in the public property regime (see, for example, Cinner & Aswani, 
2007). However, scholars (Berkes, 2006; Cinner, 2005) claim that emerging 
challenges have encouraged local fishers change their practices. Berkes (2006) 
points out that local fishers often have difficulties maintaining productivity due 
to problems such as increasing harvests by outside fishers. Cinner (2005) 
argues that local fishers continually adapt CFM to protect fisheries from outside 
users and manage conflicts between fishers. For example, local fishers adopted 
property-rights based fisheries management, such as transferability to share 
fisheries with their neighbouring communities. In Aceh, Indonesia, Quimby 
(2015) highlights the existence of unarticulated practices to share fisheries in 
open access marine areas among neighbouring communities to deal with 
decreasing fisheries and to avoid conflicts. This strategy builds ownership of 
fisheries across fishing communities. 
 
Increasing challenges to CFM, according to Berkes (2006), do not reduce the 
ability of CFM to manage the dynamics of marine environments. Harkes and 
Novaczek (2000) found that changes and the decline of CFM do not 
unnecessarily lead to ineffective CFM. They claim that, in some communities, 
rules are dynamically adapted in cooperation with higher-level organisations, 
such as churches, in order to revive them. However, in undertaking an 
adaptation, Cinner and Aswani (2007) caution against codifying unwritten rules 
into laws, as Hviding (1998) found that in some countries that codification of 
CFM diminishes its adaptive capacity.  
 
Cinner et al. (2012) confirmed Harkes and Novaczek’s (2000) finding about the 
existence of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles in CFM within the Indo-West 
Pacific region. Scholars argue that CFM in the region “facilitates rapid adaptive 
response to changes in ecological or social conditions” (Cinner, 2005, p. 2) and 
develops capacities to manage and mitigate conflicts, in order to “ensure 
community harmony and continuity” (Aswani & Ruddle, 2013, p. 464). These 
capacities reflect the requirements for resilient and robust governance. Aswani 
and Ruddle (2013, p. 464) add that although CFM “is context-dependent and 
vulnerable to endogenous and exogenous transformations, in principle it can 
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both sustain biological resources and be successfully adapted to modern 
fisheries management”. 
 
There are several challenges to the effective implementation of CFM in 
managing large-scale marine commons, but some studies indicate CFM 
potential. Berkes (2004, 2005), for example, argues that CFM focuses more on 
serving social-cultural values than on conserving fisheries, but Cinner and 
Aswani (2007) found that CFM possesses characteristics of modern rights-
based resource management, enabling its integration and co-existence with 
modern rights-based resource management. Some scholars (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; North, 1990) highlight that changes to informal institutions, including re-
introduction of customary rules that have declined after a long period of denial, 
require a long time to be effective. Furthermore, the fact that CFM is locally 
based complicates its adaptation and re-implementation in large-scale marine 
commons where there are multiple and conflicting fisheries practices across 
small fishing communities (Novaczek, 2000; Cinner, 2005; Berkes, 2006). 
These suggest that the effectiveness of CFM implementation may not be 
observable in the short run and CFM requires a long period of support from the 
government to deal with external challenges. 
2.4 Towards a Framework for Using CFM in Marine 
Common Management 
The literature identifies the characteristics of marine commons and their 
governing challenges (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 2005, 2006), particularly the 
challenges for CFM in managing them (Aswani, 2005; Cinner & Aswani, 2007; 
Cinner, Daw, et al., 2012). Marine commons, particularly large-scale marine 
environments, are more complex and dynamic than local commons because of 
their interconnection and the migratory nature of the resources (Berkes, 2006). 
These characteristics of marine commons pose difficulties for CFM. However, 
studies about the applicability and adaptability of CFM have mainly focused on 
small-scale marine commons (Cinner, 2005; Harkes & Novaczek, 2000). Yet, 
scholars are divided about their effectiveness in managing the commons at the 
local level (Armitage, 2008; Berkes, 2006; Jones, 2012).  
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At the regional and international levels, intergovernmental initiatives to manage 
large-scale marine commons have produced mixed results. However, the 
purposes of collaboration can vary across stakeholders. Many collaborative 
initiatives have been criticised for problems such as lack of compliance and 
effectiveness at both local and global levels (Cash et al., 2006; Mitchell, 2003). 
Some studies have looked at the integration of CFM with formal fisheries 
management at the national level. However, Cinner and Aswani (2007) argue 
that only a few efforts successfully integrate them due to a lack of understanding 
about fundamental differences between CFM and modern practices, and 
differences in the purposes and application methods of integration. More 
importantly, there appears to be no research examining the incorporation of 
CFM within the MEAs for marine resources. Scholars recommend an 
integration of local practices with formal rules, but only a few design principles 
of common pool resources are applicable and there has been no successful effort 
to integrate them at large-scale marine commons (Fidelman et al., 2012; Baker 
et al., 2013). 
 
A gap that exists in the literature relates to a lack of research examining the 
characteristics of CFM, including both its property rights-based management 
and its design principles, to understand their conceptual underpinnings and 
applicability in large-scale marine environments. Existing studies have only 
looked at one of these elements without combining them. Thus, the studies do 
not provide a strong case to integrate CFM with fisheries management and 
apply CFM to large-scale marine commons. 
 
The role of government at all tiers that shapes CFM is another gap in the 
literature. Most studies focused on CFM practices that are still active along with 
formal fisheries management. No study has been undertaken to understand the 
efficacy of CFM that has been in abeyance after a long period of marginalisation 
by the national government. Similarly, the literature reviewed here does not 
address tensions among government tiers that impact on the application of 
CFM as a result of changes to the level of government at which fisheries are 
managed. This approach excludes some government tiers from fisheries 
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management. These are challenges brought by MEAs that have not been 
addressed in previous studies about CFM. 
2.5 Principles for Applying CFM to a Large Marine 
Common 
This review identifies challenges to managing marine commons related to its 
characteristics, particularly property rights-based resource management and 
design principles, and governing approaches in both small and large-scale 
environments. Many empirical studies confirm the existence but also the 
absence of these characteristics in CFM across many communities in the Indo-
West Pacific countries (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004; Cinner & Aswani, 2007).  
 
Various studies have explored the nature of common pool resources and 
challenges for governing them, particularly excludability and subtractability 
(Hardin, 1968; Berkes 2005; Acheson, 2006). These challenges are greater in 
large-scale marine commons because of the complex and dynamic nature of 
fisheries and marine environments. Challenges such as institutional misfits, 
cross-scale linkages and external drives require multiple management regimes 
and stakeholders across, administrative spatial and temporal scales (Berkes, 
2005; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006).   
 
Thus, some scholars have tried to integrate management regimes, particularly 
CFM with formal management regimes in order to minimise conflicts and 
maximise their effectiveness (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004; Cinner & Aswani, 
2007). Some studies explore the challenges of institutional scales that hinder 
their integration and collaboration. Other scholars (Ostrom, 1990; Cox et al., 
2010, Trimble et al., 2015)  have tested and validated design principles of local 
rules for managing natural resources, including fisheries, which can guide the 
integration. However, most studies focus on small-scale marine environments. 
There has been no research undertaken to identify their existence and 
compatibility in large-scale marine commons in the developing country 
contexts, particularly under MEAs in countries that have devolved fisheries 
management to sub-national government.  
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Having critically reviewed the literature, successful efforts to examine how CFM 
can be applied in the management of large-scale marine management regimes 
need to: 
1) Understand the fundamental characteristics and differences of both 
regimes, 
2) Clarify the intention, its impacts and the mechanism to address them, 
3) Address conflicts arising from changes to the scale of regimes,  
4) Focus on the long-term commitment to empower customary communities 
to strengthen their self-governing capacity. 
 
This thesis therefore focuses on how CFM has been recognised in the CTI, 
which, as noted in Chapter 1, is a recent MEA, established to manage a large-
scale marine environment in the Indo-West Pacific. The following chapter sets 





Chapter 3 Research Design and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the characteristics of customary fisheries 
management (CFM) for marine management in general, and for large-scale 
marine management regimes. This chapter describes means to assess how CFM 
is applied in large-scale marine management regimes in developing countries. 
Firstly, it considers the rationale for selecting qualitative case study research 
and reviews the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. It 
then outlines the reason for selecting Rote Island, Indonesia as a case study, and 
presents the IAD conceptual framework before data collection and analysis 
methods are outlined. Research ethics are outlined, followed by a summary of 
this chapter. 
3.2 Qualitative Case Study Research 
To understand how developing countries apply CFM in MEAs, this study 
examines the institutional characteristics of CFM within its social-ecological 
contexts, and its applicability to fisheries management in large-scale marine 
environments. A challenge to applying CFM to large-scale environments is the 
uniqueness of CFM in different local communities in different countries. 
Therefore, this study uses a qualitative research design to understand its 
uniqueness and produce rich examination within its contexts (Creswell, 2014; 
Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). This approach, as O’Leary (2014, p. 130) 
argues, allows researchers to use various research design strategies, adjust to 
the contexts and examine phenomena in their natural setting to allow “an 
intimate understanding of people, places, cultures, and situations”. 
 
This study adopted a case study approach because, as O’Leary (2014)  argues, it 
enables an understanding of the complexity and particularity of CFM. In 
addition, following Yin (2014), this study meets the requirements to use a case 
study research because: “(1) the main research questions are “how” or “why” 
questions; (2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioural events; and 
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(3) the focus of study is on a contemporary (as opposed to the entirely 
historical) phenomenon” (Yin, 2014, p. 2). 
 
This study focuses on gathering information “held by the few rather than the 
many” (O’Leary, 2014, p.181). O’Leary’s view is challenged by Gerring (2004), 
who argues that the size of a case can shape the trade-off between comparability 
and representativeness. A single case study allows comparability, but it lacks 
representativeness, while multiple cases can improve representativeness, but 
they lack comparability. Yin (2014) shares this argument and suggests 
undertaking a comparative (cross-case) analysis involving many cases or a case 
at several levels. This study does not involve multiple cases in many contexts, 
but it does focus on the applicability of CFM in a MEA across jurisdictional 
levels. 
 
The analysis of a phenomenon across different layers in a case enables 
researchers to assess the case while understanding different contextual factors 
influencing the phenomenon (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Dyer Jr and Wilkins (1991) 
argue that many classic studies that have advanced knowledge in various fields 
of the social sciences used a single case study. In response to critiques of a single 
case study, such as by Eisenhardt (1989) who advocated for multiple case 
studies, Dyer Jr and Wilkins (1991) highlight the trade-off between having a 
comparative understanding and the deep insights of social contexts. This 
suggests that the more contexts involved, the less deep the contextual insight 
covered. Researchers focus on what is common across cases leading to 
favouritism to highlight general constructs over contextual ones. As a result, 
they added that there would be a gap in understanding the uniqueness of a case 
from the inside because researchers only possessed thin description, instead of 
deep contextual dynamics, insufficient to draw generalisation across cases. 
These are some reasons for not using multiple comparative case studies. 
 
In the case study approach, researchers do not interfere with the phenomenon, 
but build close relationships to develop a deep understanding of the uniqueness 
of the case. This principle contrasts with other research approaches such as 
surveys and experiments in which results from representative samples of the 
population are generalised to the whole population. Therefore, the findings of 
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this research about implementing CFM in the new regime for managing the CTI 
are context-specific and thus generalisation should consider contextuality. 
3.3 Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework 
By their very nature, local CFM regimes exist within layers of regional, national, 
and supranational government regimes.  Ostrom’s (2010, p. 1) institutional 
analysis and development (IAD) framework provides a “general language for 
analysing … behaviour in diverse situations at multiple levels of analysis and 
concerns analyses of how rules… affect the structure of action arenas, the 
incentives that individual faces and the resulting outcomes”. The framework, as 
Imperial (1999) claims, covers a broad understanding of institutions and 
policies, but  also considers contextual factors such as biological and socio-
economic issues, and recognises a variety of transaction costs, such as 
information, coordination and resource structure. The institutions include 
public policies and customary rules and practices. This section examines the 
IAD framework to build a framework to guide this research. 
3.3.1 Components of the IAD Framework 
The IAD framework comprises several inter-linked variables. Ostrom (2011) 
divides the IAD framework into seven variables: biophysical conditions,  
attributes of community, rules-in-use, action situation, interaction, outcomes 
and evaluative criteria (Figure 3.1). The first three elements are external 
influencing the other variables, as discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The IAD framework 
Source:  Ostrom (2011, p. 10)  
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Biophysical conditions refer to the environment, resources, and geographical 
characteristics influencing other attributes (Ostrom, 2005). Rules-in-use, or 
institutions, refers to existing norms, rules and practices, both formal and 
informal, that shape resource users’ behaviours regarding the resources 
(Ostrom, 1990). Attributes of the community refer to socio-cultural features of 
the community such as age, livelihood activities and ethnicity.  
 
The action situation in the IAD framework refers to the socio-cultural, political-
economic and physical contexts, within which various actors/organisations with 
diverse goals, resources, and responsibilities interact and influence one another 
to solve collective action problems (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2011). McGinnis 
(2011, p. 172) claims that the action situation is “the black box where policy 
choices are made”. The structure of an action situation, according to Ostrom 
(2005), comprises seven variables: actors are the participants assigned 
positions to take assigned actions throughout different stages of processes; 
information about the intended outcomes is acquired and used to control costs 
and benefits of their actions and outcomes.  
 
Ostrom (2011) specifies seven rules-in-use which shape these variables, and the 
action situation can be conceptualised according to these interaction rules. 
Boundary rules define participants who occupy certain positions (such as 
fishers or coordinators) as set by position rules, with some rights and 
responsibilities according to choice rules. The participants exercise control as 
set in aggregation rules (e.g. their own initiatives vs. external impositions) over 
various decisions, as outlined in the scope rules. The decisions are made 
according to mechanisms set by choice rules to take certain actions based on 
certain information provided through information rules. The actions lead to 
expected outcomes (such as fisheries improvement or degradation), as set out in 
the scope rules, taking into consideration and influenced by costs and benefits 
as outlined by payoff rules (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Rules influencing variables of an action situation  
Source: Ostrom (2011, p. 20) 
 
Some of these interaction rules share similarities with Ostrom’s (1990) 
institutional design principles, by which she argues for local-level rules for 
managing natural resources because of their effectiveness in managing natural 
resources (see Figure 3.3). Payoff and cost-benefit are directly comparable 
because they exist in both the interaction rules and design principles (see 
arrows in solid print), suggesting that CFM supports an Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries Management (EAFM) involving many communities at large-scale 
environments. However, some other design principles, such as ‘graduated 
sanctions’ and ‘conflict resolution’ are missing in the interaction rules, while the 
others such as ‘accountability’ and ‘nested enterprise’ are not clearly defined in 














Figure 3.3:Comparing and contrasting the interaction rules with institutional 
design principles 
…………..: Indirectly comparable 
______: Directly comparable 
 
Source: Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom (2011) 
 
Ostrom (1990; 2011) does not specifically define and identify the patterns of 
institutional interaction. However, Young (2006, p. 2) defines institutional 
interaction as an “interplay between or among regimes located at higher and 
lower levels on the jurisdictional scale”. The regimes can be situated across 
levels from the global, national, provincial, district and community levels.  
Young (2006) adds that the interaction can involve regimes at all levels or a few 
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levels and result in different patterns, such as dominance, negotiated agreement 
and system changes. 
 
The patterns of institutional interactions change across temporal scales due to 
various factors (Young, 2006). These changes, according to Ostrom (1999a), 
relate to a fact that the participants are rational when they decide, but there is a 
limit to the information and resources available for them to decide.  Therefore, 
changes in the patterns of interaction reflect the continuous learning process, 
which Young (20016, p.9) labels as cognitive transitions. Young (2006) 
highlights other factors such as changes in formal power distribution, dynamics 
of decentralisation and competing discourses of management regimes. The 
adoption of an ecosystem-approach to fisheries management is an example of 
the duelling discourse. Finally, blocking coalitions, such as an association of 
sub-national governments, from changing the national government 
management regimes also influences patterns of interaction (Young, 2006).  
 
These interactions shape the overall outcomes, such as improvement or 
depletion of resources and evaluation criteria (Ostrom, 2011). There are no 
particular criteria for evaluating natural resource management; scholars use 
various criteria, such as efficiency and effectiveness, depending on the problems 
and goals of an evaluation. However, the IAD framework highlights 
transactional costs related to organisational interactions.   
3.3.2 Analysis Level of the IAD Framework 
The IAD framework incorporates a multi-level institutional analysis (see Figure 
3.4 below), comprising constitutional, collective choice and operational levels 
(Ostrom, 1990 and McGinnis, 2011). In this arrangement, higher levels define 
the lower levels, and the latter have to give effect to the former. The 
constitutional level refers to governing structures and processes, including who 
are the participants in the decision-making body and how to change the lower 
levels of rules. An example of this level is a policy for designing and changing a 
constitution.  The collective-choice level relates to implementing decisions and 
how to change a lower level of rules. Examples of this level include formal 
settings, such as legislatures, regulatory agencies and courts to devise and 
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implement a policy, and informal arenas such as annual gatherings and private 
associations. The operational level relates to daily operational rules such as 
types of fish that are allowed or prohibited to be caught. Examples of this level 




Figure 3.4: Level of institutional analysis 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (1990) 
3.3.3 Uses and Criticisms of the IAD Framework 
The multilevel structure of the IAD framework allows causal relationships 
between various socio-ecological factors and their interactions and outcomes to 
be identified. Ostrom (2011) adds that interdependent relationships enable 
better understandings of various actors and organisations with different goals 
and behaviours. Similarly, according to Koontz (2005), the framework enables 
examination and comparison of individuals’ preferences and political actions 
across jurisdictions. However, Koontz (2005) points out that the framework 
excludes roles and changes in political choices and individual acts, due to 
factors such as learning, deliberative discourse and rational decision making, 
which shape an action situation over a certain period. Therefore, Clement 
(2009) proposes adding another two external variables: politico-economic 
context and discourses. 
 
The IAD framework has been applied and tested by scholars in various 
empirical studies, including fisheries. Beitl (2011, p. 507) found that certain 
common property arrangements “can promote sustainable resource use on a 
local level, while also identifying certain vulnerabilities”. Rudd (2004, p. 121) 
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studied the establishment of institutional design and monitoring for an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management and confirmed that the 
framework is “well-suited for designing and monitoring policy experiments 
because of its multilevel causal linkages and flexibility”. Similarly, Imperial 
(1999, p. 261), who used the IAD framework to investigate ecosystem-based 
management, argues that “the focus of the IAD framework on rules and 
behavioural norms is also appropriate since many ecosystem-based 
management programmes focus on changing rule structures and the behaviours 
of people”. Mulazzani et al. (2013) found that the framework provides for  
causal interactions between fisheries, fishing activities and markets in reviewing 
multi-level marine governance in several European countries.  
 
However, the IAD framework does not provide guidance to assess the 
conditions under which institutions operate. The framework establishes a lens 
to disentangle and examine the characteristics of institutions that shape actions 
and interactions to solve collective action problems (Ostrom, 2011). Thus, the 
framework does not emphasise individual efforts to learn, interact, and shape 
the interactions. For example, Heikkila and Andersson (2018) add: 
The IAD has not effectively diagnosed how political ‘agents’, or those 
people in operational choice situations, relate to the ‘principals’ they 
are representing (for example, often people in collective choice or 
constitutional choice situations). 
 
Regarding natural resource management, the IAD framework does not specify 
particular institutional arrangements to enable the application of local people’s 
voices. The use of the framework to examine how CFM is applied in large-scale 
marine environments appears not to have been studied. Most studies on the 
application of CFM in fisheries management focus on small-scale marine 
environments. In addition, as Clement (2009) suggests, there has been no study 
using the IAD framework to identify institutional interactions and institutional 
changes of fisheries management within large-scale marine management, 
particularly in developing countries. 
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3.4 Case Selection 
Yin (2009, p. 18) argues that a case includes anything that represents a 
“contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context”. In 
Runeson and Host’s (2008, p. 140) opinion, a case should have clear boundaries 
such as “typical, critical, revelatory or unique in some respect”. These 
characteristics facilitate researchers in selecting, classifying, comparing and 
contrasting cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Other guidelines to select cases include 
variation in the information of the cases, accessibility in both spatial and 
temporal scales and availability of information in the case (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Silverman, 2004).  
 
The Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area (MPA) in Nusa Tenggara Timur province 
(see Figure 3.5), the empirical focus for this study of how the Indonesian 
government applies CFM as practised by fishers on Rote Island, was established 
in 2014 in response to the establishment of the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) in 
2009. The case is contemporary with clear spatial and temporal boundaries. 
The CTI is the largest and the first MEA involving developing countries in the 
Indo-West Pacific region, where local communities have practised CFM for 
generations.   
 
 
Figure 3.5: Map showing Indonesia within the CTI. Insert shows Rote Island 
Source: Von Heland et al. (2014, p. 54). 
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Besides establishing MPAs, the CTI aims to adopt an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management. This approach shifts fisheries management from 
jurisdictional-based to ecosystem-based arrangements at regional and national 
levels (Pomeroy et al. 2015). This goal challenges the structure of fisheries 
management that the national government had decentralised to the district 
government in 1999 and to CFM on Rote Island. 
 
Rote Island fishers and Rote Ndao sub-national government had never initiated 
or managed large-scale MPAs before. The national government has restricted 
fishing methods and protected endangered species, but there is no limit in 
accessing marine areas in Rote Island. Most fishing activities of local fishers are 
at a small scale, but increased support for customary fishers at both the 
provincial and district level since the 2000s has improved their livelihoods and 
increased the importance of fisheries and marine resources. Thus, how the 
Indonesian government applies CFM in the Sawu Sea MPA influences the 
livelihoods of small-scale fishers as well as influencing the roles of both the 
provincial and district governments’ in addressing the impacts of the Sawu Sea 
MPA on the customary fishers.  
 
Oelua village (see Figure 3.5) on Rote Island is one of six villages where the 
national government re-established hohorok. The village is one of the main 
fishing communities on Rote Island with unique practices of CFM practices 
arising from the heterogeneity of customary fishers, both indigenous and non-
indigenous. As of 2017, up to a quarter of fishers living in Oelua were non-
indigenous fishers who had lived there for a long time and had strong inherited 
marine-based knowledge upon which they relied on for their livelihoods 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2018e; Carnegie, 2008). 
 
In addition, fishing communities in Oelua and on Rote Island had experienced 
various marine environmental problems, such as depleted resources from cross-
boundary pollution and illegal fishing practices by both local and outside fishers 
(Amnifu, 2016; Fox & Sen, 2002; Prihandono & Dewanty, 2015). These facts 
influence not only the need to establish MPAs but also pose challenges for 
applying CFM in the village. 
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The selection of the case is also influenced by my previous work. I was an official 
at the Development Planning Agency of Rote Ndao district between 2009 and 
2014 when the national government undertook the preparation for establishing 
the Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area (MPA). The agency is responsible for, 
among other things, reviewing budget proposals from line departments. I 
oversaw several departments, including the Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department, through which I learned that Rote Island fishers had complained 
about increased illegal fishing activities by outside fishers around the island. As 
a response, I had supported the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department 
collaboration with law enforcers to patrol the areas and act against illegal 
fishers. However, due to a lack of resources, it was difficult to prevent illegal 
fishers. Thus, when the department became involved in the establishment of the 
Sawu Sea MPA, I recognised the national government’s efforts to strengthen law 
enforcement through the MPA.  
3.5 IAD Framework for CFM Applicability 
This study uses the IAD framework to analyse the applicability of CFM in large-
scale marine management. However, it does not use all components of the IAD 
framework and it focuses on the operational level because as Ostrom (2005) 
points out, a comprehensive analysis of all components would be a formidable 
challenge. Rather, the focus of this study is on the interaction rules (Table 3.1) 
because these rules influence institutional interaction and CFM applicability. 
This study does not examine outcomes of fisheries management interaction. 
Therefore, engaging with critiques of the IAD framework, such as its elements 









Table 3.1: Rules, indicators and criteria for assessing CFM’s interaction with other 
regimes in managing large-scale marine resources  
Interaction 
rules 





Representatives and customary 
fishers play significant roles 
Coordinator, secretary 
and member  
Boundary  Selection of 
representatives 




Choice  Power  Management bodies possess 
significant power to make 
decisions and take actions. 
 
Customary fishers have 
autonomy to manage marine 
areas. 
 
Rule-making, change and 
modification involve customary 
fishers 
 
The government at all tiers 
should not undermine local 
authority and communities 
Power to recruit staff 








agreements and considers 
customary rules and practices 
considered.  
Command, negotiation 





Accessible and updated 
information for customary fishers  
 
Participatory provision of 
information about the officials’ 
performance 
Provision of accessible 
reports, bulletins, etc. to 






Provision of sufficient resources 
to support the management 
bodies in pursuing their goals.   
 
Proportional equivalence 
between benefits and costs. 






Power to manage inter-dependent 
socio-ecological aspects.  
 
Customary fishers have 
representatives across 
government tiers to influence 
decision-making;  
 
High-level management bodies 
strengthen the capacity of the 
community to deal with external 
problems. 
Board members made 





Geographical-based power across 
tiers of government. 
 
Rules suitable to local ecological 
conditions and clearly identified 
individuals or households to 
access resources 
Management bodies 
have authority across 
inter-related 
jurisdictions 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom and Crawford (2005) and Ostrom (1990) 
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Together with Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principles, various concepts 
related to participatory and collaborative natural resource management will 
guide the analysis of how CFM is applied. The concepts include common pool 
resources (Berkes 2005, 2006), a property rights-based resource management 
(Bromley, 1987; Aswani, 2006; Soliman, 2014), accountability and 
representation (Ribot, 2002), collaborative management (Berkes, 2006, 2010; 
Eppel, 2013) and collective action (Marshall, 1998), an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management (Pomeroy et al., 2015), rights-based fisheries 
management (Scott, 1999) , institutional misfits (Berkes, 2006), institutional 
interaction (Young, 2002b), scalar complexity and linkages (Berkes, 2006; 
Lemos & Agrawal, 2006)   and transactional costs (Imperial, 1999). 
3.6 Data Collection Methods 
Through public documents, semi-structured interviews, and media news, data 
relating to the interaction rules of the IAD framework were obtained about how 
CFM is recognised and applied by the Indonesian government. Emphasising a 
plurality of sources of information, known as triangulation, provides 
comprehensive data, helps in finding gaps and overlaps, reduces information 
biases and increases the validity of the study (Miles et al., 2014). Each of these 
methods is discussed below. 
3.6.1 Public Documents 
Public documents include laws, policies, plans and reports published by 
organisations relating to the CTI and Sawu Sea MPA such as the national, 
provincial and district governments, international and local NGOs, local 
communities, universities and research institutions (Table 3.2). These various 
sources of documents provided rich information about fisheries management.  
 
These documents were relatively readily accessible. Most government 
documents are available on the Internet. Some documents produced by the 
provincial and district governments, and local communities are not accessible 
online, but they are available on request. However, I had personal access to 
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many of these documents before undertaking fieldwork. Almost all newspaper 
articles are available on the Internet. 
 
The variety in the documents also enabled me to identify differences, overlaps, 
and gaps among laws and regulations across sectors and jurisdictions. This 
provided a better understanding of the institutional factors that shape fisheries 
management. Document analysis provided information on compatibility and 
incompatibility between formal and informal regulation and practices, which 
explain the applicability of CFM in the CTI. I identified their contents about 
CFM, their objectives and strategies, processes of development and the roles of 
local people and sources of funds. This strategy helped me to understand the 
contexts that shaped these documents. 
 
Table 3.2: Source of documents  
Level  Documents Purposes  
National • National laws and policies, 
and evaluation reports  
• Policies and reports on the 
Sawu Sea MPA 
• Reports on its advocating 
activities 
• National newspapers 
To identify recent institutional 
changes and challenges to 
fisheries management relating to 
efforts to support the CTI and 
customary fishers 
Provincial • Planning documents and 
reports on the Sawu Sea 
MPA 
To review institutional changes 
and challenges to fisheries 
management relating to efforts to 
establish the Sawu Sea MPA and 
support for customary fishers 
• Advocating policies, plans 
and reports 
• Provincial newspapers 
District • Panning documents and 
reports on the Sawu Sea 
MPA  
• Advocating policies, plans 
and reports 
To analyse the district 
government’s efforts to support 
the management of the Sawu Sea 
MPA and to support customary 
communities in fisheries 
management 
Community • Development planning and 
regulations  
• Hohorok rules 
To examine hohorok practices 
prior the establishment of the 
Sawu Sea MPA and challenges to 
the applicability of hohorok 
3.6.2 Media Reports 
Data about how CFM is applied according to the interaction rules of the IAD 
framework were made available by the media that reported comments and 
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opinions of officials and covered events to CFM. The media include both 
national and local printed and online daily newspapers and monthly magazines. 
The news media at the national level include Kompas, the Jakarta Post and 
Tempo, and at the provincial level include Pos Kupang and Timor Express. 
These different levels of news media provided a wide range of topics that 
complemented one another.  
 
Data from newspapers enrich information about CFM because they provide 
everyday and updated stories such as events, involving organisations and 
officials based on both the reporters’ views and direct quotes from the officials. 
In most cases, several newspapers covered the same topic, which enriched 
knowledge about the topic and enabled me to compare and contrast the 
information across newspapers. I also sought information from public 
documents to support information provided by the newspapers. This helped me 
to avoid bias that might occur from relying only on particular newspapers.  
3.6.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
During a field trip to Indonesia in mid-2017, I undertook twenty-five interviews 
with key decision-makers, researchers, professionals and customary figures and 
fishers at all tiers of government, and with independent researchers (see 
Appendix 1). I visited Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, to interview 
government officials at the national level, NGO officials who had been involved 
in the establishment of the CTI and independent researchers who have interests 
in legislation and have done studies related to CFM. I also visited Kupang, the 
capital city of NTT province, to interview government and NGO officials, 
particularly members of the Provincial Conservation Forum. On Rote Island, I 
interviewed members of the District Conservation Forum, customary figures 
and fishers in Oelua, Lalukoen, and Oetefu Villages and on Ndao Island. I did 
the main interviews in Indonesia, while I undertook additional interviews using 
electronic mail, social media (especially Facebook) and phone calls after I 
returned to New Zealand.  
 
The goal of the interviews was to seek information that was not available 
through documents, and to confirm information across sources. The selection of 
 60 
participants was based on the following criteria: knowledge of CFM; 
involvement in the development of the CTI and Sawu Sea MPA; roles and 
interests in the development of the CTI and Sawu Sea MPA. While most of the 
interviewee selection was based on my knowledge of key stakeholders in 
fisheries management across government tiers and in the community, some 
interviewees were chosen based on information from previous interviewees or 
based on snowball sampling.  
 
The number of interviews reflected the need to ensure comprehensive coverage 
of the case by providing a broad range of insights about customary fisheries 
management practices both in freshwater and marine environments. Therefore, 
data collection was undertaken across government tiers involving government 
officials, NGO workers, independent researchers, customary leaders and fishers. 
At the community level, data collection was undertaken in four villages, instead 
of one as I initially planned, where hohorok was revived and reapplied. When 
data ‘saturation’ was reached no further interviews were undertaken. 
 
The interview questions focused on gathering data on participants’ roles, 
knowledge and views in relation to fisheries management at different tiers of 
government, about CFM on Rote Island and in the Sawu Sea MPA.  The 
questions were developed using the IAD framework outlined in Chapter 3 (see 
Appendix 2 for a copy of the interview schedule.) The interviews enabled me to 
obtain opinions, experiences and knowledge not available in official documents, 
and which are only available to a limited degree in media reports. I focused on 
seeking additional information and confirming information provided by 
previous sources. This strategy helped me to undertake triangulation without 
wasting my time and failing to collect necessary data. 
 
There were several challenges I encountered during data collection. Before 
undertaking the fieldwork, I identified potential participants in government 
organisations, non-government organisations, customary figures, and 
customary fishers. The fieldwork involved all the targeted participants. 
However, while I interviewed all of them, some of them only allowed a limited 
time for interviews.  Some participants from key provincial and district 
governments, who were involved in the early stages of the establishment of the 
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Sawu Sea MPA, had assumed different jobs before the interviews. These officials 
were not available for interviews because they felt they had not been in their 
positions for sufficient time to understand the topic.   
 
Following the interviews, I transcribed the recordings both in Bahasa 
Indonesian and Rote, and then I translated them into English. This choice of 
language enabled me to protect the ideas and arguments in their original 
language and facilitate comparison with the report in English. The translation 
into Bahasa Indonesian helped me to recall certain expressions and intentions 
of the participants in the language I used during the interviews. I did not find 
much difficulty in translating the transcriptions. Therefore, the risk of reduced 
or changed meanings of data from the translation was minimal, particularly 
after two participants, who speak English, were available to review the 
translation of transcripts I made from Bahasa Indonesia into English  
3.6.4 Fieldwork Reflexivity 
Reflexivity was undertaken in relation to the interviews I undertook because my 
cultural identity and working experience influenced my communication 
approach, knowledge and views of local contexts. As a Rotenese who shares 
many cultural attributes with other Timorese, I did not see myself as an outsider 
to local contexts. I speak local languages and understand local culture. I had 
worked in the provincial and district government between 1996-2009, and so 
was familiar with the sub-national government contexts. I gleaned information 
about the CTI, the Sawu Sea MPA and the involved organisations and officials 
through the media and research-based websites.  
 
Established knowledge of local contexts helped me to secure contacts with some 
participants at the national and provincial levels prior to undertaking fieldwork. 
At the district and community levels, I benefited from my personal knowledge 
as a Rotenese about CFM practices, from my professional work on Rote between 
2009 and 2014, and from my involvement in research on fisheries and poverty 
in 2013. I established relationships with some interviewees through various 
media such as social media before and during this fieldwork.  
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In practice, I found that my personal networks worked not only more efficiently 
than a formal procedure but also increased my confidence in getting access to 
the participants and building trust, so they shared information with me. 
However, the flexibility I applied in approaching interviewees was another key 
to the access. In two interviews, I had to travel with participants in their cars so 
that I could interview them as they journeyed to work, meaning that being an 
insider did not make data collection easy; they did not allocate particular time 
for my interview because my position did not influence them. 
 
I adjusted the interviews according to the preferences of the participants. In 
most interviews, I met the participants at a place of their choice. All 
interviewees welcomed and allowed me to interview them. However, I found 
that interviews in places other than workplaces were more relaxing. The 
interviewees did not highlight a time limit for the interviews. I learned that 
interviews in Rote language enabled interviewees to articulate their thoughts 
without difficulty. The atmosphere of interviews with government officials at 
workplaces was formal, often disturbed by additional activities and limited to a 
particular time. 
 
I made a change in this study related to case selection at the community level. I 
found out from initial interviews that CFM on Rote Island, which the national 
government re-applied for managing fisheries in Oelua and several other 
villages, has its root in both terrestrial and marine-based fisheries management 
but the fishers in Oelua village had never implemented CFM in marine fisheries 
in the village. CFM was practised in other coastal villages, such as Oetefu village 
and Ndao Island, and in lakes such as the Tua Lake in Lalukoen village (see 
Chapter 5). Therefore, this study collected data in three villages on Rote Island 
and from Ndao Island, instead of in Oelua village as I initially planned. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
I undertook data analysis to build an institutional framework to show how CFM 
has been practised on Rote and how the national government applied CFM into 
the management of the Sawu Sea MPA. Thus, as O’Leary (2014) has identified, 
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my data analysis involved several stages, which started from  real or particular  
data and progressed to generalisation or abstraction. The stages were: 1) 
collection of raw data; 2) organising, reducing and coding data; 3) 
interconnecting data; 4) building themes; and 5) building and verifying theories 
(see Figure 3.6).  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Data analysis process 
Source: Adapted from O’Leary (2014) 
 
In this procedure of data analysis, I did intensive and repeat activities of 
listening to the recordings, reading the transcripts, and reordering and 
classifying data according to emerged themes. I used a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet to classify and reorder data and categorise transcripts according to 
organisations, documents and interviewees across government tiers. The 
analysis I undertook involved institutional analysis and stakeholder analysis. 
 
Following Ostrom (2011), I undertook institutional analysis by examining the 
process and products of policies, such as laws, regulation, plans and reports 
across government tiers and by identifying local rules and practices at the 
community level to understand how the national government applies CFM. The 
aim is to understand the process of their development and their 
interconnection. For example, while national laws serve as a regulatory 
framework, most local laws and regulations serve as operational ones. National 
laws specify the roles and responsibilities, interaction of government 
organisations and involvement of the people in the development of operational 
regulations. However, lower-level regulations often fail to give effect to higher-
level ones or the government delays enacting operational regulations in order to 
implement high-level laws. 
 
In undertaking a stakeholder analysis, I identified stakeholders across 
government tiers and non-government organisations, independent researchers, 
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and members of local communities. This analysis enabled me to understand 
their roles and involvement, expectations and experience, and opinions in the 
development and implementation of related laws and regulations. The 
involvement of key stakeholders in the development of policy, their perspectives 
about its implementation and the benefits they view or enjoy influenced the 
legitimacy of institutions (Haus, Heinelt, & Stewart, 2004; Scharpf, 2003). 
3.8 Research Ethics 
This section describes, firstly, my positionality in relation to this research; and, 
secondly, the key ethical considerations and the institutional ethical procedures 
that were followed and finally the steps taken to ensure data collection adhered 
to ethical standards. 
3.8.1 Ethical considerations and procedures 
The key ethical considerations for this study include freedom from harm, 
voluntary participation, informed consent, cultural sensitivity and avoidance of 
conflict of roles. The Massey University Human Ethics Committee screening 
questionnaire was applied to the proposed methods and this indicated that the 
research was low risk.  Subsequently, a low risk notification was submitted to 
the university’s Ethics Office.  
 
To ensure informed consent, participants were provided with an information 
sheet, which explained the nature of the research and the research procedures 
(See Appendix 4 for a copy of the invitation letter sent to prospective 
interviewees and Appendix 5 for a copy of the Information sheet). It was 
emphasised that participation was voluntary, and the participants were free to 
withdraw from the research at any time. Participants were sent a copy of the 
interview guide (see Appendix 7) and asked to sign a consent form (see 
Appendix 6) if they would take part.  
 
Freedom from harm included, where appropriate, ensuring that participants 
were able to request that their identity was kept confidential. I identified 
participants from government organisations according to the name of their 
 65 
posts to help me, among other things, in identifying tensions among different 
organisations. Fisheries officials at both the provincial and district 
governments, for example, tended to refer to one another when I asked 
questions about which government tiers should responsible for empowering 
customary fishers after the national government recentralised fisheries 
management. 
3.8.2 Positionality 
My previous employment with the Development Planning Agency (2009-2012) 
and the Consent Agency (2012-2014) of the Rote Ndao government influenced 
this study. In the former, my responsibilities included drafting planning 
documents, reviewing budget proposals, and undertaking monitoring and 
evaluation of development programmes. In the latter, I dealt particularly with 
managing consents for activities such as construction, issuing permits for 
businesses such as restaurants and workshops, and producing warrants of 
fitness for public transport.  
 
These roles provided me with a comprehensive understanding of laws and 
policies across sectors and tiers of government. However, I was not directly 
involved in implementing programmes related to customary fisheries 
management and empowerment of fishers by line departments such as 
Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Therefore, to some extent, I have 
the knowledge of an insider but also felt as though I was an outsider regarding 
this study. These dual roles reflect the observation of Scheyvens et al. (2014, p. 
185) that  often researchers as “‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ are more accurately 
understood as existing on a sliding scale or continuum, rather than being seen 
as binary opposites”.  
 
As an insider. I have a good knowledge of local language and culture and some 
knowledge of customary rules for natural resource management. This assisted 
me in connecting and communicating with participants. I did not have difficulty 
gaining access to participants and understanding the contexts that shape the 
participants’ worldviews.  
 
 66 
However, an ‘insider’ position can also be a source of bias and subjectivity that 
affects the research process. Following Herod’s (1999) advice on how to 
minimise bias and to be aware of the influence of subjectivity, I positioned 
myself along the insider and outsider continuum in different contexts, and I 
managed to represent the position I chose to play in a fluid way. In 
communicating with the provincial and district government officials, for 
example, I positioned myself as a former official as they knew my previous 
positions but I emphasised that I was conducting research on a topic about 
which I did not have direct, in-depth knowledge.  
 
Rose (1997) notes that the similarities in identity can strengthen trust. In 
communicating with customary figures and fishers, I positioned myself as an 
outsider and informed them of my position as a student to avoid potential 
problems related to power relations due to my previous professional roles in 
government. As an insider, I had some basic information about hohorok and 
Bajo fishers because of my upbringing prior to data collection. However, I had 
no updated and comprehensive knowledge about hohorok nor had I 
encountered the fishers directly. Therefore, during data collection and analysis, 
I continued to undertake reflection about my position in order to avoid 
imposing my worldviews on the interviews. I also relied on triangulation to 
avoid biases.  This multifaceted ‘self’ is a common practice (Bailey, 2007, pp. 6-
7)  and researchers (see, for example Scheyvens, Scheyvens, & Murray, 2014, p. 
187) do not view this strategy as a deception.  
 
Mullings (1999, p. 340) notes “to acquire information that faithfully represents 
the real world, researchers must often seek, what [is referred] to as positional 
spaces, that is, areas where the situated knowledge of both parties in the 
interview encounter, engender a level of trust and co-operation”. The use of 
appropriate language, according to Rose (1997), facilitates building rapport and 
the articulation of information. When I interviewed customary figures and 
fishers, I used Rote language, as I am a fluent speaker of it. I used Bahasa 
Indonesia (Indonesian language) when I interviewed government officials.  
Also, when interviewing government officials, I met interviewees in places other 
than the interviewees’ work places as this gave us more freedom to exchange 
information than would have been possible in the interviewee’s workplace. The 
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use of local language and the chosen places for interviews other than work 
places allowed more open and trusting communication. 
3.9 Summary  
A qualitative case study was used to generate in-depth information about how 
CFM is being applied by the Indonesian government in managing the Sawu Sea 
MPA. Using the IAD framework (Figure 3.7), the following chapters of this 
thesis will firstly provide background on the contexts of Indonesian fisheries 
(Chapter 4) and describe Indonesian fisheries management at all government 
tiers (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 will cover CFM practices on Rote Island before 
Chapter 7 presents the applicability of CFM within large-scale marine 
management regimes on Rote Island. 
 
Figure 3.7: Conceptual framework for examining CFM’s applicability.  
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2011) 
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Chapter 4 Indonesian Fisheries Management 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the context of fisheries management at the national level 
in Indonesia and at the provincial level in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) 
province. It presents the geography and marine ecology, socio-economic 
characteristics, political arrangements, customary communities and their rights, 
and the development of marine conservation in Indonesia, all of which have 
shaped fisheries management from the mid-20th century.  
4.2 Geography and Marine Ecology  
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world with over seventeen 
thousand islands. Its marine area is twice the size of its landmass, with both 
combined covering over 773 million ha².  The coastline of these islands is over 
100,000 km in length, making it a country with one of the longest coastlines in 
the world.   
 
Its large geographical size makes Indonesia rich in fisheries and marine 
resources. It has over 92% of the 550 million ha of the coral reef in the Coral 
Triangle region (TNC, 2011), over three quarters of the world’s reef coral species 
and 37% of all reef fish species (World Resource Institute [WRI], 2012).  About 
90% of these reef fish species are common to other countries in the region. Up 
to 13 species of sea grasses are found in Indonesia covering three million ha², 
and there are at least 41 species of mangroves covering 3.2 million ha² (ADB, 
2014) .  
 
The World Resource Institute (2012) notes that fisheries depletion has been on 
the rise across the country since the 1990s. Destructive fishing, as well as 
overfishing generally, is the main threat resulting in a significant loss of 
fisheries stock and harm to the marine ecosystem. The losses amount to as 
much as US$2.6 billion over a 20-year period and up to 80% (3.1 million ha2) of 
coral reefs in Indonesia are under threat (WRI, 2012). Habitat destruction and 
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fisheries depletion are serious problems for marine systems in Indonesia due to 
illegal fishing (explosives, poisons and trawlers), unregulated and unreported 
(IUU) fishing.  
 
The Sawu Sea in NTT province, which is within the Lesser Sunda eco-region4, is 
the third most important eco-region in Indonesia due to its size and biodiversity 
(TNC, 2011). The Sawu Sea, at over five million ha², is nearly four times that of 
the landmass in the NTT province (Government of NTT, 2014) . It is rich in 
marine biodiversity, providing habitat for sea mammals migrating between 
Australia and Indonesia (Treml, Fidelman, Kininmonth, Ekstrom, & Bodin, 
2015). However, over 60% of the coral reef ecosystem in NTT has been severely 




Figure 4.1 Map showing Indonesia’s marine eco-regions and their ranking for marine 
biodiversity conservation. Sawu Sea and Rote Island are in Eco-region 3 
Source: Susanto, Suraji and Tokeshi (2015) 
4.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Indonesia has a large population with considerable ethnic diversity. Indonesia’s 
population was over 260 million people in 2018, with around 2% annual growth 
                                                   
 
4  Green and Mous (2008, p. vii) define eco-regions as “large areas containing geographically 
distinct assemblages of species, natural communities, and environmental conditions”. 
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and over 714 ethnic groups (President of Indonesia, 2018). More than 70% of 
the population lives in the western part of the country, particularly in Java and 
Sumatera Islands. Javanese ethnicity in central and eastern Java is the largest 
single group, with over 40% of Indonesia's population, and the Sundanese 
ethnicity in western part of Java make up to 15% of the population. Over 70% of 
Indonesia’s landmass is in the eastern part of the country (Bureau of Statistics, 
2018f).  Thus, population density is higher in the western part of the country 
than in the eastern part.  
  
The concentration of population in the western part of the country influences 
economic activity. Up to 50% of annual economic investment, particularly by 
foreign investors, is focused in the western part (Indonesia Investment 
Coordinating Board, 2017). The economy is currently growing at over 5% per 
year.  Over 70% of its annual US$1,000 billion gross domestic product (GDP) is 
generated by economic activities in Java and Sumatera islands. Agriculture-
based economic activity, including fisheries, contributes up to 15% of annual 
GDP (President of Indonesia, 2018). 
 
Despite increased fisheries production, the number of fishing households has 
halved during the last ten years from 1.6 million in 2008 to below 0.8 million in 
2018 (Dinillah, 2018). That the number of fishers has decreased despite 
increased fish consumption and production shows improved harvesting 
methods. For example, motorised fishing fleets increased from almost 350,000 
vessels in 2007 to near 400,000 in 2009, an increase of 2% annually (Bene et 
al., 2010; FAO, 2014).   
  
Nusa Tenggara Timur province is one of a few provinces in Eastern Indonesia 
with a relatively small population. Its population in 2017 was over 5 million 
people, growing at 1.6% annually. It has well over 500 islands, of which Flores, 
Sumba and Timor are the most populated (Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). Despite 
having a relatively small population, NTT is ethnically diverse with over 70 
ethnic groups with different linguistic backgrounds and cultural practices, 
including diverse customary fisheries management (MMAF, 2014a). 
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The livelihoods of most people in NTT (over 20%, or 1.5 million) are associated 
with dry-land agriculture and livestock farming such as cows, buffalos, horses 
and sheep. The scale of livestock farming is mostly small, serving socio-cultural 
purposes besides an economic purpose. NTT province has been known 
nationally since the 1970s as one of Indonesia’s main suppliers of cattle and 
meat with a significant export of livestock to other parts of the country 
(Government of NTT, 2005).  
 
However, NTT’s economy (as measured by GDP) is small compared to other 
provinces, which explains why NTT is classified as the third poorest province in 
Indonesia (Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). Government spending at all tiers is the 
main driver of formal economic activity before private investment. However, 
over 90% of the more than US$3 billion budget of sub-national government in 
NTT comes from transfers from the national government (Bureau of Statistics, 
2018f). NTT’s GDP in 2017 was just over US$11 billion, growing at 6% annually, 
with agriculture (including fisheries) contributing less than 30%. Annual 
income per capita is just over $US700.  Twenty per cent of the population have 
incomes below the poverty line, earning less than US$23 per month (Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018f). 
 
The growing population and economy have impacts on the fisheries sector at the 
national level. Fish consumption increased from almost 40 kg/person in 2013 to 
over 46kg/person in 2017. Fish was the source of 50% of protein in 2012 (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation [FAO], 2014). Indonesian fisheries production has 
seen a significant increase over the last two decades, and Indonesia is now the 
second largest fish producer in the world after China (FAO, 2014). In 2012, 
fisheries production was nearly nine million tonnes (FAO, 2014), about 22% of 
the value of global fisheries with a value of over $1.5 billion per year (WRI, 
2012). Tuna production, for example, comprised 16% of the world production of 
over 185,000 tonnes in 2014. This growth is significant given that in other 
developing countries fisheries production is declining.  The growth in fisheries 
production results from the national government’s actions to address illegal 
fishing (Setyadi, 2015; MMAF, 2018). Seaweed production in 2012, yielded 6.5 
million tonnes, compared with nearly one million tonnes in 2005 (FAO, 2014), 
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as a result Indonesia now accounts for over a quarter of global seaweed 
production.    
 
The fisheries and marine sector was not a major source of income for most of 
the population prior to the 2000s (Government of NTT, 2014) . Local 
communities collected mainly marine resources such as seaweed during low 
tides for their diet but were not heavily involved in fishing. Less than 1% were 
involved in fishing for commercial purposes in 1984 (Bureau of Statistics, 2016). 
The Kupang City Government (2013, p. 67), for example, acknowledged that 
“there was a lack of awareness of marine-based culture and livelihoods”. 
Furthermore, the East Sumba Mayor stated in Kompas, a national newspaper, 
that fisheries’ activities had been monopolised by outside fishers (Kewa Ama, 
2008).  
 
However, from the mid-1980s, more people became involved in fisheries, and 
by 2002 the percentage had increased to 5% (Government of NTT, 2002, p. 5). 
Since the 2000s, the provincial government introduced a movement called 
Gemala5 to encourage local people to harvest fisheries and marine resources.  
The provincial government provided subsidies and training for local people who 
were interested in the movement. All the district governments in NTT have 
replicated the movement. The number of fishing households in 2015 was over 
3% of 1 million households in NTT but over half of them were small-scale fishers 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). 
 
Some communities in NTT have traditionally had a strong marine culture, such 
as the Lamalera fishers in the eastern part of the province. These fishers have 
been well known for their whale hunting tradition using small traditional boats 
and wooden sticks (The Nature Conservancy, 2011). This fishing practice has 
been the focus of much research by international NGOs who are concerned 
about the threats to migratory whales in Indonesia. However, the fishers 
undertake this practice only to meet their dietary needs and for other cultural 
purposes and not for commercial purposes (Profauna Indonesia, 2005).    
                                                   
 




In addition to indigenous fishers, outside migratory fishers, mainly Bajo fishers 
have increasingly fished in NTT. They had fished across the Timor sea for a long 
time during the Dutch colonial period (Nolde, 2009; Stacey, 2007). Bajo fishers 
are from an ethnic group that inhabits other parts of eastern Indonesia and 
parts of Malaysia and the Philippines (Bria, 2014; Nolan & Vincent, 2010). They 
are well known for their migratory marine culture, enabling them to fish across 
boundaries. Bajo fishers travelled to the NTT province to collect trepan and 
catch sharks in the southern marine waters off Rote and northern Australia 
(Jaiteh, Loneragan, & Warren, 2017; Nolde, 2009).  
 
However, Bajo fishers have also contributed to increased fisheries depletion due 
to illegal fishing practices (Pet-Soede & Erdmann, 1998). In an international 
seminar about Bajo fishers, Suyuti (quoted in  Radja, 2013, p. 1) states that 
almost all Bajo fishers in Indonesia use destructive fishing methods, particularly 
coral reef  blast fishing. Their fishing has destroyed over half of coral reefs in 
NTT (MMAF, 2014a). Bajo fishers adopted this fishery practice during their 
migratory fishing activities across marine areas in NTT, Rote Island and as far 
as Australia’s northern waters (Stacey, 2007). The Australian Government has 
imprisoned many of these fishers for various reasons related to illegal fishing 
(MMAF, 2014a).  
 
During the last two decades, the involvement of local people in NTT in marine-
based livelihoods has increased significantly. The number of indigenous fishers 
quadrupled from 1% in 1984 to 4% in 2012 (Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Seaweed 
production in 2014 increased sharply from approximately 40 tonnes to nearly 
4,000 tonnes in 2002, still within sustainable limit. The fisheries sector’s 
contribution to regional domestic products increased from over 3% in 1999 to 
nearly 5% in 2015 (Bureau of Statistics, 2003, 2015, 2016). While most seaweed 
farmers are indigenous people, Bajo fishers focus on capture fishing. There are 
no reports of conflicts between Bajo fishers and local fishers because of 
competition over depleted fisheries, although conflict with Bajo fishers has 
occurred elsewhere in Indonesia (Supreme Court, 1978, 1988).  This lack of 
conflict is because of the way in which Bajo fishers have become integrated with 
indigenous local communities. 
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Newly released data from the provincial government shows that the fisheries 
harvests in NTT, including Rote Island, are below target, just over 35% of 
existing potential (Lewanmeru, 2018). The increased number of fishers has not 
led to a significant increase in the fisheries harvest because most fishers are 
artisanal. This claim, however, does not reflect the state of fisheries and marine 
resources in NTT because over half of the coral reef, sea grass and mangrove 
areas are severely threatened by illegal fishing by commercial trawlers from 
outside Rote, NTT and Indonesia (MMAF, 2014a).  
4.4 Political Arrangements 
Changes to national level political regime have had considerable influence on 
Indonesian fisheries policy, affecting Rote arrangements over the last few 
decades, which shifts in the exercise of power and the roles of customary 
communities in shaping natural resource management. The power of the 
national and sub-national governments, the roles of customary communities 
(village governance) and how power has been exercised have changed since 
independence. 
4.4.1 The national tier of government 
The Indonesian Constitution, adopted after Indonesia gained independence in 
1945, and therefore referred to as the 1945 Constitution, establishes Indonesia 
as a unitary state (Ellis, 2002). In this political system, the ultimate power is 
concentrated in the national government. While the Constitution outlines the 
general role of sub-national government, national laws and regulations outline 
the roles of communities, which are a sub-local tier of government (albeit not 
addressed in the Constitution) (Ellis, 2002). 
 
Following the Trias Politica model for a division of power, the Constitution 
states that there are three branches of power in Indonesia (Lev, 1978). First, the 
national government exercises executive power. The government also exercises 
legislative power together with the People’s Consultative Assembly and the 
People’s Representative Council. Finally, the judiciary is independent from the 
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other branches of government. However, the implementation of this model has 
varied throughout the three main periods in Indonesian history. 
 
In the first period, Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno governed between 1945 
and 1965. During this period, known as the Old Order, the government 
experimented with both liberal and guided democracy (Lev, 1978, 2009). 
Following independence, the national government was faced with a divisive 
debate about a political system, reflecting regional differences in religions, 
customs and tradition. Thus, the national government adopted a unitary 
system, which empowered it to unite the country.   
 
In 1950, the national government introduced Liberal democracy under a new 
constitution, known as the Provisional Constitution of 1950 (Aspinall & 
Mietzner, 2010).  The national government’s efforts to address political unrest 
and to support the US-led model of democracy shaped this policy. This 
constitution gave great freedom of democracy and a liberalised economy, 
acknowledged autonomous sub-national governments and mandated a 
parliamentary democracy (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010). The political system, 
however, led to short-lived coalitions because of continued divisions of power 
among many political parties. There were seven cabinets in eight years, on 
average, each cabinet lasting just over a year (MoMAF, 2016).  
 
In July 1959, Sukarno re-introduced the 1945 Constitution in order to establish 
political and economic stability (Lev, 1978). He abolished the parliament and 
merged the many political parties into three big parties under three categories: 
nationalist, communist and religious. Sukarno’s policy was known as Guided 
democracy (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010; Cribb, 2001). The guided democracy 
resulted in political and economic crises, in which the inflation rate reached 
600%, leading to a failed bloody coup by the Communist Party of Indonesia in 
1965 and the impeachment of the president in 1966 (Aspinall & Mietzner, 
2010). 
 
The New Order is associated with the new president, Suharto, who ruled 
between 1967 and 1998. He inherited significant problems but gained strong 
domestic political and military support to solve them (Liddle, 1985). Suharto 
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banned the Communist Party of Indonesia, slaughtered hundreds of thousands 
of the party’s members in Java and Bali6, allowed only limited freedom of 
expression and controlled the news media. There were only three political 
parties under the categories of nationalist, bureaucratic and religious. The 
president appointed over half the members of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly, determined the nomination of the people’s representatives, 
nominated active military officials to occupy high ranking political posts, and 
influenced the selection of governors and mayors by Local Representative 
Councils (Liddle, 1985).  
 
Significantly for this research, Suharto built political support from the military 
and business elites by granting them privileges to exploit natural resources such 
as mining, timber, and fisheries (Broad, 1995). He also designed a uniform 
government structure for all communities (villages) and brought the villages 
under a hierarchical relationship with the national government (Antlöv, 2003). 
Suharto successfully led Indonesia to become one of Asia’s economic giants. 
However, due to widespread human rights abuses and the 1997 Asian economic 
and political crisis, this military-backed general was toppled from power by a 
student-led movement in 1998, starting the Reform era in 1999. 
 
In his speech to the People’s Consultative Assembly in 2000, Habibie, the first 
president of the Reform era, acknowledged the undemocratic nature of the New 
Order:  
The New order was characterised by strong domination of the 
executive over legislature and judiciary, a strong domination of the 
national government over sub-national governments and a 
patronage-client relationships between the government and the 
people (President of Indonesia, 2000, p. 3)  
 
Since 1999, Habibie and his successors have introduced greater political 
freedom by amending the 1945 Constitution (Webber, 2006). The national 
government now granted more freedom of expression and allowed the 
establishment of political parties to contest elections. Habibie also introduced a 
decentralisation policy in 1999 (Rasyid, 2004), and removed appointed military 
                                                   
 
6 According to Kontras (2012, pp. 9-10), a national-based human rights NGO, the number of 
victims varies between studies. 
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officials from serving as members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Ellis, 
2002). This has had implications for military involvement in managing natural 
resources and illegal fishing (discussed further in Chapter 5). The assembly’s 
members are only made up of members of the People’s Representative Council 
and the Regional Representative Council with the people directly electing the 
members of these councils. Furthermore, the national government established 
the Constitutional Court in 2003 (Mietzner, 2016). This court has the final say 
in reviewing and cancelling laws that it deems unconstitutional, and in 
adjudicating disputes between government bodies and disputes between 
political parties regarding electoral results.  
 
The constitutional amendments strengthened the people’s political power 
(Horowitz, 2013). Previously, the president nominated and selected some 
members of the national parliament, who later selected the president. People 
elected members of the parliament who had been nominated by the president.  
In the amended Constitution, the people directly elect the president, deputy 
president and members of the parliament (Ellis, 2002). These amendments 
shifted the power of the president, who had the right to appoint members of the 
parliament, and the parliament, that in turn would select the president, to the 
people. More importantly, for the first time, the national government held a 
direct election of governors and mayors in 2004 (Mietzner, 2010). Table 4.1 















Table 4.1: Significant political events in Indonesian political history 
Order/era Date Event 
Old order  1945 Independent from the Dutch 
(1945-1966) 
  





The national government introduced Liberal democracy: 
The Provisional Constitution of 1950, 
Freedom for democracy,  








Introduction of Guided democracy: 
Re-introduction of the 1945 Constitution,  
Abolishment of the parliament, and 
Rearrangement of political parties into three big parties 
under the categories of nationalist, communist and 
religious. 
 1965 Abortive coup of the Communist Party of Indonesia 








Suharto was installed as the President: 
Banning Communist Party of Indonesia, 
Killing of the party’s members,  
Limitation of political freedom and the press, 













Introduction of greater political freedom: 
Abolishment of the military’s political function, 
Political and financial decentralisation policy, 
Multiple political parties, 
Freedom of the Press. 
 2003 
2004 
Establishment of the Constitutional Court 
The first time for direct election of the president, 
governors and mayors by the people 
4.4.2 Sub-national government  
There are two tiers of sub-national government in Indonesia: the province and 
district or city. The 1945 Constitution did not clarify the relationship between 
tiers of sub-national governments, but, prior to 1999, districts and cities were 
subordinated to the provinces and, in turn, provinces were subordinates of the 
national government (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002; Rasyid, 2004). Sub-national 
governments had to give effect to the policy and laws of the national 
governments. Until 2004, sub-national governments did not have the power to 
enact laws (Suharjono, 2014).  
 
The roles of sub-national governments have changed, including the ability to 
enact laws and regulations after 1999. The national government revised the 
decentralisation law allowing Local Representative Councils to select governors 
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and mayors without the national government’s intervention, but it did not allow 
sub-national governments to enact laws and regulation (Suharjono, 2014). 
However, due to several problems, particularly widespread corruption in the 
selection process, the national government revised the law allowing the people 
to directly elect the governors and mayors in 2004 (Mietzner, 2010). This 
allowed sub-national government to enact district laws and regulations to give 
effect to higher-level laws and to manage its own affairs autonomously 
(Government of Indonesia, 2011). The president kept the right to cancel local 
laws that do not give effect to national interests but, in 2016, the Constitutional 
Court abolished this presidential power (Kusuma Dewi & Widodo, 2018). This 
gives sub-national government autonomy in enacting laws and regulations to 
manage local affairs.  
 
The number of units of sub-national government exploded because of 
decentralisation in 1999. Prior to 1999, there were 26 provinces, 234 districts 
and 59 cities (Minister of Home Affairs, 2015). The national government 
introduced decentralisation in 1999 in response to the demand of natural-
resource rich provinces for greater power and to avoid national disintegration 
(Directorate General of Local Autonomy, 2011). Under centralised natural 
resource management, these provinces had no power in managing natural 
resources, resulting in an unfair distribution of benefits for them (Rasyid, 
2004). This policy has encouraged the establishment of new units of sub-
national government, resulting in 34 provinces, 415 districts and 93 cities in 
2015 (Minister of Home Affairs, 2015).  
 
The increased number of sub-national government units partly relates to the 
provision of the decentralisation laws: Law 22/1999 on Sub-national 
government and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal balance between national and sub-
national governments (Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005). Law 22/1999, for 
example, specifies that local community groups can apply to become a new unit 
of sub-national government and get funds from the national government 




Greater power for sub-national government has been the main factor shaping 
the increased proliferation of sub-national governments (Aspinall, 2016). Prior 
to 1999, the national government devolved limited autonomy, mostly 
administrative and development affairs. Other matters, such as politics and 
finance, were controlled by the national government. According to Rasyid 
(2004), the then Minister of Local Autonomy, many regions were dissatisfied 
with the benefit-sharing arrangement of natural resource management and the 
dominance of the national government in the appointment of officials to occupy 
political posts in the sub-national government. The introduction of the 
decentralisation policy in 1999 changed these arrangements because almost all 
public affairs, except foreign affairs, defence and security, law and order, 
monetary and fiscal, and religious affairs, were devolved to sub-national 
governments (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002).  
 
This prompted more ethnic groups in Indonesia to apply for local self-
government and to become separate units of sub-national government 
(Mietzner, 2014), a process which continues at the time of this research with 
318 proposals for new units of sub-national governments (Bempah, 2018). The 
proliferation of sub-national government units based on ethnic group 
boundaries has fostered greater awareness of ethnic identity (Aspinall, 2016). 
This is in contrast with previous sub-national government structure, which was 
imposed by the national government based in Java and influenced by people 
from the Javanese ethnic group. Importantly for this thesis, the new units of 
sub-national government based on ethnic groups also reflect vested interests of 
local elites over natural resources. The increased power of sub-national 
governments, according to Firman (2009), serves as “incentives for regional 
splitting” (p.49) which are “captured by local elites” (p.46). 
 
Such splitting is now recognised as problematic and the national government 
has sought to impose a moratorium on the creation of new ethnic-based units of 
sub-national governments (Aspinall, 2016; Directorate General of Local 
Autonomy, 2011; Firman, 2009; Fitrani et al., 2005). However, of relevance for 
this thesis is the significant increase in these small units of sub-national 
government, which, as a result of sub-national government law, have the power 
to manage, and accrue benefits, from natural resource exploitation.  
 81 
 
The 1999 decentralisation policy thus has important ramifications for fisheries 
management and customary fisheries management. The proliferation of new 
units of sub-national government, for example, is based on ethnic-geographic 
territory (Aspinall, 2016; Ministry of Home Affairs, 2011). This has resulted in 
the division of marine environments, exclusion of fishers from other units of 
sub-national governments and horizontal conflict among fishers (Satria, 2003). 
4.4.3 Customary Communities 
Prior to independence from the Dutch in 1945, local communities in Indonesia 
practised customary rules, known as ulayat rights, for natural resource 
management. There are approximately 700 ethnic groups with diverse practices 
of natural resource management. Customary fisheries management in 
Indonesia is known by many names, such as Sasi in Maluku, Panglima laut in 
Aceh, Seke in North Sulawesi, Rompong in South Sulawesi, Awig-awig in 
Lombok, and Papadak or Hohorok in Rote Island (Adrianto & Irving Hartoto, 
2009; Oktavia, Salim, & Perdanahardja, 2018; Satria & Adhuri, 2010; H. 
Susanto, 2011).  
 
In many customary communities, Satria and Adhuri (2010) found that the main 
goal of customary fishing practices is to assure a fair distribution of fisheries 
among community members. Meeting the dietary needs of the community and 
promoting sustainable fisheries uses are secondary goals. The priority of these 
goals relates to existing relationships among many fishing communities that 
value reciprocity, trust and solidarity and communality over competition 
(Jentoft, 2004). In particular, in many communities in NTT province, a lack of 
dependence on fisheries and marine resources (Fisher, Moeliono, & Wodicka, 
1998; Government of Kupang City, 2013) could explain a lack of value over the 
resources. 
 
Customary practices in Indonesia experienced different recognition before and 
after independence in 1945. The practices flourished during the Dutch period 
when customary communities were acknowledged (McWilliam, 2006). Their 
rights and territory over lands and coastal water were well defined. This 
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acknowledgement continued after independence because the new government 
recognised that the rights and interests of customary communities aligned with 
the national interest under the Constitution. However, McWilliam (2006, p. 46) 
argues that customary practices “remained for the most part ill-defined and 
diffused as coherent systems of bounded customary practice and authority over 
defined jurisdictions.” The national government recognised customary 
practices, but it did not define their rights and territory. 
 
Customary communities’ lack of well-defined rights and territory was initially a 
result of the national government’s effort to unite the country and fight ethnic 
conflicts. Despite its national motto bhinneka tunggal ika7, which means ‘unity 
in diversity’, McWilliam (2006) claims that the national government tended to 
reject the concept of indigenous people having customary rights in natural 
resource management. The national government tended to use the term isolated 
tribes (suku terasing), rather than indigenous tribes (suku asli), in its effort to 
include and strengthen their voices in public policy. The term suku asli has a 
similar meaning with pribumi (native people) vis-à-vis non-pribumi such as 
Chinese-descendant (keturunan) and their connection with some ethnic 
sentiments and conflicts in Indonesia (Moniaga, 2007; Searle, 2002). As a 
result, the terms pribumi, non-pribumi and keturunan (descendant) were 
forbidden from being used in public policy by the national government in 1998 
(Carina, 2017). 
 
The democratic change in Indonesia since 1999 has resulted in increased efforts 
by customary communities to fight for their rights (Henley & Davidson, 2007; 
Warren, 2005). The Constitutional amendments resulted from the long struggle 
of customary community groups across Indonesia, under the coordination of 
the Nusantara Customary Communities Alliance (AMAN), which comprised 
approximately seventeen million people (AMAN, 2016b; Henley & Davidson, 
2007). Customary communities had fought for their rights since the 1980s 
under an environmental-based NGO called WALHI (Indonesian Environmental 
Forum), but it became formally acknowledged only in 1999 after the national 
                                                   
 
7 A concept that was borrowed from Majapahit Empire, the biggest kingdom in Indonesian 
history based on Java Island around the 14th century. 
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government lifted controls over civil organisations (Moniaga, 2004). During the 
first AMAN summit in 1999, these customary communities stated “if the state 
does not acknowledge us, neither do we acknowledge the state” (AMAN, 2016b, 
p. 3). AMAN’s pressure resulted in positive responses from the national 
government.  
 
The national government has developed several policies to strengthen 
customary communities. The national government passed Law 6/2014 on 
Village, which defines the meaning of adat (customary rules and practices), 
adat community, adat governance, adat rights and territory (Antlöv, 
Wetterberg, & Dharmawan, 2016). Adat communities, for example, can 
establish their own self-governing system or adat village, instead of using the 
formal centralistic governing concept of village, which was introduced by the 
national government in 1979 (Antlöv et al., 2016; Warren, 2005). An adat 
community needs to be established through a district law before they can claim 
their rights such as establishing an adat village or managing an adat forest, to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (AMAN, 2016a). The president handed over 
eighteen certificates of ownership of adat forests in 2016 and another nine in 
2017 to customary communities (Rahmah, 2017). Customary communities have 
to meet a long bureaucratic procedure before they can exercise their rights and 
this became possible only after adat communities had been facilitated by NGOs 
(Lumbangaol, 2017). However, importantly for this thesis, the improvement of 
public policy on adat in natural resource management tends to focus more on 
forest and other terrestrial resources rather than fisheries and marine resources. 
4.5 International actors and institutions 
The roles of external actors, agreements and institutions have shaped fisheries 
management and conservation in Indonesia for decades - both the Netherlands 
as the former colonial occupier since 1714 and post-war international donors 
such as the World Bank, USAID and AUSAid. Additionally, various UN agencies 
such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) together with US-based NGOs, such as the Nature 
Conservation (TNC) and Conservation International (CI), have also initiated 
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and influenced marine conservation and management in Indonesia (California 
Environmental Associates, 2018; Mulyana & Dermawan, 2008). 
 
Dutch involvement in fisheries conservation in Indonesia, known as the Dutch 
East Indies, was initiated for the first time during its colonial period between 
1662 and 1942 (Arnscheidt, 2009; Wiadnya, 2011). The Dutch established 
several terrestrial national parks in the 1700s for purposes of conservation, 
while marine parks only began to be established on small islands in the 1900s 
(Wiadnya, 2011). Komodo Park on Western Flores was the first park established 
(in 1912) and Western Bali Park was the last park established (in 1941), but 
these parks did not have marine areas. From 1921, the Dutch started to 
undertake conservation of fisheries and marine resources. They limited harvests 
of some marine resources, such as seashells, beyond three kilometres from the 
coastline, banned blasting and poison fishing and regulated fishing activities in 
general for both domestic and foreign fishers (Mulyana & Dermawan, 2008).  
 
After independence in 1945, the national government, with Dutch help, through 
scientific, institutional and funding support of the WWF and FAO (Arnscheidt, 
2009; Coral Triangle Initiative Support Program, 2011), continued to manage 
established marine conservation areas and created more marine parks 
(Wiadnya, 2011), which influenced the establishment of state ministries. 
However, the national government only established the Directorate of 
Protection and Preservation of Nature under the Ministry of Agriculture during 
the New Order in 1971 (Susanto, 2011). The president strengthened these 
directorate roles by ratifying the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna in 1978. As a follow up action, 
during the Third National Park Congress in Indonesia in 1982, the national 
government announced the establishment of ten marine parks with support 
from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (Susanto, 2011).  This increased 
conservation led to the establishment of the Ministry of Forestry and the 
Ministry of the Environment in 1983. Therefore, between 1983 and 1999, two 
ministries managed conservation in both terrestrial and marine parks. 
 
The Earth summit in Brazil in 1992, at which the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was signed, strengthened the national government’s commitment to 
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protect biodiversity. The government enacted Law 5/1994 on the Convention on 
biological biodiversity as a response to the summit. This led to the creation of 
additional marine parks (Mulyana & Dermawan, 2008). By 1997, the national 
government had established 24 national parks covering 2.6 million ha across 
Indonesia (Susanto, 2011).    
 
A significant policy taken by the national government in response to the 
increased international agreements and the involvement of international NGOs 
in fisheries management was the establishment of the Ministry of Marine 
Exploration in 1999  (Susanto, 2011). As its name implies, this ministry focuses 
on exploring fisheries and marine resources. The ministry’s name was changed 
to the Ministry of Marine Exploration and Fisheries in the same year before it 
was changed to the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in 2000. The 
national government did not abolish the Directorate of Protection and 
Preservation of Nature under the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, the Ministry of 
Agriculture continued to manage MPAs that had been established, until 2009. 
This change, according to Mulyana and Dermawan (2008), did not strengthen 
fisheries integration at the national level.     
4.5.1 International NGOs and international donors 
The involvement of International donors and NGOs in Indonesia has been 
because Indonesia is one of the world’s most marine bio-diverse countries and 
the largest archipelagic state, but fisheries are being depleted (World Resources 
Institute, 2012). It is also because protecting the ocean and fisheries in 
Indonesia influences the world’s state of fisheries (California Environmental 
Associates, 2018). This is more for Australia, which shares marine ecological 
boundaries with Indonesia, protecting fisheries in Indonesia will benefit 
Australia because some fisheries migrate from Indonesia to Australia (Treml et 
al., 2015).  
 
The then president’s invitation for the international community’s involvement 
in restoring fisheries in the Coral Triangle region made way for international 
NGOs (President of Indonesia, 2009a).  Indonesia, together with some 
countries that share ecological boundaries, has limited technical and financial 
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capacities (Von Heland et al., 2014). There is an expectation from Indonesian 
government, particularly for the establishment of the CTI, to share the costs of 
restoring fisheries with other countries that benefit from restored migratory 
fisheries in Indonesia (Secretariat of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009a).  
 
Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project (COREMAP) is the largest 
multiyear fisheries conservation project in Indonesia involving international 
donors and NGOs since 1999 (Coral Triangle Initiative Support Program, 2011). 
The project was funded with loans up to $250 million from the World Bank 
Asian and Development Bank and grants from the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) and AusAID (McElroy, 2004). It aimed at rehabilitating coral 
reefs together with their ecosystem and strengthening the livelihoods of people 
who relied on the resources. Through this project, FAO, TNC, and CI undertook 
many conservation projects across Indonesia (Resosudarmo, 2005). 
 
The decentralised fisheries management regime in Indonesia in 1999 enabled 
some sub-national governments to establish MPAs. International NGOs such as 
TNC, FAO, WWF and CI provided financial and institutional assistance for the 
national and local governments to manage fisheries and undertake conservation 
(Directorate General of Marine Coastal and Small Islands, 2013; Provincial 
Development Planning Agency, 2013). Until 2011, there were 47 MPAs covering 
over 5 million ha established by both the provincial and district governments in 
Indonesia. In NTT province, Eastern Flores district established 150,000 ha of 
MPA in 2013 and the Alor district established over 270,000 ha of MPA in 2015 
(WWF, 2017). Some MPAs have also been also established by several local 
communities across Indonesia to protect mangrove, marine resources and 
fisheries, but their size on average is just over 10 ha (Faiza, Kusumastanto, 
Bengen, Boer, & Yulianda, 2010; Kasmidi et al., 1999). 
 
The establishment of MPAs in Indonesia was shaped by the national 
government’s commitments made at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and 
subsequent Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. At 
the 8th Conference of Parties in 2006, the Indonesian president committed to 
establishing 10 million ha of MPA in 2010 and to double it in 2020. Later, 
during the 10th Conference in Nagoya in 2010, Indonesia stated its goal was to 
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establish up to 10% of its marine areas (approximately 31 million ha) as MPAs. 
The priority marine areas for MPAs are based on a scientific study by Huffard, 
Erdmann, and Gunawan (2012) funded by the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral 
Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security. This suggests that MPAs establishment in 
Indonesia has been shaped by a global agenda and support. 
 
By 2011, Indonesia had established almost 14 million ha of MPAs, with most of 
these MPAs situated in Eastern Indonesia (Figure 4.2). The size of MPAs has 
exploded since 2003. There were over 5.4 million ha of MPAs established by the 
Ministry of Forestry in 2003. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
developed just over 700 ha of MPAs. However, the Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries started to lead the establishment of MPAs between 2004 and 
2010 with a total size over 9 million ha or about 66% the size of the entire 
established MPAs (Susanto, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: MPAs in Eastern Indonesia  
Source: MMAF (2008) 
 
The biggest increase was in 2014 when the Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries established the Sawu Sea MPA in NTT province (Figure 4.3), which 
covers over 3 million ha. Together with over 5 million ha of MPAs established by 
sub-national governments and local communities, the collected size of the 
MPAs has met the national government’s target to establish ten million ha of 





Figure 4.3: Map showing the Sawu Sea MPA in NTT province. Insert shows Oelua 
village in Rote Island 
Source: MMAF (2014) 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has set the scene for the empirical work of this thesis. It has 
outlined the changes in political arrangements in Indonesia since 1945 drawing 
attention to the significant impact of political instability, tentative 
democratisation initiatives and in particular decentralisation which empowered 
ethnically-based sub-national government. The proliferation of new units of 
sub-national government, with new political and financial resources provided 
by the national government provides considerably expanded ethnically based 
natural resource management including greater scope for CFM. This has been a 
deliberate policy of the national government.  
 
However, the establishment of MPAs and the national government’s effort to 
achieve its goals in establishing 10% of its marine areas as MPAs have a great 
impact on natural resource management and the application of CFM. The 
number and size of MPAs that have been established by local communities are 
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insignificant compared to those established by the government at all tiers. In 
Chapter 5 I present data from document analysis, which critically reviews the 
impacts of changing legislation on fisheries management, including CFM. 
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Chapter 5 Changes to and Implications of Formal 
Fisheries Management to Customary 
Fisheries Management 
5.1 Introduction 
Ostrom’s (1990) institutional analysis and development framework identifies 
existing institutional arrangements as exogenous variables shaping ‘the action 
situation’. Thus, this chapter examines the changes to fisheries institutional 
arrangements in Indonesia since 1945 by analysing laws and reports of 
governments at all tiers, the media and NGOs. The purpose is to understand 
both the changes in fisheries management at all government tiers and the 
impact of these changes on customary fisheries management (CFM) in 
managing large-scale marine environments. Throughout Indonesian history, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, different political systems resulted in different fisheries 
legislation and policies for applying CFM. This chapter explores the five themes 
that emerge from the document analysis: economic challenges; conservation 
approach; democratic changes; poverty reduction; and establishment of the 
Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). 
5.2 Economic Challenges 
Four sub-themes can be identified as arising from the national government’s 
effort to address economic challenges since independence; all have implications 
for Indonesian customary fisheries management. They are constitutional denial; 
legalising destructive fishing; combating illegal foreign fishers; and controlling 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 
5.2.1 Constitutional denial  
After gaining independence, the Indonesian government acknowledged the 
customary rights of local communities in the Constitution, but the Constitution 
contradicted itself in the area of natural resource management. Article 33 states, 
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“the state takes control over the earth, water and all resources within the earth 
and uses them for the prosperity of the people”. The state respected self-
governing communities, but the national government did not acknowledge the 
rights of customary communities in natural resource management. This 
inconsistency, according to the National Human Rights Commission (2014), 
related to the government’s goal of pursuing economic growth as a newly 
independent nation.  
 
Although the government focused on economic growth, this did not lead to 
significant changes in fisheries management. During the Old Order, there was a 
lack of private investment and fisheries development, largely because the 
government did not welcome foreign investment (MoMAF, 2016). The national 
government passed Regulation 64/1957, Devolution of tasks in fisheries and 
forestry to sub-national government to enable provincial governments to 
manage fisheries. However, this regulation did not significantly impact CFM, 
because of the high degree of political instability. The Nusa Tenggara Timur 
(NTT) province (Figures 4.2 & 4.3), which was established in the same year, 
focused on building administrative and bureaucratic institutions and it did not 
get involved in exploiting fisheries. Thus, fisheries management was de facto 
monopolised by customary fishers (MoMAF, 2016).  
 
After an absence of legislation during the 15 years following independence, the 
national government enacted Law 5/1960, Agrarian basic principles 
(Government of Indonesia, 1960). This law recognised private fishing rights, 
which were seen as a part of the rights attached to the land but limited its uses 
for social purposes and allowed customary communities to manage natural 
resources. It stated that the power of the state in natural resource management, 
as stated in the Constitution, could be delegated to customary communities that 
still exercised customary rules and practices in line with national interests 
(Article 3). This meant that this law acknowledged both communal and private 
property rights with some conditions. However, the law did not elaborate on 
whether fishing rights were transferable or if they could serve as collateral and 
have titles. Similarly, the national government did not regulate fisheries 
conservation and failed to provide regulations to define how communal 
property rights were to be exercised. 
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5.2.2 Legalising destructive fishing  
During the New Order, the national government encouraged foreign trawlers to 
work in extracting fisheries. Significant harvests of fisheries occurred in 1966 to 
support economic growth. In its Decree 44/1968, Appointment of the President, 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (1968) commissioned the newly-selected 
president to establish political stability and pursue economic growth with 
military support. Untapped fisheries were seen as a solution to economic 
problems during the New Order (Bailey, 1986, 1988). The national government 
passed Law 1/1967, Foreign business investment, that granted up to fifty years 
of fishing licences to foreign investors. In his speech to the National Parliament, 
President Suharto (1968, p. 64) claimed that “a big source of national income is 
fisheries ... exports of fisheries are predicted to grow at 6-9% per year”. Fisheries 
and marine resources played important roles in boosting economic growth during 
his administration. 
 
The NTT government similarly relied on fisheries to improve economic 
performance. After establishing bureaucratic institutions since its establishment 
in 1958, the NTT government enacted Regulation 7/1972, Capture Fisheries and 
Withdrawal of Marine Resources aiming to “safeguard fisheries and marine 
resources and to increase the government’s revenues” (p.1). This regulation 
focused on creating revenue from fisheries harvests. There was no reference to 
customary communities’ rights in the regulation. However, fisheries investment 
in NTT was limited during the 1970s, as most foreign investments focused on 
western Indonesia (President of Indonesia, 1982, 1995). This regulation did not 
result in a significant de facto extraction of fisheries and decreased access to 
fisheries by customary fishers in NTT.  
 
In 1974, the NTT provincial government enacted Regulation 8/1974, Ownership 
of the land that contradicted National Law 5/1960, which had acknowledged 
fishing rights. Article 2 states, “the lands that were once under the management 
of customary communities are now managed by the provincial government; the 
Governor” (point 1), and “individuals or organisations that managed the land as 
mentioned in point 1 need to have proof of ownership (point 2), which should be 
in writing and guaranteed by the government” (p.7). This regulation denied 
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existing land ownership and fisheries rights that were based on stories that were 
passed down over generations.  
 
The government had inconsistent policies relating to protecting small-scale 
fishers. In his 1982 annual speech at the National Parliament, the President 
(1982) acknowledged that the total catch of small-scale fishers at the national 
level decreased by 40% in 1977. The President did not directly link the decrease 
to the increased exports, but he acknowledged, “trawling fishing [by outside 
large fishers] does harm to the marine ecosystems and distresses local small and 
traditional fishers” (p.25). Thus, the President issued Decree 39/1980, Abolition 
of trawlers to protect small-scale fishers from competition with large-scale 
fishers. This decree limited trawling in order to 1) maintain the sustainability of 
fisheries, 2) protect small-scale fishers, and 3) avoid social conflicts. However, 
two years later, the President issued the contradictory Decree 85/1982, Use of 
shrimp nets that allowed the exploitation of shrimp by large-scale fishers. The 
enactment of this decree was a response to a provision of the Presidential 
Decree 39/1980, which states, “to avoid reducing shrimp production due to the 
abolition of trawlers, a national shrimp production programme needs to be 
maximised” (Article 7). The national government pursued economic benefits at 
the expense of customary fishing rights and did not consider destructive fishing 
to be illegal.  
5.2.3 Harvesting shared fisheries 
Besides economic interests, legalising destructive fishing methods relates to the 
competition in harvesting cross-country migratory fisheries. As a response to 
increased illegal foreign fishing in marine areas shared with other countries, the 
MMAF passed Regulation 06/2008, Uses of Trawlers in the northern marine 
area of East Kalimantan province. This province shares marine borders with 
Malaysia and the Philippines. When introducing the regulation, the minister 
argued, “trawlers are compatible with geographic characteristics of marine areas 
in this province” (point b). The government thus legalised destructive fishing 
methods for economic interests.  
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This regulation marginalised small-scale fishers. The national government 
divided the marine areas into two zones: Zone I (1-4 nautical miles) for ships 
less than 5 gross tonnage and Zone II (4-12 nautical miles) for ships between 5 
and 30 gross tonnage. The district and provincial governments managed the 
licences for these zones, respectively. This regulation exempted both small-scale 
fishers and other fishers that used ships less than 5 gross tonnages from 
needing fishing licences. However, according to Halim (2016), the Secretary-
General of the People’s Coalition for Just Fisheries, this provision made way for 
non-small scale fishers to use small ships to operate in Zone I. There were 2,862 
trawlers operating in these areas, which resulted not only in the depletion of the 
fisheries, but also the marginalisation of small-scale fishers.  
 
The enactment of Regulation 06/2008 was partly shaped by the government’s 
difficulties in combatting foreign illegal fishers within the marine borders. 
Halim (2016) quotes the Acting Governor of East Kalimantan who said, that by 
allowing trawling in these areas, the fishers would help the national government 
to undertake surveillance in the areas. This supervision would gather 
information for the government, so it could combat foreign illegal fishers in 
these areas. This suggests that the government had become entrapped in a 
dilemma that involved taking part in a destructive competition to exploit the 
resources.  
5.2.4 Corruption in fisheries management  
According to Transparency International (Merkle, 2018), corruption in 
Indonesia is associated with the New Order, under which the country 
experienced high economic growth under a totalitarian regime. It started as 
President Suharto built political support by granting privileges to political and 
military elites to engage in profit-oriented activities, including natural resources 
extraction (Broad, 1995). In fisheries management, however, the Indonesian 
Navy, which was responsible for law enforcement in the seas, used its authority 
to make money from illegal fishing by collaborating with foreign trawlers 
(Heazle & Butcher, 2007).  
 
 95 
The practice of corruption continued during the Reform Era (President of 
Indonesia, 2009b), although the MMAF (2007) claimed that in 2004 the 
number of illegal vessels operating in Indonesia dropped from 7,000 vessels to 
just over 1,000 vessels. The President of Indonesia (2014b) stated that over 90% 
of these ships were involved in IUU fishing. This illegal activity resulted in 
financial losses of between US$ 2.5 million (Audit Board of Indonesia, 2013) 
and US$20 million (MoMAF, 2015a)   every year arising from the loss of 
royalties and marine ecosystem destruction.  
 
Corruption involving Indonesian officials has always been a problem 
contributing to illegal fishing, but there is no formal acknowledgement of this 
problem. In his annual speech to the People’s Consultative Assembly, the 
President of Indonesia (2007) reiterated the national government’s 
commitment to fight corruption and reduce military involvement in profit-
oriented businesses associated with fishing, which were the legacy of the New 
Order. This commitment is in line with the CTI’s priority of actions to combat 
IUU fishing. However, the CTI does not highlight the role of corruption in IUU 
fishing (Secretariat of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b). Similarly, 
there is no acknowledgement from the president concerning the involvement of 
the military in illegal fishing, nor is it included in the Strategic Plan of the 
MMAF 2015-2019 (MMAF, 2015b). 
 
Information about corruption in fisheries has been made available by 
independent researchers (Heazle & Butcher, 2007; Siry, 2006), who blame the 
Navy and Fisheries officials for supporting IUU fishing. De Alessi (2014, p. 579) 
reveals that “the Navy cooperative ‘INKOPAL’ apparently holds fishing licences 
and has business relationships with foreign fishing companies fishing in 
Indonesian waters”. Heazle and Butcher (2007, p. 278) confirm that the Navy 
lacks resources to undertake patrols but “there is a great deal of evidence that 
naval patrols have demanded bribes from vessels that they have detained”. They 
further add that “in recent years the most common estimate has been that the 
military receives about 30% of its operating expenses from the official budget” 
while its “business enterprises [including INKOPAL] contributed [the other] 70 
percent” (p.279). Thus, corruption is a big problem contributing to IUU fishing. 
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Since 2014, the new president, Joko Widodo, has pledged to fight corruption 
and IUU fishing (President of Indonesia, 2014a, 2014b). The law enforcers have 
taken serious action tackling illegal fishing, resulting in a decrease in illegal 
fishing and an improvement of fisheries, by detaining and sinking over 300 
foreign illegal ships between 2014 and 2017 (California Environmental 
Associates, 2018; Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2018; Setyadi, 2015). 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has certified some big fishing 
companies in Indonesia for meeting international standards for sustainable 
fishing (Summers, 2019). These changes have been possible because the 
president showed support for law enforcers, the constitutional court and the 
anti-corruption commission (Merkle, 2018). 
 
Despite the president’ strong political will, law enforcement in the ocean is still 
lacking and corruption in general is still high. The lack of law enforcement is 
because the country has limited financial and human resources to enforce the 
law in the sea. The Maritime Security Agency, for example, only possesses 22 
ships or under 10% of the required number of ships (California Environmental 
Associates, 2018). More importantly, corruption in all branches of power is still 
high. In 2019, Indonesia scored 38 out of 100 (completely clean) on 
Transparency International’s corruption index, an increase from 34 in 2014, 
ranking it 98th out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2018). This 
corrupted regime continues to limit law improvement in fisheries (California 
Environmental Associates, 2018). 
5.3 Conservation Approach 
Following independence, it took the national government over four decades to 
institutionalise the conservation of natural resources. Changes to strengthen 
CFM have been gradual. Initially, the national government externally imposed 
conservation goals, but the government did not acknowledge existing customary 
conservation practices. The national government made significant changes to 
acknowledge the role of CFM in conservation by introducing a zone-based 
conservation approach almost a decade after the Reform era, which started in 
1999. These gradual changes are explained in the following two subsections. 
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5.3.1 State-based conservation approach 
In 1990, for the first time since the independence, the Indonesian government 
enacted Law 5/1990, Conservation and natural resource and the ecosystem. 
This law adopted a new conservation ethic that focused on conserving species, 
genetic diversity and ecosystems (Article 5). After adopting the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992, the Government 
strengthened its commitment to protect the biodiversity by enacting Law 
5/1994, Convention on Biological Diversity.  
 
Law 5/1990 and Law 5/1994, however, did not enable a significant involvement 
of local people in conservation. Law 5/1990 framed conservation as a 
government function and ignored customary conservation practices. It stated: 
“the involvement of people in conservation is guided and mobilised by the 
government through various beneficial activities” (Article 37(1)), such as 
“education and training” (Article 37(2)). It allowed the national government to 
declare conservation areas without getting any approval from local 
communities. As a result, in its recent inquiry concerning the protection of 
customary rights, the National Human Rights Commission (2016) confirmed 
that conservation has resulted in lengthy conflicts between formal laws and 
indigenous practices that could displace customary communities from their 
cultural livelihoods.  
 
The NTT government took the same approach as the national government in 
managing conservation. The provincial government had established several 
marine parks in NTT, but their management does not involve local people 
(Directorate of Marine Conservation and Fisheries Biodiversity, 2013a, p. 8). 
The Provincial Regulation 5/1994, Management of Protected Areas shaped this 
approach. This regulation viewed conservation as a provincial government 
function; it did not make provisions relating to customary conservation rules 
and practices:   
(1) The governor undertakes coordination for implementing regional 
regulations in the establishment of protected areas; 
(2) The coordination is undertaken by promoting and sharing 
information with communities; and  
(3) Awareness of the communities’ responsibilities are increased 
through training and education (Article 17) 
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5.3.2 Zone-based conservation approach 
The approach to fisheries management changed as the national government 
adopted a zone-based conservation approach based on Law 31/2004, Fisheries. 
The established marine conservation area, about 2.6 million ha, took a species-
based conservation approach, which did not allow any goals other than 
conservation. The MMAF regulated further this approach in Regulation 
17/2008, Conservation areas in coastal areas and small islands. It states that 
in the zoning approach, a conservation area is classified into different zones, 
based on their characteristics, enabling diverse uses including operation zones 
for the surrounding small-scale fishers. Marine protected areas are established 
not only to protect fisheries, but also to secure local fishers’ access to fisheries. 
 
Indonesian MPAs meet global standards with some differences. According to 
the National Government Regulation 60/2007, Conservation of fisheries, an 
MPA is “a marine area, which is protected and managed according to a zoning 
system to achieve sustainable fisheries and environmental management” 
(Article 1.8). The International Union for Conservation of Nature [IUCN] (1999, 
p. xi) defined an MPA as “any area of the intertidal or sub-tidal terrain together 
with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural 
features, which has been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part 
or all of the enclosed environment”. The IUCN’s definition of MPAs does not 
clarify a zoning system approach as adopted by Government Regulation 
60/2007. However, some IUCN’s categories of MPAs, according to the 
Directorate of Marine Conservation and Fisheries Biodiversity (2013b, p. 5) are 
compatible with some categories of MPAs according to Government Regulation 
60/2007 (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of MPA categories 
 
IUCN Indonesia 
Strict Nature Reserve/ Wilderness Area Cagar Alam 
National Park Taman Nasional Perairan 
Natural Monument Not applicable 
Habitat/Species Management Area Area Suaka Margasatwa 
Protected Landscape/Seascape Taman Wisata Alam 
Wilderness area Not applicable 
Managed Resource Protected Area Not applicable 
Source: IUCN (1994) and the National Government Regulation 60/2007 
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In establishing MPAs, the national government requires the management to 
meet the social and cultural conditions of local communities. The conditions, 
according to Government Regulation 60/2007 include “the support level of 
local communities, the likelihood of a conflict of interests and threats, 
indigenous knowledge and customary rules” (Article 9). Involvement of 
customary communities in the preparation of planning documents for MPAs 
was established by further conditions of MMAF. In the MMAF Regulation 
30/2010, Management plan and zoning of MPAs, “the head of the national 
marine conservation agency is commissioned to establish a working group that 
consists of … community groups and customary communities” (Article 31 (1)). 
In managing the MPAs, Article 18 of the Government Regulation 60/2007 
recommends the management to establish “a partnership with sub-national 
government and communities”. These regulations show that the national 
government is willing to apply customary fisheries practices in managing MPAs. 
 
In addition to existing MPAs, the MMAF Decree 17/2008, Conservation of 
marine areas in coastal and small islands recognises marine conservation 
areas (MCAs). MCAs are defined as “marine areas for customary and cultural 
protection that have special archaeological and historical values, historical 
maritime sites, and sites for religious and customary rituals, which are in line 
with efforts to conserve coastal areas and small islands” (Article 1 (21)). The 
government recognised customary MCAs, but it did not allow customary 
communities to manage them autonomously (Articles 23 and 26).  
5.4 Changes to Democracy 
Improved legislation for customary communities in regarding natural resource 
management became possible after the New Order’s regime changed in 1999. 
As discussed below, democratic changes, including autonomous district 
governments, increased the power of the people. This occurred after a series of 
amendments to the Constitution and the introduction of several laws under the 
Reform Era’s regime, particularly the change to the direct election of the 
president. This resulted in a variety of outcomes. 
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5.4.1 Autonomous district governments 
Increased fisheries exploitation began when the government decentralised 
natural resource management in 1999. Through Law 22/1999, Sub-national 
government, which replaced Law 5/1974, and later replaced by Law 32/2004, 
the national government divided fisheries management among the levels of 
government. The provincial governments managed marine areas within 4-12 
nautical miles from the shoreline, and the district governments managed the 
marine area up to 4 nautical miles from the coastline. The district governments 
were entitled to raise revenue from the harvesting of marine resources within 4 
nautical miles. This law established territorial use rights in fisheries for the 
district governments. 
 
In sharing benefits from fisheries, however, the national government ignored 
the marine jurisdiction of the district governments. The national government 
passed Law 25/1999, Fiscal balance between national and sub-national 
governments, which specified sources of the district government revenue that 
included levies on the production of fisheries and other marine resources. 
Nevertheless, it did not make provision regarding levies on small-scale fishers 
and it distributed collected levies into equal sums for all the districts in the 
country, regardless of the size of the levy contributed per district (Article 6). The 
district governments with no shoreline gained the same amount of levy as the 
districts that had shorelines. This decision saw fisheries and marine resources 
as belonging to all districts or open to fishers from any district. This discouraged 
ownership and improvement of fisheries in the districts with a shoreline 
because the law saw fisheries as a resource belonging to all the districts. 
 
The introduction of decentralised fisheries management has resulted in 
intensive fisheries exploitation and conflicts (Mulyana & Dermawan, 2008). 
Law 22/1999 not only divided up marine areas for district governments to 
autonomously manage, but also encouraged the district government to exploit 
fisheries. The Indonesian Institute of Science reported that the division of 
marine jurisdictions limited the previous cross-district fisheries access for local 
fishers (Satria, 2003). Many district governments and fishers saw this 
autonomy as an opportunity to be financially independent by exploiting 
fisheries and limiting fisheries access for fishers from other districts, leading to 
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conflicts between small-scale fishers. The Director General of the Finance 
Ministry stated: 
Regarding local regulations that focus on increasing local revenues 
and imposing fees [on local activities of the people], it is because 
many [the provincial and district governments] view local autonomy 
as auto-money (Hen, 2008, p.1) . 
 
The NTT provincial government shared the same view about the role of fisheries 
as it sought to boost economic growth from the exploitation of fisheries. Thus, it 
passed Regulation 13/2001, Examination of Fishing Boats and Regulation 
11/2003, Revenues from Fishing Business Permit. These regulations aimed to 
increase the provincial government’s revenue, reflecting the priority it gave to 
economic goals over customary fisheries. These regulations did not exempt 
small-scale fishers from having permits for fishing and trading activities. The 
provincial government was inconsistent with Regulation 8/2001 that focused on 
managing fisheries resources to “reduce unemployment and the poverty rate” 
(Government of NTT, 2001b, p.16) .  
 
The marginalisation of customary fishers increased as the national government 
tried to regain control over decentralised fisheries management. The 
government passed Law 27/2007, Small island and coastal management. The 
law aimed to establish integrated fisheries management and strengthen fishing 
community participation, which was absent under decentralised fisheries 
management (Siry, 2011). However, this law introduced a new private property 
right, known as commercial use rights of coastal and small islands that could 
be granted for 20 years and could be extended for a further 20 years. 
Furthermore, it did not acknowledge the existing customary rights of local 
communities; rather, it required customary communities to apply for this right 
(Siry, 2011). The law was made to facilitate economic investments in small 
islands across districts, instead of supporting customary fishers in fisheries 
management. 
5.4.2 Improved community legal rights 
The Constitution strengthened community rights following amendments 
between 1999 and 2002. In the last amendment, the government added a 
 102 
specification to Articles 18, 24 and 33 of the Constitution. While Article 24 
established the Constitutional Court, Article 33 establishes principles of 
economic democracy such as justice and sustainability in natural resource 
management. Article 18 clarifies customary rights in natural resource 
management:  
The state acknowledges and respects customary communities and 
their traditional rights as long as they still exist, and the practices are 
in line with the current development of the society and the unitary 
principle of the state, which will be regulated by state laws. 
 
In response to the specification of the Constitution, the government supported 
small-scale fishers by passing Law 31/2004, Fisheries. This law stated, 
“Fisheries management aims to improve the well-being of small-scale fishers” 
(Article 3). Therefore, “fisheries-levies are not imposed on small-scale fishers 
and farmers” (Article 48). It also extended the territorial use right for small-
scale fishers from within 0-3 nautical miles, as regulated by Decree of the 
Agriculture Ministry 607/1976, Fishing capture zones, to 0-4 nautical miles. In 
addition, it stated, “Small-scale fishers can fish in marine areas all over the 
country” (Article 61). Thus, for small-scale fishers’ access to fisheries is not 
confined to the marine areas under the jurisdiction of district governments 
(within 4 nautical miles), as regulated by Law 22/1999, Sub-national 
government. 
 
These amendments allowed people to review laws and regulations that are 
inconsistent with the Constitution. A review and annulment of Law 27/2007, 
Management of the Coastal Zone and Small Islands, was an example of 
significant changes. The law granted commercial use rights of coastal and small 
islands to the private sector and enabled the conversion of MPAs into 
commercial fishing areas, which denied the customary rights of local 
communities. This law was annulled because the Constitutional Court (2010, 
pp. 167-168) found that the law “conflicted with the Constitution”. The 
Constitutional Court enables people to challenge the legal rulings of their 
representatives that may conflict with the Constitution.  
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5.4.3 The leadership of the president 
Presidential leadership has also been important for fisheries policy. The 
amendment of the Constitution in 2000 strengthens the power of both the 
president and the people. According to Article 6A, “the people directly elect the 
president and deputy of the president”. This can be seen in the commitment of 
the current President, Joko Widodo, who was directly elected by the people for 
the first time in 2014. He stated at his inauguration that he would transform the 
country into a “global maritime axis” in order to improve food security and 
strengthen the fishers as the main players in this process (President of 
Indonesia, 2014a). 
 
The president has committed himself to enforcing the law and improving 
fisheries for the benefit of small-scale fishers (President of Indonesia, 2015). In 
the Medium Term Development Plan (2015-2019), the President (2015, p. 67) 
aims to secure “territorial sovereignty and fisheries [from foreign trawlers and 
IUU fishing] in order to sustain independence in economies”. During the 
development of the Five-Year National Development Plan 2014-19, the 
President challenged his staff:  
Two months ago, I had given the order to take strict action on IUU 
fishing. I ordered ships to be sunk straightaway. But I had to repeat 
my order three times before some ships were sunk. I wonder why I 
should give the order three times. Why is once not enough to sink the 
ships? Over 90% of four to seven thousand ships operating in 
Indonesia are illegal, but why have only three ships been sunk? I am 
expecting more to be sunk (2014b, p. 2). 
 
As a response to the President’s commitment, the MMAF issued Regulation 
56/2014, Moratorium of new entrants to capture fisheries businesses in 
Indonesia and Regulation 2/2015, Bans of Trawlers and Seine Nets in the 
Whole Marine Area in Indonesia. Similarly, the President (2016) issued 
Regulation 44/2016,  List of negative investment, in which the government 
banned foreign ships from capturing fish in Indonesia. These regulations, 
among others, outlaw destructive fishing that had been legally practised for 
decades. 
 
The improved implementation of legislation has produced a significant 
improvement in both fisheries and the incomes of small-scale fishers. The 
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number of ships detained, burned and sunk in 2014 was 24, rising to 117 ships 
in 2015, 115 ships in 2016 and 127 ships in 2017 (MMAF, 2018). This strict 
action has reduced fisheries exploitation by as much as 30-35% and the rate of 
maximum sustainable yield has doubled from over six million tonnes in 1997 to 
over twelve million tonnes in 2017 (MMAF, 2018). The number of catches of 
small-scale fishers in some marine areas has increased by 30% (Setyadi, 2015). 
Obviously, the exclusion of outside fishers has improved fish stocks to the 
benefit of small-scale fishers. 
5.5 Poverty Reduction 
The goals at different tiers of government are contradictory in respect to the 
roles of fisheries in alleviating poverty. While the national government tended 
to commercialise fisheries, the provincial and district governments relied on 
fisheries to solve poverty.  However, the provincial and district governments 
focused more on facilitating customary fishers’ access to fisheries rather than on 
strengthening their customary rights.  
5.5.1 Conflicting institutional provisions 
The marginalisation of small-scale fishers during decentralised fisheries 
management was due to the lack of protection of their rights. Mulyana and 
Dermawan (2008) linked the problem to the lack of provisions relating to the 
rights of customary communities in Law 22/1999. Similarly, AMAN (2016)  
highlighted the absence of laws promoting the specification of Article 18B (2) of 
the amended 2002 Constitution on customary rights. The government 
decentralised natural resource management to sub-national governments in 
1999 without clarifying and protecting the rights of customary communities. 
 
The national government highlighted the importance of fisheries management for 
supporting small-scale fishers. However, fisheries management at the national 
level is not shaped by a poverty reduction strategy, so it does not support the social 
challenges in NTT, which is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. The 
operation of fisheries was undertaken mainly by large-scale outside fishers. The 
national government did not introduce local specific local policies to empower 
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small-scale fishers to increase their benefits from fisheries. The poverty rate in 
NTT in 2001 was over 40% (Government of NTT, 2001a, p.12) , which was far 
higher than the national poverty rate in Indonesia of about 18% (Bureau of 
Statistics, 2007). 
 
The high rate of poverty in NTT contrasted with its abundant fisheries. The 
Government of East Sumba District (Kewa Ama, 2008) and the Government of 
Kupang City (2013) shared the same view that poverty was correlated with the 
livelihoods of the local people. Most people rely on subsistence terrestrial-based 
activities, particularly agriculture, leaving outside fishers to benefit from the 
abundant fisheries. As the Governor (2002, p. 5) stated in Decree 24/2002, 
Fisheries culture and capture movement, “fisheries and marine resources are 
among the natural resources that are high in abundance”, but the resources did 
not actually benefit local economies. He added, “the contribution of fisheries 
and marine resources was only 3.15% of the regional GDP in 1999; it only 
employs less than 5% of the existing manpower” (Governor of NTT, 2002, p.5)  . 
Thus, since 1999, the provincial government has promoted marine-based 
livelihoods through several programmes (Bria Seran, 1999; Governor of NTT, 
2002).  
 
The provincial government had a similar view to the national government of the 
importance of fisheries for poverty reduction, and it has taken further actions. In 
the Regional Priority Development Plan 2001-2004, the Government of NTT 
(2001b, p. 74) emphasised “empowerment of local communities in natural 
resource management [fisheries management]” to address poverty. The 
provincial government introduced the “Fisheries capture and culture movement” 
(Gemala) programme in 2001. As elaborated in Decree 24/2002, the 
programme aims to: 
reduce poverty by prioritising fisheries and marine sectors supported 
by the other sectors, such as spatial planning, transportation and 
coastal-based activities at the community level (Governor of NTT, 
2002, p.13)  . 
 
The provincial government introduced this ‘Fisheries capture and culture 
movement’ policy in 2002 in order to alleviate poverty among local people 
(Governor of NTT, 2002) . The provincial government sees marine-based 
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livelihoods as a way out of poverty for local indigenous people. Thus, the 
provincial government did not limit whale-hunting activities although the 
whales are protected due to their endangered state. Juxtaposed to this, through 
Regulation 1/2011, Spatial Plan 2010-2030, the provincial government 
recognised marine areas for traditional whale watching as a cultural tourism 
event. The district government supported this policy with a focus on providing 
subsidies and training for local people to undertake marine-based fisheries and 
aquaculture.  
 
The provincial government’s priority in fisheries management shaped its 
policies in acknowledging customary rights. In Provincial Regulation 3/2006, 
Environment Control, the government recognises ulayat rights, which are 
defined as “the highest rights of adat communities to manage and use the 
environment in responsible and sustainable ways for present and future 
generations” (Article 1 (28)). However, the provincial government did not 
establish a particular timeline for local communities to exercise this right. 
Article 21 states: 
The provincial and district governments are required to identify, 
examine and analyse the environment regularly regarding the 
environment potential that can be managed by the communities, 
adat communities, and private companies”.  
 
In addition, the Provincial Regulation 3/2006 clarifies the rights of customary 
communities in environmental protection and control. Article 7 states, “in 
managing the environment, the sub-national governments have to … protect 
indigenous knowledge according to local adat”. Therefore, the regulation 
recognises the rights of individuals to obtain information, get compensation and 
take legal actions against environmental activities that are not sustainable and 
in conflict with customary rules and practices. As Article 20 (3) of Regulation 
3/2006 specifies individuals can:  
a. harvest natural resources according to their capacity and 
allocation in sustainable ways;  
b. get information from the sub-national government about control 
and use of the environment;  
c. get compensation for losses of rights of control over their 
environment;  
d. get compensation for losses of access to the surrounding 
environment as sources of their livelihoods; 
e. manage the environment according to adat laws;  
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f. lodge objections and lawsuits for environmental approvals and 
disapprovals.  
5.5.2 Improved legislation 
The changes toward the empowerment of customary communities in 
environmental management influenced institutional arrangements in fisheries 
management. The provincial government enacted Regulation 4/2007, Coastal 
and Small Island Management, which clarifies the obligation of the 
government and businesses, and acknowledges the rights of customary 
communities. Article 24 states “the government acknowledges, respects and 
protects the rights of customary communities over coastal and marine areas 
that have been managed for generations in sustainable ways”. Similarly, in 
Article 20 (2), the provincial government requires private permit holders to 
“acknowledge, respect and protect the rights of customary communities and/or 
local communities” in harvesting coastal and marine resources. However, the 
regulation does not clarify what it means by ‘managed for generations’ and 
‘sustainable ways’. Moreover, the provincial government has not passed any law 
since the establishment of this regulation, over a decade ago, in order to identify 
marine areas for customary communities to exercise their ulayat rights. 
 
The provincial government strengthened its support for customary fishers in 
Regulation 1/2011, Spatial Plan of NTT Province 2010-2030. In this regulation, 
the provincial government views both natural and cultural resources as equally 
important. The government highlights the roles of customary rules and 
practices for natural resource management. This provision did not exist in 
Regulation 9/2005, Spatial Plan of NTT Province 2006-2020, which focused 
only on natural resource management. Article 4 of Regulation 1/2011 states:  
The spatial plan is undertaken to establish the NTT province as an 
archipelagic and maritime province by focusing on the development 
of sustainable natural resources and local culture, to achieve quality, 
just and prosperous communities. 
 
The provincial government, however, is inconsistent with its own regulations. 
Regulation 1/2011 (Article 34), for example, recognises marine areas for 
traditional whale watching in Lembata district as a cultural tourism event, but 
the regulation does not categorise the marine areas as a customary marine 
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conservation area, as regulated by Article 1 of the MMAF Decree 17/2008, 
Conservation of Marine Areas in Coastal and Small Islands. The customary 
marine conservation areas reflect the provincial government’s 
acknowledgement of customary fishers’ rights to manage the area according to 
their customary rules and practices. The provincial government passed 
Regulation 4/2007 Management of the Coastal and Marine Environment, but 
it does not particularly refer to customary marine conservation areas. This 
policy is in contrast with Provincial Regulation 3/2006, Environment Control, 
which highlights customary community-based natural resource management. 
Despite the efforts the provincial government has introduced, there are no 
marine areas within which customary fishers in NTT have exclusive rights to 
manage fisheries, according to customary rules and practices. 
 
The provincial government focuses more on facilitating local people’s access to 
fisheries rather than enabling the communities to manage fisheries according to 
customary rules and practices. However, its programme has enhanced the 
marine-based livelihood of local people. After five years of Gemala 
implementation, the provincial government claimed, “District and city 
governments [in NTT] have replicated Gemala; it has created jobs and reduced 
unemployment” (Diaz, 2016, p. 1). Seaweed farming has been the most 
favourable aquaculture activity.  
5.6 Coral Triangle Initiative and Its Implications 
There are also multi-national politics, which provide a new direction for 
fisheries management. The year 2009 marked a new approach to fisheries 
management in the Indo-West Pacific region as the Indonesian government, 
together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands 
and Timor Leste, established the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). Thus, this 
section identifies changes brought by the CTI, which will influence how the 
government across tiers applies customary fisheries management in the Sawu 
Sea MPA. It first outlines the institutional arrangements of the CTI, subsequent 
legislative and regulatory changes at different tiers of government, the 
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management framework for the Sawu Sea MPA, the support of international 
donors, and, finally, consultation with affected communities.  
5.6.1 The institutional arrangements of the CTI 
The CTI aims to address both fisheries depletion and the protection of small-
scale fishers. The CTI’s Leader Declaration, signed on the 15 of May 2009, 
asserts that it aims to “address threats to the marine, coastal and small island 
ecosystem through accelerated and collaborative action”, while recognising “the 
urgent need to address poverty and strengthening food security” (Secretariat of 
Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b, p. 1). However, the leaders agreed 
that the CTI Regional Plan of Action, containing the principles and goals of the 
CTI that had been endorsed previously, is “a living and non-binding document” 
and it ‘takes into consideration laws and policies of each country”. These two 
documents shape the CTI institutional arrangement. 
 
There are several governing bodies with different responsibilities established for 
preparing and establishing the CTI. The highest body is the Council of 
Ministers, which is made up of government ministers from all member 
countries who have the responsibility to convene and formally endorse the 
establishment of CTI for leaders of member countries. Based on the Leaders’ 
declaration (Secretariat of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009a), the 
Committee of Senior Officials representing member countries (in collaboration 
with international NGOs and donors) developed the Regional Plan of Action. 
The Regional Secretariat facilitates the National Coordinating Committees in 





Figure 5.1: The CTI’s governing bodies 
Source: Lukman, Pratikto, and Putri (2017, p. 16) 
 
The Regional Plan of Action established the CTI’s principles, goals, actions and 
timeline. The CTI’s goals include the application of an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management (EAFM) and the establishment of marine protected areas 
(MPAs). It aims to achieve these goals through principles such as people-
centred biodiversity conservation, poverty reduction, fair benefit sharing, in 
addition to inclusiveness and engagement of multiple stakeholders (Secretariat 
of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b).  
 
Despite cooperation and collaboration, the Regional Plan of Action, by which 
the CTI Regional Secretariat facilitated the development of the National Plan of 
Action, is not a binding document. The CTI allows individual countries to 
develop plans, rules and enforcement strategies without being confined by a 
higher authority (Secretariat of Regional Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009a). 
Thus, the National Coordinating Committee of member countries 
independently undertook the development of the National Plan of Action. 
However, as presented below, the Indonesian plan of action (Indonesia National 
Coordinating Committee of the CTI, 2009) reflects the CTI regional plan of 
action. 
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5.6.2 Legislative and regulatory changes at the national 
level 
The development of the Indonesian plan of action is guided by the CTI regional 
plan of action (Indonesia National Coordinating Committee of the CTI, 2009). 
The plan sets out guiding principles, goals, targets, and priority action reflecting 
those of the CTI plan. In response to the CTI’s goal of establishing MPAs, for 
example, an action that the Indonesian government established in the national 
plan of action is to “enhance and ensure the involvement of indigenous and 
local communities and relevant stakeholders in MPA planning and 
management” (Indonesia National Coordinating Committee of the CTI, 2009, p. 
40). However, actions relating to building a collaboration in the national plan is 
undertaken “between neighbouring protected areas across national boundaries” 
(p.22) and “with other countries and donor agencies” p.42). Unfortunately, 
collaboration is not established to involve all stakeholders, particularly 
customary fishers. 
 
The regional and national plans of action resulted in several changes, which, 
however, did strengthen small-scale fishers’ fisheries access. The national 
government enacted Law 45/2009, Fisheries that clarified the meaning of 
“small-scale fishers as people whose livelihoods involve catching fish to meet 
daily needs using boats and ships less than five gross tonnage” (Article 1(11)). It 
excludes small-scale fishers from the obligation to hold fishing licences (Article 
27) or pay fisheries levies (Article 48). More importantly, this law imposed 
heavy penalties on IUU fishing, which had been the main challenge faced by 
small-scale fishers. Article 76A states, “equipment and/or tools used in and/or 
produced from fisheries crimes can be seized for the state or destroyed after 
getting approval from the court”. The previous Law 31/2004 did not have these 
provisions. 
 
Improved legislation during the Reform Era increased acknowledgement of 
customary rights following the CTI establishment. For example, as a response to 
the annulment of Law 27/2007 by the Constitutional Court in 2010, the national 
government passed Law 1/2014,   Management of the coastal zone and small 
islands. The Constitutional Court (2010, p. 164) acknowledged ulayat rights 
over coastal areas and small islands. This law no longer favours the 
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commercialisation of fisheries at the expense of customary fishing communities 
as the old one did. However, in order to have legal power, ulayat rights have to 
be codified and enacted in formal written laws: local regulations at the district 
or city level (Constitutional Court of Indonesia, 2012). This arrangement leads 
customary communities to depend on the district or city governments.  
 
Law 1/2014 resulted in a further strengthening of customary communities in 
natural resource management. The national government clarified the 
institutional arrangements of villages through Law 6/2014, Villages. The 
previous law 5/1979, Village governance was annulled in 1999 after the 
national government enacted Law 22/1999, Sub-national government. 
However, while Law 22/1999 treated villages as extended units of the district 
governments, established a uniform governing structure for all villages and 
denied the villages’ rights in managing natural resources, Law 6/2014 
recognises the diversity of governing structures as a variety of adat and ulayat 
rights. This provision is in line with the provision of Law 1/2014 about the rights 
of local communities in fisheries management. However, the enactment of 
village regulations is subject to the approval of the district/city governments. 
This provision enables the government to intervene in customary communities 
in establishing customary rules for natural resource management. 
 
The main change in pursuing the CTI’s goals is the integration of fisheries 
management according to an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. 
This goal is incompatible with decentralised fisheries management in Indonesia 
as specified in Law 22/1999. The national government enacted Law 23/2014, 
Sub-national government that shifted the authority for managing fisheries and 
marine resources from the district/city governments to the provincial 
government. The entire marine area from the shore out to 12 nautical miles now 
falls under the jurisdiction of provincial governments. The law does not 
recognise the jurisdiction of the district/city governments in marine areas, as 
was the case previously with Law 22/1999. The national government re-
integrated the divided fisheries management, implementing the CTI’s goal of an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management. 
 
Indonesia committed to achieving the CTI’s goals. The National Plan of Action 
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states that the CTI’s goal of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management in 
Indonesia had been implemented prior to the establishment of the CTI through 
Law 31/2004, Fisheries, Law 27/2007 and National Government Regulation 
60/2007 (Indonesia National Coordinating Committee of the CTI, 2009). 
Similarly, Indonesia has established over three million ha of MPAs since the 
preparation for the CTI establishment in 2007. This led to the declaration of the 
CTI in 2009 of its commitment to establish twenty million ha of MPAs by 2020. 
As of July 2017, Indonesia has established nearly eighteen million ha of this 
commitment (MoMAF, 2017, p.1). This means Indonesia has established over 
fifteen million ha of MPAs since the declaration of the CTI. 
 
At the implementation level, the national government enacted Decree of MMAF 
23/2008, Organisation and Governing System of the National Management 
Unit for Marine Protected Areas (NMU-MPA) to manage established MPAs. 
This decree established the NMU-MPA’s organisational structure, 
responsibilities, relationships with the national government and geographic 
jurisdiction (including all MPAs in Eastern Indonesia). However, the decree, 
which was enacted prior to the establishment of the CTI, does not elaborate on 
funding sources, decision-making, information provision for and by customary 
fishers, surveillance or law enforcement, all of which will influence the 
applicability of CFM in managing large-scale MPAs. 
5.6.3 Legislation changes at the provincial level 
The Indonesian government at the CTI summit committed to establishing the 
Sawu Sea MPA (MMAF, 2014a). This MPA covers 4.5 million ha of marine areas 
in the Sawu Sea in the NTT province (President of Indonesia, 2009a). The MPA 
is part of the national government’s goal to double the size of marine 
conservation to 20 million ha or 7% of Indonesian economic exclusive zone in 
2020 (MMAF, 2014a). The MPA is home to many cross-country migratory 
fisheries, which justifies the CTI’s goal for adopting an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management. However, some fishing communities in NTT, such as 
Lamalera fishers, have relied on these migratory fisheries for food and for 
exercising their cultural beliefs. 
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The declaration of the Sawu Sea MPA during the first summit of the CTI was a 
direct commitment of the Indonesian government to the CTI, but the 
preparation for its establishment had been undertaken together with the 
provincial government since 2006. The Governor of NTT issued Decree 
190/2006, Team for Studying and Establishing Marine Protected Areas of 
Sawu, Solor, Lembata and Alor Sea to undertake public consultation and 
prepare planning documents.  
 
Preparation for the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA required new 
legislation. In 2007, the provincial government issued Regulation 4/2007, 
Management of the Coastal and Marine Environment. This regulation aims to: 
build a sustainable coastal and marine management … distribute 
coastal and marine resources for the prosperity of coastal 
communities, assure the sustainability of the ecosystem and increase 
the communities’ awareness of laws and legislation (Article 3).   
 
This regulation lays a foundation for customary marine conservation and the 
application of customary communities’ rights in the establishment of the Sawu 
Sea MPA. It recognises: 
The management of particular marine areas with adat laws (Article 
11), and protection of the rights of adat communities to manage 
coastal and marine areas (Article 24). 
 
Regulation 4/2007 gives power to the MMAF Decree 17/2008 concerning 
customary marine conservation areas. However, the provincial government did 
not identify the marine areas in the Sawu Sea that are managed according to 
adat, as regulated by Article 11. As a result, the preparation to establish the MPA 
attracted resistance from customary whale hunting fishers in Lamalera. These 
fishers were not involved in the workshops and training related to the 
establishment of the MPA, which were held in Kupang, the capital city of the 
province. Thus, in April 2009, their representatives held a meeting with the 
MMAF. The MMAF agreed to exclude their fishing grounds from the Sawu Sea 
MPA (Moa, 2009), although the area was not identified as a customary marine 
area in the Provincial Regulation 4/2007 in order to protect whales that have 
been hunted by these customary fishers. 
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The exclusion of the Lamalera whale hunters’ area influenced the view of the 
provincial government. The provincial government had regulated customary 
marine areas, but it did not explicitly recognise the whale hunting area as a 
customary marine conservation area, as specified in the Provincial Regulation 
1/2011. The governor, in his letter of support for the reservation of the MPA to 
the MMAF, urged the national government to consider the interests of all 
parties in the Sawu Sea. Amongst other issues, the governor (2009b, p. 1) 
highlighted the importance of considering:  
3) The interests in the Sawu Sea at local, national and international 
levels; 
4) The dependence of traditional and customary communities on 
fisheries and marine resources of the Sawu Sea; 
5) The dependence of local communities and sub-national 
governments on fisheries and marine resources of the Sawu Sea. 
 
Following the declaration of the MPA, the Governor issued Decree 180/2009, 
Team for Studying, Establishing and Planning of the Management of the Sawu 
Sea MPA. The team was commissioned to undertake further consultation and 
preparation of management plans for the Sawu Sea MPA. This cross-
organisation team comprises policy makers from national and provincial 
governments, experts from local universities, and representatives from the 
private sector, global, national and local NGOs, including fishers’ associations. 
However, it did not involve customary fishers as required by the MMAF 
Regulation 30/2010, Management plan and zoning of MPAs on the argument 
of efficiency. There was an inconsistency among regulations across government 
tiers, as lower-level regulations do not affect higher-level regulations. 
 
A final change that supports the application of customary fisheries was the 
enactment of the Provincial Spatial Plan. Previously, the provincial government 
established in Regulation 9/2005, Spatial Plan of NTT Province 2006-2020 
that at least 30% of the area (both marine and forest) of each island in the NTT 
be recognised as protected. This target was planned to be effective until 2020. 
However, the size of the proposed Sawu Sea MPA itself, as the president 
declared during the CTI summit (President of Indonesia, 2009a), is about 13% 
of NTT, but the area encompassed by the MPA’s marine zones in islands such as 
Rote is larger than 30%. Thus, the provincial government revoked this 
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minimum target for conserved areas in Regulation 1/2011, Spatial Plan of NTT 
Province 2010-2030. 
 
In Regulation 1/2011, the provincial government integrated the Sawu Sea MPA 
together with its zones for customary fisheries management into the Plan. The 
national and provincial governments agreed to “incorporate the policies and the 
zoning system of the Sawu Sea MPA in the Provincial Spatial Plan according to 
the interests of district and city governments” (Sofyanto, 2009, p. 1). The 
Governor reminded the team to “consider coastal zones for seaweed farming 
and other aquaculture activities in order to avoid conflicts of interest and 
strengthen the legal certainty of the businesses” (Sofyanto, 2009, p. 1). This 
suggests that the provincial government considered fisheries access for 
customary fishers in the MPA. 
 
The provincial government no longer views fisheries and marine resources as 
tangible economic assets that need to be commercially harvested as previously 
practised (see Chapter 4). Instead, in Regulation 1/2011, the provincial 
government recognised that the Sawu Sea MPA has intrinsic values in terms of 
“recreation, tourism and cultural practices” (Article 23). However, the 
Provincial Spatial Plan assumes that the existing rate of fisheries catches is 
sustainable. The harvesting rate in the Provincial Regulation 1/2014, Medium 
Term Development Plan (2013-2018) was around 34% of the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield in 2012, while the total size of coastal areas used for seaweed 
farming was only 10% of all potential areas in 2010 (Government of NTT, 2014, 
p.II.81). Thus, although the plan supports marine conservation, it also aims for 
more use of fisheries. 
 
To support the management of the Sawu Sea MPA, the Governor of NTT 
established the Provincial Conservation Forum based on Decree 74/2013, 
Provincial Conservation Forum of NTT province (Governor of NTT, 2013)  . In 
all districts within the Sawu Sea MPA, the MMAF requires the Provincial 
Conservation Forum (in Decree 6/2014) to facilitate the establishment of a 
District Conservation Forum. In 2015, the Mayor of Rote Ndao established the 
forum (in Decree 273/2014), with a similar structure and function as the 
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Provincial Conservation Forum, to involve in managing the Sawu Sea MPA in 
Rote Island.  
 
The most significant change, in relation to this thesis, is the acknowledgement 
of customary rules for managing fisheries on Rote Island. In 2016, all tiers of 
government reinstated hohorok, or customary rules for managing natural 
resources, in six main fishing villages on Rote Island (Amalo, 2016). Hohorok is 
established within the indigenous zone in the Sawu Sea MPA (see Figure 4.3) 
and has been designated for customary fishers to manage fisheries according to 
customary rules practices. 
5.6.4 The Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area 
MMAF Decree 6/2014, the main regulation managing the Sawu Sea MPA, 
established the management plan of the Sawu Sea MPA for the following twenty 
years. This management plan included the geographical marine zones (Figure 
4.3), the management bodies, supporting boards and their roles (Figure 5.2), a 
strategic plan (Figure 5.3), the involvement of local fishers, funding sources and 
interaction among these bodies and stakeholders. The Minister provided a 
guideline for the parties to manage the Sawu Sea MPA. However, the MMAF did 
not clarify the rights of customary fishers in this decree. The provincial 
government failed to enact laws acknowledging the customary rules and 
practices in NTT, as stipulated by the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (2012). 
This lack of clarification influenced the later 2014 decree. 
 
As recommended by the CTI, the management of the Sawu Sea MPA involves 
the collaboration of several bodies at each tier of government. The management 
body at the national level is the National Management Unit for Marine 
Protected Areas (NMU-MPA); at the provincial level, it is the Provincial 
Conservation Forum; at the district level it is the District Conservation Forum 
(DCF); and at the Rote Island community level it is as the Manahoro (keepers of 
Hohorok) (MMAF, 2014a). The overall organisational framework of the Sawu 






Figure 5.2: The Sawu Sea MPA’s management structure 
Source: The MMAF (2014, p.252).  
 
As a guide for collaboration in managing MPAs, the MMAF issued Regulation 
21/2015, Partnership in MPAs that specifies the responsibilities, rights, 
funding, reports and conflict resolution mechanisms of the various management 
bodies. In managing the Sawu Sea MPA, these management bodies are guided 
by the strategic plan (see Figure 6.5) “to achieve sustainable and collaborative 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA in order to protect marine biodiversity, 
maintain cultural practices, and increase community prosperity” (MMAF, 
2014a, p.223).  
 
This vision shapes the objectives, goals and activities of the Sawu Sea MPA 
management, which are in line with the CTI’s Regional Plan of Action and the 
Indonesian National Plan of Action. One of the objectives, for example, is “to 
strengthen the management of the Sawu Sea MPA based on ecosystem, 
integrated, participative and collaborative approaches (Figure 5.3), while one 
goal, among others, is “to revitalise indigenous knowledge and practices for 
fisheries management”. To achieve this goal, the management bodies of the 
Sawu Sea MPA undertake several activities, such as identifying, strengthening 
and integrating indigenous knowledge for fisheries management into the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA. The application of customary rules and 
practices in the Sawu Sea MPA is a vital element of collaborative management 




Figure 5.3: Strategic plan of the management of the Sawu Sea MPA.  
Source: MMAF (2014, p.223)   
5.6.5 Role of international NGOs and donors 
Prior to the establishment of the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA, international 
NGOs such as TNC and CI were involved in marine conservation in Indonesia. 
They worked with the support of grants and loans from donors such as the 
World Bank, JICA, USAid and AUSAid (California Environmental Associates, 
2018; WWF, 2017). The NGOs had long been engaged in several projects in the 
Sawu Sea because it serves as a migratory path of sea mammals, particularly 
whales; they had also served as brokers 8 or as institutional entrepreneurs 9 in 
the CTI (Rosen & Olsson, 2013, p. 196). These NGOs have assisted the national 
and sub-national governments in operating the fisheries and marine 
                                                   
 
8 A broker is an actor who mediates transactions (e.g. of money or knowledge) between (at least) 
two other actors who are not directly connected (Gorris, Glaser, Idrus, & Yusuf, 2019, p. 5). 
9 The concept usually refers to the activities of individuals who leverage resources to create new 
institutions or transform existing ones within particular problem domains (Rosen & Olsson, 
2013, p. 196) 
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conservation programmes since 1998 (People's Coalition for Just Fisheries, 
2013). They worked directly with local fishers, but also through local actors such 
as local governments, universities and NGOs. The projects included capacity 
building, community-based management, control and surveillance, research 
and monitoring, and public awareness for fishing communities (Coral Triangle 
Initiative Support Program, 2011).  
 
The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International both provided the 
provincial and district governments in NTT with institutional and financial 
assistance for the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA (Provincial Development 
Planning Agency, 2013). These NGOs actively facilitated scientific studies, 
workshops and the preparation of management plans for the MPA (Governor of 
NTT, 2009a). Between 2008 and 2010, for example, TNC spent over €530,000 
of grant money on these activities (Hirschmann, 2009) although sometimes, 
much of the money went to their operational activities (World Conservation 
Union, 2002). This suggests that the international community’s roles and 
interests influenced the establishment of the MPA’s goals and continued to 
influence their achievement. 
 
The previous involvement of international NGOs and the UN agencies in 
fisheries conservation in NTT shaped their involvement in the Sawu Sea MPA. 
The Nature Conservancy, the main NGO in the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA, for 
example, was involved in some projects in Indonesia prior to the establishment 
of the CTI funded through, among others, a debt-through-nature swap for 
almost three decades (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2018; U.S. 
Embassy Jakarta, 2016). In fisheries, TNC has been involved in projects such as 
monitoring the state of fisheries, fishing vessels, and promoting rights-based 
management in small fisheries, bringing it to work in Indonesia (Fujita et a., 
2018). The revival of hohorok, for TNC, was to build local ownership for 
sustainable fisheries among small-scale fishers (Mahbub, 2016). This rationale 
is in line with the Convention on Biological Diversity signed in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992 and 2006 highlighting the sustainability of marine biodiversity and 
promotion of indigenous conservation practices (Glowka et al. (1994; Zakaria, 
2018). 
 121 
5.6.6 Consultation with affected communities 
The provincial government consulted local people regarding the Sawu Sea MPA 
from the early stages of its establishment. Following the Sawu Sea MPA 
declaration, the Governor issued Decree 180/2009, Team for Studying, 
Establishing and Planning of the Management of the Sawu Sea MPA. This 
team undertook two series of consultations. The first round involved 
participants from 110 villages and it focused on identifying issues such as 
customary knowledge and practices about fisheries management. In the second 
round, the provincial government discussed the management plans the MPA 
with participants in 125 villages. 
 
The involvement of small-scale fishers in decision-making, however, was 
limited. In their evaluation report, the Team (2014) acknowledged that many 
key local communities were not involved in the consultation processes prior to 
the declaration of the MPA. The Team and the Nature Conservancy (2016) 
confirmed further that nearly 80% of the respondents had not heard about, or 
knew about, the Sawu Sea MPA. The Team (2014, p. 25) concluded: 
The involvement of local fishing communities in the processes 
leading up to the establishment of Sawu Sea MPA is simply about 
informing. They were informed about the management plans and 
they provided feedback about management plans and zones, but they 
were not involved in the decision-making processes. 
 
Despite the fact that local people did not have access to decision-making 
concerning the establishment of the MPA, the national government considered 
the proposal of the provincial government for incorporating customary fisheries 
management. After five years of preparation, the MMAF enacted Decree 
6/2014, Development and Zoning Plan of the Sawu Sea MPA and Surrounding 
Water in NTT 2014-2034, which was based on the management plans of the 
Sawu Sea MPA that had been prepared by the provincial government (MMAF, 
2014a). The plans applied existing development plans along with the provincial 
government’s priority programmes to recognise the customary fishers’ 
management system in the MPA (Centre for National Marine Parks, 2013).  The 
decree recognised several customary fisheries’ management systems, such as 
Hohorok in Rote and Lilifuk in Timor as “useful indigenous knowledge for the 
 122 
conservation efforts in the management of the Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area” 
(MMAF, 2015, p.59). 
 
The other significant change was the revision of the MPA’s size. In Decree 
6/2014, MMAF excluded some marine areas around Rote and Sabu Islands to 
serve as marine transportation zones for both traditional fishers and modern 
ships. As a result, the size of the Sawu Sea MPA decreased by over 22% after the 
exclusion of the fishing grounds for Lamalera whale hunters, and decreased 
another 5% after the exclusion of marine areas around Rote and Sabu Islands 
(MMAF, 2014a; TNC, 2011). 
 
Overall, there was a lack of public consultation and involvement in decision-
making, but the national government considered some fishers’ voices. The 
national government’s policy to exclude whale-hunting areas from the Sawu Sea 
MPA reflects its acknowledgement of customary fishing practice, despite its 
impacts on endangered species. In this case, the national government 
prioritised food security over conservation.  
5.7 Summary 
This chapter shows the changing nature of fisheries management and the 
application of CFM in Indonesia during the last seven decades. These changes 
have been shaped by several factors. While economic challenges have long been 
the main factor shaping fisheries management, decentralised fisheries 
management has marginalised CFM. These factors influence conservation, 
where the government at all tiers tended to see itself as the only player, leading 
to a denial of existing customary conservation practices. 
 
Poverty reduction has particularly shaped the policy of the NTT government, 
distinguishing its policy from the country as a whole. It aims to reduce poverty 
due to the abundance of fisheries on the one hand, and a lack of marine-based 
livelihoods on the other. Thus, decentralised fisheries management enabled 
sub-national governments in NTT to pursue this goal. However, the provincial 
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and district governments focused more on empowering local people to benefit 
from the resources than on empowering customary fishers to manage fisheries. 
 
The CTI establishment in 2009 has led to significant institutional changes and 
acknowledgement of CFM by the national government in managing large-scale 
marine environments. The MMAF identified several CFM practices for 
managing the Sawu Sea MPA, which were re-established in pursuing the CTI’s 
goals. However, the NTT provincial government had passed no law to enable 
customary communities to manage fisheries within clearly defined geographic 
areas, as required by the Constitutional Court. The policy of the provincial 
government is similar to policies prior to the establishment of the CTI. This 
influences customary fishers’ involvement in the establishment of the Sawu Sea 
MPA, which in turn affects the management of the Sawu Sea MPA. Therefore, 
Chapter 6 will examine how customary fisheries management is practised by 
local people on Rote Island and recognised by the national government in 
managing the Sawu Sea MPA. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of relevant legislation at the national and provincial levels 
 
Years  National Provincial 
1957 Regulation 64/1957, Devolution of tasks 
in fisheries and forestry to sub-national 
government 
 
1960 Law 5/1960, Agrarian basic principles  
1968 Decree 44/1968, Appointment of the 
President, the People’s Consultative 
Assembly 
 
1967 Law 1/1967, Foreign business 
investment 
 
1972  Regulation 7/1972, Capture fisheries and 
withdrawal of marine resources 
1974  Regulation 8/1974, Ownership of the 
Land 
1976 Decree of the Agriculture Ministry 
607/1976, Fishing capture zones 
 
1979 Law 5/1979, Village governance  
1980 President issued Decree 39/1980, 
Abolition of trawlers 
 
1982 Presidential Decree 85/1982, Use of 
shrimp nets 
 
1990 Law 5/1990, Conservation and natural 
resource and the ecosystem. 
 
1994 Law 5/1994, Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
Regulation 5/1994, Management of 
Protected Areas 
1999 Law 22/1999, Sub-national government  
 Law 25/1999, Fiscal balance between 
national and sub-national governments 
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Years  National Provincial 
2001  Regulation 13/2001, Examination of 
Fishing Boats and Regulation 11/2003, 
Revenues from Fishing Business Permit 
2004 Law 31/2004, Fisheries  
 Law 32/2004, Sub-national government  
2006  Governor Decree 190/2006, Team for 
Studying and Establishing Marine 
Protected Areas of Sawu, Solor, Lembata 
and Alor Sea 
2007 Law 27/2007, Small island and coastal 
management  
Regulation 4/2007, Management of the 
Coastal and Marine Environment 
The National Government Regulation 
60/2007, Conservation of fisheries 
 
2008 MMAF Regulation 06/2008, Uses of 
Trawlers 
 
The MMAF Regulation 17/2008, 
Conservation areas in coastal areas and 
small islands 
 
Decree of MMAF 23/2008, Organisation 
and Governing System of the National 
Management Unit for Marine Protected 
Areas 
 
2011  Regulation 1/2011, Spatial Plan of NTT 
Province 2010-2030 
2013  Governor Decree 74/2013, Provincial 
Conservation Forum of NTT province 
2014 Law 1/2014,   Management of the coastal 
zone and small islands  
 
MMAF Regulation 56/2014, 
Moratorium of new entrants to capture 
fisheries businesses in Indonesia 
 
MMAF Decree 6/2014, Development 
and Zoning Plan of the Sawu Sea MPA 
and Surrounding Water in NTT 2014-
2034 
 
2015 Presidential Regulation 2/2015, Bans of 
Trawlers and Seine Nets in the Whole 
Marine Area in Indonesia 
 
MMAF Regulation 21/2015, Partnership 
in MPAs 
 





Chapter 6 Customary Fisheries Management on 
Rote Island 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite post-1945 changes in Indonesia, the generations-old customary 
fisheries regime continues. Chapter 4 outlines the fisheries management in 
Indonesia before and particularly after independence in 1945 at the national 
and provincial levels within which customary fisheries management on Rote 
Island is recognised and practised in the Sawu Sea Marine Protected Area. This 
chapter explains how CFM on Rote Island operates within this framework.  
 
There is limited written information available about both terrestrial and marine 
fisheries management on Rote Island. This chapter draws on public documents 
and literature but relies mostly on interviews with government officials, 
customary public leaders and customary fishers who have knowledge and 
authority relating to customary natural resource management on Rote Island. 
Contextual information and CFM are first described, then analysed in regard to:  
property rights-based management; conformity with Ostrom’s (1990) 
institutional design principles; revitalisation; and opportunities and challenges. 
 
6.2 Rote Island 
6.2.1 Geography and Ecology 
Rote Island, in the most southern part of the Sawu Sea, shares marine borders 
with the Timor Sea and Australia to the south, and the Sawu Sea to the north, 
west and southwest. Its size is 1.214 km2, the largest island of 107 islands in 
Rote Ndao district, and one of only eight that are populated. The district has a 
total landmass of 1.280 km2 and is mostly flat without hills (Government of Rote 
Ndao, 2014). Rote Island and the other islands are all officially categorised as 
small islands as they are less than 2,000 km2 in area (Government of Indonesia, 
2007). These islands share similar ecological characteristics: the land is barren, 
rocky and dry, and is mostly covered with bushes and savannah because of the 
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limited period of rain, mostly between November and March (Government of 
Rote Ndao, 2014).  
 
The coastal areas of Rote Island have different characteristics. The southern 
coastal areas are rocky with high marine waves, roaring during the dry season 
between April and November, but some western secluded muddy coastal areas 
such as in Oetefu, Landu, and Batutua villages are suitable for the marine 
culture, salt mining and for traditional marine capture using both deabatur and 
shrimp captures (Government of Rote Ndao, 2014). Most eastern coastal areas 
are compatible for marine culture; particularly seaweed growing since the 
2000s, because there are many sounds protecting the areas from waves and 
other physical matters that can influence the growth of marine resources.  
 
The Rote Ndao district islands have abundant fisheries and marine resources. 
Marine areas surrounding the island are home to migratory fisheries such as 
whales and rich underwater marine resources. These marine areas have over 
700 ha of coral reef, over 7,000 ha of mangroves and over 1,400 ha of sea grass 
(Government of Rote Ndao, 2014), but between 30-50% of these marine 
ecosystems are categorised as severely threatened (MMAF, 2014a). Many of the 
islands have white sandy beaches, attracting tourists from many countries and 
being suitable for growing seaweed and salt mining (Government of Rote Ndao, 
2014). There are also rocky beaches, which serve as the ecosystem of demersal 
fish.  
	
 Rote island has several lakes from which the islanders get freshwater fish (small 
size fish such as trout, carp and eel) and water to irrigate paddy fields (Laksono 
et al., 2018). Dano Tua, just under 2 km2 in size, situated in the western part in 
Thie domain, together with Dano Ana lake, served as food sources for many 
communities in Thie and Dengka domains in the past. Endarwin et al., (2005) 
identify 20 lakes with similar functions, size and that their water comes only 
from rainwater. Since 2009, the national government has re-introduced a 
critically endangered turtle called Chelodina mccordi rhodin back to its native 
habitat in Rote Island. The national government established three lakes as 
conservation areas in the eastern part of the island: Peto lake in Maubesi, 
Ledulu lake in Daiama, and Lendo Oen in Daeurendale, Kecamatan Landu 
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Leko. On average, these lakes are small like those in the western part but 
because there are many lakes compared to the Island’s small population in the 
past, they have played a limited role in providing food. Increasing human 
pressure on the lakes, droughts and lack of rainwater in recent years have 
significantly diminished the roles of these lakes as a source of food (Endarwin et 
al., 2005).  
 
6.2.2 Rote Island society and economy 
 
Rote Island is small in size, but the people are politically and historically 
diverse. There are eighteen Nusak (self-governing domains representing 
different clans and dialects) established by the Dutch in a few stages during the 
colonial period (Fox, 2016). Since the Dutch arrival on Rote in the early 1600s, 
local rulers had been involved in several deadly conflicts before they made peace 
with the Dutch allowing them to rule their domains. The recognition started 
with nusak Termanu, Dengka, Bilba and Korbaffo in 1662, Landu, Ringgou, 
Oepao, Bokai, Loleh, Lelain, Thie and Oenale in 1690, before the Dutch split 
Ba’a from Lelain in 1700, Diu in 1756, and finally, Lelenuk, Keka and Talae were 
split from Termanu in 1772 (see Figure 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1: Map showing nusak and dialects in Rote Island   
Source: Bureau of Statistics (2018e) and Fox and Grimes (1995) 
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The diversity of nusak results in various differences among them. The farther 
the nusak are from one another, the bigger the differences in the dialect; 
neighbouring nusak tend to share more common dialects (See figure 6.1). Fox 
and Grimes (1995) classified the language into eight groups with several dialects 
in each language (See Figure 6.1). However, most nusak share similar adat, 
religion and economic activities (Fox, 1977). Up to 93% of the people are 
indigenous Christians (Protestants). Those who dwell in the eastern part are 
known as the older kids or “Lamak anan” (descendants of Lamak) also “Ledo 
toda” (The sunrise), while those in the western part are called “Hendak anan” 
(descendents of Hendak) also “Ledo toda” (The sunset) (Fox, 1968). Rote is a 
small island with shared characteristics among nusak, but it is also diverse in 
many aspects. 
 
The graduated recognition of nusak influenced charterers of the social and 
economic characteristics of the people. The Dutch established schools in several 
nusak to educate Rote people (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1977). Thus, 
nusak that were firstly acknowledged gained more benefits from the Dutch than 
the other nusak. Many people in the first group of nusak were educated and 
employed by the Dutch in many other islands, particularly Timor, for various 
roles such as soldiers (Fox, 2014). As a result, there were many people of these 
nusak that occupied formal jobs in the provincial government and were 
landowners in Timor, granted by the Dutch.  However, there are now more 
people living in the western part of the island than the eastern part, although 




Figure 6.2: Population growth on Rote Island per Nusak 
Source: Fox (1977) and Bureau of Statistics (2018e) 
 
Despite a high rate of out-migration, Rote population has tripled during the last 
century. There were 42,000 in 1920 during the Dutch colonial period before the 
population increased to nearly 160,000 in 2017, growing by over 4% per annum 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2017; Fox, 1977; Lassa, 2018) (See figure 6.3). Rapid 
population growth began in 2003 when the national government granted 
autonomy to Rote and the other surrounding islands, allowing them to exist 
separately from the Kupang district. The policy created jobs in both formal and 
informal sectors, encouraging Rote people in other islands to migrate back to 
Rote Island in just a couple of places, mainly in Ba’a, the capital city.   
 
 
Figure 6.3: Rote population growth (1920-2017) 
Source: Bureau of Statistics (2017), Fox (1977) & Lassa (2018) 
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The economy of Rote Island has been driven mostly by primary sectors such as 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, making up to 50% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2017, with over 80% of the people living as farmers and 
fishers (Bureau of Statistics, 2018e). The district government spending 
contributes over 12% to the GDP. However, nearly all the annual budget (over 
96%) of the district government comes from the national government. Local 
revenue makes up less than 4% of the district government’s budget because the 
national government does not allow the district governments to impose taxes on 
natural resource extraction activities (Government of Rote Ndao District, 2018). 
This explains the district government’s dependence on the national government 
to fund development programmes. 
 
Rote Island faces socio-economic challenges similar to the entire NTT province. 
The livelihoods of the indigenous people were largely associated with livestock 
raising, sugar harvesting from Lontar palm (Borassus flabellifer) and dry-land 
farming (MMAF, 2014a, Fox, 1977). Rote Island is rich in fisheries and marine 
resources (Government of Rote Ndao, 2014), but there is a lack of marine-based 
livelihood activities among indigenous people; they mostly undertake 
subsistence fishing activities along coastal areas. Prior to the 2000s, over 80 
thousand Rote Islanders lived in villages, thus, they relied on terrestrial-based 
livelihoods (Bureau of Statistics, 2000). Only a small number lived along coastal 
areas and thus being involved in undertaking part-time marine-based 
livelihoods (MMAF, 2014a). People live in villages and developed inland 
fisheries on a small-scale as the lakes are small. Some fishers do harvest 
naturally occurring seaweed and collect shellfish in coastal areas (Governor of 
NTT, 2002).  
 
Although the island’s population only really grew in the last 20 years, changes in 
the indigenous people’s marine livelihoods started to happen in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. The Bajo 10  fishers’ arrival on Rote Island influenced and 
                                                   
 
10 Bajo fishers are from an ethnic group that inhabits other parts of eastern Indonesia as well as 
parts of Malaysia and the Philippines (Nolan & Vincent, 2010). They are well known for their 
migratory marine culture, enabling them to fish across islands and countries (Nolde, 2009).  
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strengthened the island’s marine-based livelihoods. Initially, they used their 
vessels to transport sugar produced by Rote Islanders to neighbouring islands, 
facilitating more indigenous people to be involved in inter-island trades. Bajo 
fishers subsequently settled on Rote Island, mostly in coastal areas, in the 1980s 
(Carnegie, 2008; Nolan & Vincent, 2010). They settled mainly in coastal 
villages, Papela in the eastern coast of Rote and Oelua in the northern coast of 
western Rote, are the main villages. There are over 130 Bajo families settled in a 
secluded hamlet called Tanjung Pasir in Papela and up to 7 families in Oelaba in 
Oelua. However, because up to 10% of them live in their boats and over 30%, 
particularly adult single men, migrate regularly, their exact number remains 
unknown. The number of Bajo fishers is under 0.5% compared to the whole 
population of Rote, but their fishing activities are intensive (full-time) and can 
range as far as Australia. Initially, they fished mainly for shark fins and sea 
cucumbers to meet Asian market demand, but in recent years after 2010, many 
have shifted their fishing activities to meet local market demand after a decline 
in shark fin prices (Jaiteh et al., 2017). Their fishing activities play some role in 
meeting the dietary needs of Rote people beyond these villages.    
 
As Bajo fishers started to settle, they started to adopt and influence the island’s 
culture, particularly through intermarriage between Bajo fishers and Rote 
Islanders. This extended their kin and business networks. Thus, current Bajo 
fishers are not only capable of speaking the local language but are also adopting 
local family names. The arrival also gradually changed and increased the 
number of indigenous people involved in marine-based livelihoods on Rote as 
they learned and worked with Bajo fishers. The presence of Bajo fishers, 
together with the district government’s policy to provide subsidies for fishers 
have led to an increase number of fishers; tripling from over 3,500 to 11,000 
between 2006 and 2016, while seaweed farmers, mainly indigenous Rote 
people, increased fivefold from nearly 6,000 to 30,000 during the same period 
(Marine Affairs and Fisheries Department of Rote Ndao, 2016).  
 
The involvement of indigenous people in fisheries has led to significant 
economic productivity. Fisheries production increased by over 50% from 2,000 
tonnes in 2003 to over 3,000 tonnes in 2014. The biggest change has been in 
seaweed harvesting, which increased over sevenfold from nearly 2,000 dried 
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tonnes in 2003 to over 16,000 dried tonnes in 2014 (Department of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries, 2015; Government of NTT, 2014). Most these 
commodities are sent to other islands to be proceed further; there has been no 
large-scale effort to produce high-quality products from fisheries and marine 
resources on Rote Island.   
 
Despite these changes, fisheries production is still on a relatively small scale; 
seaweed farming, for example, is still less than 10% of its existing potential on 
Rote Island (Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2015; Government of 
NTT, 2014). Over half of the fishers on Rote Island live under the poverty line 
(Marine Affairs and Fisheries Department of Rote Ndao, 2016). Abundant 
marine resources and fisheries have not been able to solve the high rate of 
poverty in Rote Island, where up to 28% of the people live under the poverty 
line (spend less than $2/day) in 2018 (Bureau of Statistics, 2018e).  
 
6.2.3 Governance 
For generations, traditional adat governance had existed on Rote Island, 
influenced by nusak or former kingdoms (Haning, 2015). The king (known as 
Manek) ruled together with the vice king (Fetor), who in practice did not have 
real authority. Manek and Fetor were supposed to support one another like a 
family, as their names imply; Manek represented male characteristics, while 
Fetor11 represented female characteristics. However, Rote people practiced “Tou 
mane (Male man) and ina kakana (Kid female)” 12 principle in a traditional 
family, meaning that men decided for women because men were the kings, 
while women were equal to kids (kakana). Thus, fetor only exercised symbolic 
power.  
 
Adat governance recognised and practised some limited democracy. In some 
nusak, manek was elected and replaced by particular families within the nusak; 
the power was not inherited (Haning, 2015). This might relate to a kings’ initial 
title, which was Mana lolo bote do mana tada tena, a shepherd; protecting the 
people. In nusak Thie, for example, prior to the arrival of the Dutch, all maneleo 
                                                   
 
11 Fetor means female sibling 
12 Tou means male (adult), similar to mane (male) for animal also manek (king). Ina means 
female, while kakana means kids   
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(head of tribes) had the right to elect manek from any tribes. Manek and fetor 
were not exclusively passed down from one member to another within a family. 
However, manek and fetor replacement 13 was the privilege of clans of “Boru 
anan;” 14 these clans exercised legislative power. This succession mechanism of 
manek and fetor, and their relationship with Boru anan reflected a democratic 
process, enabling a balance and check relationship among them. 
 
Under manek and fetor, there were up to nine functional, territorial and clan 
posts15 (Haning, 2009, 2010, 2015). In Thie, the officials were 1) Mane dombe 16  
(Attorney), 2) Mane nggero 17 (Judge), 3) Mane leo 18, 4) Mane dae langgak 19 
(oversaw schedule for land tilt and paddy growing), 5) Mane raraa (oversaw 
inspection/guardianship of paddy field), 6) Mane mok (oversaw fencing of 
plantations or gardens), 7) Mana helo 20 (oversaw chanting during ceremonies), 
8) Mana kila oe 21 (oversaw water distribution), 9) Mane horo 22 (oversaw 
monitoring and sanctions). These officials managed social and natural aspects 
independently from one another; the power of customary courts, for example, 
was independent of the other customary positions, and in many aspects, the 
court was independent from manek (Fox, 2007) (see Figure 6.4). 
 
                                                   
 
13 The replacement was known as kuku ndara  (Kuku means hoof and ndara means horse), 
which started with Boru anan got together, slaughtered a horse and sent one of its front legs 
without the hoof to the king, implying that the king had lost the people’s trust. 
14 Boru anan (children of Boru) are Todefeo, Nalefeo, Mesafeo and Ndanafeo 
15 The number of officials varied across nusak 
16 Dombe means knife 
17 Nggero means to divide into two 
18 Sio means nine 
19 Dae means land also under, langgak means head 
20 Helo means to chant 
21 Kila means distribute, oe means water 
22 Mana means the one, horo means to forbid, also to divide into two 
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Figure 6.4: Adat governance (Example of Nusak Thie) 
…………..: Indirect relationship 
______: Direct relationship 
Source: Adapted from Haning (2009, 2010 & 2015) 
6.2.4 Post-colonial Adat 
Adat experienced significant changes after independence in 1945. The 
Constitution acknowledged the existence and rights of customary communities, 
but operational rules do not clarify and support the role of adat governance by 
nusak. The role of adat continued to decline because the national government 
introduced a formal and uniform governing system for all communities in 
Indonesia in 1957 (Antlöv, 2003). The law denied the existence of various roles 
of adat and nusak, particularly in enforcing and protecting customary rules and 
rights in natural resource management (Fox, 2007; Pollock, 2017). As a result, 
after four decades, the understanding of adat among young people had 
diminished and similarly its practices among elder generations could hardly be 
found.  
 
The role of adat started to improve after the national government introduced its 
decentralisation policy in 1999. On one hand, decentralisation ended not only 
centralistic governance but also the hegemony of the culture and people of Java 
in public policy at the level of local government. On the other hand, it 
strengthened local and ethnic sentiment and pride. The provincial government, 
for example, introduced adat uniforms, locally hand woven garments, to be 
worn by government employees during working hours throughout the province 
and disallowed employees from wearing Javanese factory-made garments 
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(Pollock, 2017). More extreme changes included establishing new local 
government units based on ethnic territories, leading to, among other thing, the 
separation of Rote Island from Kupang District to become a separate district in 
2002.  
 
Formal changes to strengthen adat were more obvious after the establishment 
of Rote Ndao district. Under the Kupang district, there were three sub-districts 
in 1962, before it was divided further into four sub-districts in 1963 and six sub-
districts in 1976 (Government of Rote Ndao District, 2013b). After the 
separation, Rote people not only had their own government and elected their 
own politicians, but also made their own laws and gradually strengthened adat. 
The number of sub-districts increased to eight in 2005 and then ten in 2011 
(Government of Rote Ndao District, 2013b).  
 
The increase in the number of sub-districts reflects a stronger sentiment of 
nusak for identity building. The sub-districts do not have a significant role in 
public management in Indonesia, but a sub-district comprises several nusak 
and weakens the identity of individual nusak. However, because of the small 
population and territorial size of nusak (Government of Rote Ndao District, 
2013b), only a few large nusak, such as Thie and Dengka, formed a single 
independent sub-district, while small nusak have been joined to form a sub 
district (See figure 6.1). 
 
The greater autonomy to the Rote Ndao government has resulted in many other 
changes, particularly in food policy. In 2010, the Rote Ndao government 
introduced a policy to encourage local people to once again grow and consume 
more local food, known as Lakamola anan sio 23 such as corn, sorghum, millet, 
mung bean, sesame and pumpkin (Haning, 2010). The use of such food has 
diminished  among younger people because the national government had for 
decades paid the salary of civil servants using rice, in addition to cash 
(McCulloch & Peter Timmer, 2008). Rice is associated more with the culture of 
Java more than with Rote culture. However, because civil servants are seen as 
                                                   
 
23 Lakamola anan sio means the nine children of Lakamola, the god of food (Ministry of 
Education and Culture, 1977). 
 136 
elites in the society, local people started to value rice as more prestigious than 
other types of food, encouraging its consumption nationally and marginalising 
local food (Haning, 2010). 
 
6.2.5 Fisheries management 
Since its establishment in 2003, the district government has never introduced 
significant changes in fisheries management influencing customary fisheries 
management. According to Law 22/1999, the district government had marine 
jurisdiction within 0-4 nautical miles from the coastline. Within this area, the 
district government can establish marine conservation. However, the 
government of Rote Ndao district did not establish any policy to conserve these 
marine areas. Therefore, fisheries management on Rote Island did not change; 
customary fishers’ access was not constrained. 
 
As a newly established district, however, the district government sought to 
boost its income. It authorised several laws, particularly Law 34/2004, Charges 
for collecting and transporting fisheries and marine resources, which was 
imposed on all fishers.  However, this law, together with some other similar 
laws, was later annulled by the national government (Minister of Home Affairs, 
2005). The national government’s reason was that the law imposed charges on 
fishing activities, burdening small-scale fishers. However, the national 
government did not annul laws relating to fisheries businesses and fishing by 
large-scale fishers (Government of Rote Ndao, 2012). Thus, the district 
government did not raise revenue from small-scale fishers. 
 
Other tiers of government have shaped the activities of the district government 
and the achievement of its goals in fisheries management. In District Law 
20/2009, Medium Term Development Plan, the district government (2009) 
aimed to increase the fisheries production and improve the sustainability of 
fisheries, but the law did not explicitly establish particular strategies. It provides 
subsidies for fishers to facilitate marine fisheries capture and seaweed culture. 
Initially, it has undertaken these activities as part of supporting the provincial 
government’s programmes and considerable funds have come from both the 
provincial and national governments. In recent years, there has been a 
significant increase of budget allocated by the district government to support 
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the fishers and farmers (Government of Rote Ndao, 2014). This change, 
however, does not apply to freshwater fisheries because the lakes are 
insignificant in size and because of drought during the dry season.  
 
6.2.6 Case study villages  
Oelua, the main village in this study, was chosen because it is the only village in 
the western part of Rote where hohorok was re-applied. However, at the time of 
data collection, marine hohorok was no longer practised in Oelua, thus data 
collection was extended to Lalukoen, where freshwater hohorok was practised, 
and to Oetefu village and Ndao island where marine hohorok is still practised.  
These villages are situated in the western part of Rote Island.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: The map showing villages of the study and Tua Lake on Rote Island 
Source: Google Maps (2017) 
 
Oelua is the largest fishing community of the four villages. Up to 10% of its 3500 
population had marine-based livelihoods in 2018 (Bureau of Statistics, 2018d). 
As elsewhere on Rote Island, palm sugar production, involving extracting and 
evaporating water from the sap of the sugar palm (Borassus sp.) involves up to 
half of the indigenous people in these villages, with most men extracting sap 
during the dry season. Both indigenous Rote fishers and non-indigenous fishers 
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such as Bajo fishers live in Oelua, as well as transient fishers from other islands 
who come to work in exchange with palm sugar. Most non-indigenous fishers 
are Muslim. Therefore, the number of fishers in Oelua varies from time to time 
and is often uncertain. They travel regularly between islands; thus, this study 
does not include them as indigenous fishers of Rote Island. 
 
The other villages, however, consist mostly of indigenous Rote people who are 
Christians. Both Lalukoen and Oetefu share the same structure of population 
and economy; their populations are just under 2000, where 98% of the people 
are indigenous (Bureau of Statistics, 2018c). Up to half of them work in the 
palm sugar business, producing over 5 tons of sugar per year (Government of 
Rote Ndao District, 2013a). They differ in their reliance on fishing. Lalukoen’s 
fisheries are freshwater ones, thus the people do not rely on marine fisheries the 
whole year. In comparison, the 180 fishers in Oetefu who undertake only 
marine fishing. The lake in Lalukoen, Dano Tua (see Figure 6.5), is used to 
irrigate paddy farming, the main activity of the indigenous people in Lalukoen 
in the rainy season, but it is not the case with Oetefu people.  
 
For decades, Oetefu has been known as a centre for shrimp and salt production. 
The coast here is suitable for these businesses because they are muddy, 
sheltered and covered with mangroves, protecting the coast from high waves. 
Up to 10 families are involved in salt mining in each dry season and over 35 
families have relied on catching shrimp, producing over 60 tons of salt and 2 
tons of dried shrimp each year (Bureau of Statistics, 2018c). Thus, fisheries are 
much more important for Oetefu than Lalukoen.  
 
Ndao shares the same pattern of fishing activity as Lalukoen. This small island 
just off Rote Island, almost 900 ha2 in size, has over 15% of its 3500 population 
as fishers with less than 2% of the population being non-indigenous. They only 
fish during the dry season when the sea is not rough (Bureau of Statistics, 
2018a).  Over half of the people in Ndao have been growing seaweed for the last 
decade, but for decades they have been well known for having high skills in local 
garment weaving and working gold. Their products are made to meet market 
demand in Rote Island, particularly since the provincial government now 
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requires government employees to wear locally-woven garments (Grimes, 
2012).  
 
The provincial government policy, later replicated by the district government, 
has had a significant impact on the economic activities of Ndao people. To meet 
growing market demands, Ndao people, initially men, left the island before the 
rainy season for other nearby islands to sell the handcrafts. Now, many more 
women are shifting their weaving activities to Rote Island to get closer to 
markets (Asdhiana, 2018). There is a shift in Ndao economy from natural 
resource extraction to home industry. 
6.3 Hohorok as part of Adat 
Adat for natural resource management is known as hohorok (also hoholok) by 
the people in the western part of Rote Island and as papadak by people in the 
eastern part of the island (Fox, 2014; Hidayat, 2017; Prescott, Riwu, 
Steenbergen, & Stacey, 2015). In literal terms, hohorok, means the forbidden 
place or species, referring to particular terrestrial and marine resources and 
areas. Hohorok forbids community members from accessing particular 
communally managed resources and areas at certain times and/or using 
particular methods. The Secretary of the Rote Ndao Forum for Adat and Culture 
(RNFAC) 24 explained: 
It was a traditional practice to manage natural resources and to 
ensure their benefits for all community members, both current and 
future. Hohorok means forbidden as local people are forbidden from 
harvesting resources under hohorok. Hohorok mainly regulated 
terrestrial-based resources. Hohorok in the sea was implemented 
along coastal areas and in sounds [eastern and western Rote]. 
 
Hohorok applied to almost all types of natural resources. These include 
terrestrial resources, such as forest, lakes and wildlife, and marine resources 
such as fisheries, although these were very insignificant. The resources could be 
owned and managed by the community or privately managed and owned by 
                                                   
 
24 Rote Ndao Forum for Adat and Culture (RNFAC) is a coordinative forum involving all 
customary leaders on Rote Island. It was established in 2014 to re-strengthen adat for 
development in Rote Ndao district 
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groups of individuals or even individuals alone. However, accessing and sharing 
of the resources can be communal; allowing other people to enjoy the resources. 
According to the Forum Coordinator: 
The resources can range from commonly managed property, such as 
sounds, forests, terrestrial fisheries and wildlife, to privately owned 
resources, such as mango trees on private farms belonging to 
individual people. Forests, for example, that are managed under 
hohorok principles are called hohorok forests. 
 
Thus, hohorok was a traditional property rights regime, which allocated either 
group or private rights to residents of Rote. In general, hohorok established 
several complementary rules for managing natural resources. These included 
access and management rights, a goal to assure a fair distribution of resources 
amongst community members; enforcement; trials and sanctions.  
6.4 Hohorok Property Rights Regime in the Past 
Hohorok can be analysed using property rights theory. It regulates the rights of 
communities’ members, controls access to natural resources, and enforces the 
processes and types of sanctions for rule breaking, and the responsibility of the 
enforcers (Table 6.1). According to the Forum Secretary: 
Hohorok regulates many factors. [They include] the type of resources 
such as water and its location, how, when, where and who can access 
fisheries, [the process of] monitoring and enforcement, different 
types of enforcers [such as manahoro], and types of sanctions. 
 
Table 6.1: Scope of rules of hohorok 
Aspect  Definition  
Resources  Types (such as forest, fisheries and lakes) and location 
Access  Where, how, when, and who can harvest the resources  
Enforcement Processes of enforcement and responsibilities of enforcers 
Sanctions Types and stages 
 
The rules and rights arrangements in hohorok have been practised largely 
unchanged for generations. The lack of change could imply that there have been 
no significant changes in social aspects, such as population growth, or in 
ecological aspects, such as the state of the resources. Changes in either of these 
areas would have required modification to the rules to address the changes. The 
absence of change is also because hohorok did not specify how to make and 
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under what conditions local people could change the arrangement of these 
aspects. The Forum Coordinator explained that there is no rule for how to 
change the rules in hohorok: 
However, there was no rule about how to change existing 
arrangements that hohorok had regulated for generations. We 
practised it as our parents did. We have never changed it. 
 
According to the Forum Coordinator, who echoed the thoughts of the Secretary, 
the focus of hohorok was on managing the community. Its aim was to build the 
local identity and strengthen solidarity. Hohorok was not simply about 
managing natural resources. The Coordinator added: 
Yes, hohorok regulated many aspects of society. Hohorok is not only 
about forbidding access to natural resources and punishing 
lawbreakers. Hohorok is about building the whole community, 
building collectiveness and solidarity. So, hohorok is not about the 
resources, but it is about the community.  
 
The focus of hohorok on social aspects, rather than environmental matters, 
influences the arrangement regarding control of access for managing natural 
resources. Hohorok did not fully restrict access to resources; it is a partially 
restricted access to fisheries. It allowed conditional fishing access at all times, 
but placed controls on the uses of particular fishing methods. This avoided 
fishery depletion, but at the same time, hohorok also considered the 
community’s needs for food.  
 
In addition, hohorok took into account the established social relationships 
between communities. Access to fisheries was open to neighbouring 
communities. The Tua Lake manahoro commented:  
All the people in the communities and neighbouring villages have the 
same obligation to follow hohorok rules and the same right to harvest 
when manahoro lifted the hohorok. Artisanal fishers and fishers 
using fishing rods could access fisheries the whole year. During the 
open period, fishers could use fishing nets, including from other 
villages. We allowed them to access fisheries because we depend on 
one another in many ways.  
 
To ensure law enforcement, manahoro enjoyed some benefits and rights to 
enforce the law and bring transgressors to a customary court. Most manahoro 
have the same rights to access fisheries as the community members, but some 
enjoyed exclusive access rights to fisheries throughout their lifetime. More 
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importantly, this position bestowed higher social status within the community. 
The Tua Lake manahoro articulated the rights of manahoro:  
Most manahoro have all the access rights attached to users, the right 
to supervise the sites and regulate control of fisheries and bring 
lawbreakers to the customary court. Some manahoro have an 
exclusive right to access the reserve areas of lakes. The tenure of 
manahoro can vary from one to three years, but sometimes someone 
can assume manahoro for an indefinite time. Therefore, manahoro 
could enjoy the rights for their whole life. 
 
The allocation of property rights in some marine fisheries hohorok differed from 
those of terrestrial hohorok. Most marine fisheries hohorok were implemented 
in Deabatur, a fence made of stones or coconut leaves built to trap fish during 
low tides (see Figure 6.5). Some users in marine fisheries hohorok were also 
owners who had rights to access, manage, exclude, and transfer fisheries. 
Private parties owned fisheries but this form of hohorok had a social aspect; it 
allowed local fishers to have limited rights to access fisheries without exercising 
the rights of ownership. A fisher in Oetefu village, whose family was an owner in 
a marine fishery hohorok explained: 
Local fishers established marine hohorok in shallow marine areas 
with limited or no waves. Some areas belonged to certain families, 
but many of them were open access areas so anyone could manage 
them. In these areas, groups of local fishers, normally fourteen 
people, would build and manage a deabatur. It was a large v-shaped 
fence with a small semi-circle-shaped fence attached to the main 
fence to trap fish. The group of villagers that built and managed the 
deabatur were the owners. They had the right to open and close it, 
impose entry fees, exclude certain people, preserve, and rent or sell 
it. There was no prohibition about the arrangement of these property 





Figure 6.6: Examples of Deabatur (fish trap) on Rote 
Source: Yopi Bauana  
 
A shared characteristic of freshwater and marine fisheries hohorok is that they 
considered both ecological and social aspects of fisheries. Freshwater fisheries 
hohorok considered the whole benefits of the water and fish, particularly for 
irrigation uses. Thus, manahoro lifted hohorok when the level of water in lakes 
was low as the result of irrigation uses. Irrigation needs for water was equally as 
important as people need for fish. It also stressed fair access rights to the 
resources for community members. Thus, manahoro considered the 
community’s need was for an accessible level of water to everyone to harvest 
fisheries without difficulty. The Tua Lake manahoro added:  
We lift the fisheries restriction after the community harvest rice, 
around July and August [when fish are large enough in size after 
almost ten months of a closed period]. An early lift would drain the 
water in the lake for agriculture needs. But, the purpose of lifting 
hohorok after the level of water was low is to enable fair access to 
fisheries for all people. When the level of water was high, it would be 
difficult for women and the elderly to catch fish.  
 
Terrestrial fisheries hohorok did not recognise an individual quota system that 
could be transferred to other people or saved for future harvests. The right to 
access fisheries was only valid during the open period. Beyond this period, 
fishing was forbidden, but artisanal fishers and users with fishing rods could 
fish at all times. Therefore, during the open period, people harvested as much 
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fish as possible. Community members, who did not have access to fisheries 
when the hohorok was lifted, could not claim their rights in the future. The Tua 
Lake manahoro shared the view of the fisher in Oetefu Village that: 
There was no limit to the harvest. Therefore, most people would 
come in the first few days of the open period of hohorok. Everyone 
had the same right to come, bringing as many family members as 
possible, and taking as much fish as possible. If any people did not 
come, they would lose their rights to fish for this period. The open 
period only lasts for three to six days in a year.  
 
Terrestrial fisheries hohorok did not impose limits on the number of fish caught 
during open periods. However, terrestrial hohorok limited the length of the 
open period as well as the accessible fishing areas for the public. There were 
non-harvesting areas that served as fishery banks for future needs and, 
therefore, ensured a sustainable level of fishing. This arrangement of property 
rights protected fishing stocks for future use. The Tua Lake manahoro 
confirmed:  
There were always some fish left from the harvesting areas, and there 
were many fish left in the non-harvesting areas. Therefore, we did 
not worry about replenishing the fish stocks [mostly native fish]. In 
fact, with this leftover, we could harvest fish in the following years at 
almost the same amount as the past years.  
 
Marine fisheries hohorok did not place limits on the size of harvested fisheries, 
as is the case in terrestrial fisheries hohorok. This was because marine fisheries 
hohorok did not recognise endangered fisheries, which need to be protected, 
because the sea replenished fisheries and marine resources in a deabatur 
during high tides. Users harvested all fisheries in the designated areas within a 
deabatur when it was opened. The limits were on the areas and the time for 
harvesting fisheries. It was the owners who harvested fisheries in the reserved 
areas. Marine fisheries hohorok had the same social goal as terrestrial fisheries 
hohorok, but the former did not set different harvest time for the elderly and 
disable people as the later did. The other difference was that there was no 
intention to conserve fisheries in a deabatur, but because fishing was 
undertaken only within deabatur, thus it did not deplete fisheries in the sea 
beyond the deabatur. 
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While marine fisheries hohorok did not recognise conservation of resources 
within a deabatur, terrestrial hohorok established some reserved areas. The 
closed period in terrestrial hohorok could last up to a year; it lasted longer than 
the period of marine hohorok, which lasted from two days to four weeks. On the 
days when a terrestrial hohorok was lifted, fishing tools such as nets were 
allowed. All community members, regardless of their Leo (tribe), could catch 
fish without paying any fees, but sometimes there were fees imposed for a 
certain time and purposes. The Tua Lake manahoro further explained:  
We believe people could not deplete fish, as there were parts of the 
lake that cannot be accessed due to its natural characteristics. There 
were natural caves in the lake, in which fish can hide and the people 
cannot reach them. In addition, there were forbidden areas to catch 
fish in the lake. The areas were much deeper than other parts of the 
lake. They were man-made wells and were owned privately by 
maneleo. These wells served as fish banks to regrow fish in the lake.  
 
The practice of hohorok on surrounding small islands such as Ndao differs from 
that of the deabatur on Rote Island. The coastal fishing communities in Ndao 
still practise hohorok, but they do not recognise deabatur as practised on Rote 
Island. They reserve certain coastal marine areas, which serve as feeding 
grounds for fish, but they allow fishing by artisanal fishers and fishers using 
fishing rods. Fishing in other marine areas does not have restrictions on the use 
of fishing nets. A customary public leader in Ndao Island confirmed the 
arrangement for marine hohorok: 
Our hohorok differs from marine hohorok on the mainland, which 
allows harvests using nets at certain times. We only regulate fishing 
methods in the reserved areas. It is legal to use bare hands and 
fishing rods, but fishing nets and spearfishing are illegal. There are 
taboo marine areas, where there is no entry without the permission 
of the manahoro. In addition, there is no private ownership. It is a 
communal resource. Thus, the regulation applies to all members of 
the community. However, fishers could fish beyond hohorok areas 
using nets.  
 
For terrestrial fisheries hohorok on the mainland of Rote, there was a different 
arrangement in terms of holders’ rights and conservation practice from those of 
coastal marine fisheries hohorok. However, there were similarities with hohorok 
in Ndao in assuring the communities’ needs for food. The Tua Lake manahoro 
confirmed: 
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Hohorok was implemented in lakes, forests and farms. These were 
closed for a year. During this period, artisanal fishers and fishers 
using fishing rods could access fisheries. This practice enabled small-
scale fishers to meet their daily needs for food. It was illegal to use 
small-sized trawler-type fishing nets, which can remove many fish 
within a short time of fishing. When it was open, all villagers could 
harvest fisheries in non-reserved areas. 
 
The variety of practices in hohorok for both marine and terrestrial fisheries on 
Rote and Ndao islands are summarised in Table 6.2. There are differences in 
terms of resource ownership, fishing methods allowed, and approaches to 
conservation. A common quality is that all hohorok recognised the social 
function of fisheries, which influenced how fish were distributed within the 
community regardless of the type of fishery ownership. 
 
Table 6.2: Practices of hohorok 
 Marine hohorok on 
Rote (deabatur) 
Terrestrial 






Limited public access 
Closed  
period 
Time 2 days -4 weeks 12 months Indefinite  
Methods None  Fishing rods Fishing rods 
Areas None  Designated areas All areas 
Open  
period 
Time 1 day 3-6 days Indefinite  
Methods Artisanal Fishing nets  Fishing rods 
Areas Determined areas Designated areas All areas 
Conservation   




Recognised  Recognised 
 
Overall, both marine and terrestrial fisheries hohorok possess several similar 
characteristics to those found in modern property rights-based management 
(Table 6.3). Different parties exercise different rights. Users might access 
fisheries within a certain timeframe, but they would lose the right if they did not 
exercise it. Their right cannot be transferred to other users nor be secured for 
future access. This arrangement is similar to the rights of manahoro, who had 
the right to enforce the law and enjoy all the rights of users. However, only 




Table 6.3: Comparison between modern rights-based resource management and 
hohorok regimes 
 
Characteristic Modern rights-based 
resource management  
Hohorok  











Goal  To avoid depletion of 
fisheries  
To secure resources for a social 
purpose  
Transferability Recognised  Limited to local communities  
Duration  Decades Days - months 





6.5 Hohorok and Ostrom’s Institutional Design 
Principles 
This section examines the effectiveness of hohorok against Ostrom’s (1990) 
design principles for managing common-pool resources. Hohorok design 
principles are discussed below in relation to those of Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles (explained in Chapter 2). 
6.5.1 Small-scale environments and resource users 
Most hohorok resources are geographically small, mostly situated within a 
village. Fisheries hohorok, for example, cover either a lake (dano) or a sound 
(tasi bafak). There are no large-sized lakes or sounds in Rote. The Tua Lake, for 
example, is approximately 2 km long and 700 m wide (Figure 6.6) and is shared 
by Lalukoen village on the southern edge of the lake and Lidor village on the 
northern edge. This small size enables local people to identify the boundaries of 
the hohorok resource.  
 
The small size of environments and the number of users meant that manahoro 
could easily undertake monitoring, and law enforcement. Because a community 
comprises around fifty families, this small number of users enables community 
members to communicate face-to-face with one another. Thus, changes in user 
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activities and fisheries can be monitored with little difficulty. As explained by 
the Tua Lake manahoro: 
In the 1980s, the number of fishers who went fishing every day was 
small, and they tended to stay static. Everyone knew about everyone: 
not only his or her activities but also favourite fishing grounds, the 
number of catches and changes in the fisheries. Thus, we did not 
have problems patrolling the lake. I could also get information from 
people living near the lake about fishers’ activities. And I could 
prosecute a lawbreaker a few days after an illegal fishing activity took 
place. No one could hide from me.  
6.5.2 Social-based benefit sharing  
In managing fisheries, both marine and terrestrial, hohorok considered social 
aspects of the resources. Most marine fisheries hohorok were privately owned 
and managed by a group of fishers. This ownership was associated with land 
ownership along coastal areas. However, there was some public access to 
harvesting fish.  
 
During the open period, non-owners could harvest fish in a designated area 
within a deabatur. Non-owners enjoyed this benefit even though they did not 
contribute to the cost of managing the fishery, but they helped the owners in 
catching fish within a deabatur. While the non-owners caught fish in the 
designated areas, they caused the fish to gather in the v-shaped part of a 
deabatur, where the owners had exclusive access. A fisher in Oetefu village 
explained:  
The deabatur was closed to everyone for a certain time. It could be a 
few days, weeks or months. During this closed period, it was illegal 
for anyone to fish within the deabatur, but when it was open villagers 
could harvest fish within the outer parts of the deabatur with no limit 
in the ways or amount of harvest. The involvement of the public 
helped the owners to trap fish within the inner parts of the deabatur 
with little effort. Therefore, the owners always get most of the fish. 
 
Similarly, terrestrial fisheries hohorok allocated fish based on social 
considerations. All community members had the same rights to access fish 
during the open period. To reduce competition and ensure access for all 
members of the communities, manahoro provided harvest days exclusively for 
the elderly and physically weak people. This ensured their access to fish 
regardless of their skills or ability to fish. The Tua Lake manahoro confirmed: 
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We would shorten the open period if many people joined the harvest 
and caught a significant amount of fish. We did this to preserve fish 
for other people, especially the elderly, who would harvest on 
separate days. This separation enabled everyone to catch sufficient 
fish for their family. 
6.5.3 Traditionally-based rules and participatory changes 
Customary communities have practised hohorok for generations. Its main 
elements, such as rules and roles, are the same as they were before 2014. In 
general, local communities only adapted, they did not fundamentally alter the 
rules. However, sometimes, the community changed the rules for a short period 
for particular reasons, such as meeting the collective needs of communities. The 
Tua Lake manahoro asserted: 
We made no change to the rules of hohorok. There were no rules 
about changing the rules of hohorok. But, I remember once we had to 
lift hohorok for only a few days, less than a week as it was practised, 
after noticing that the amount of daily fishing activity involved more 
fishers, which meant that less fish was left for hohorok to be lifted. 
However, there was no rule specified in advance about this change. 
We made the change after consulting the elders and members of the 
communities.  
 
There were some other reasons to modify the rules. In most cases, changes were 
made in the interests of resources and communities and only applied for a 
limited period and upon approval of the people. One reason for the change was 
the increasing number of fishers, which can lead to overfishing, and a second 
reason was the need for the community to obtain funds for building community-
owned infrastructure. This change was never made previously. According to the 
Tua Lake manahoro:  
Since the 1980s, the number of users had increased. Thus, for some 
years, an entrance fee was imposed on fishing activities in certain 
parts of the lake with the agreement of the community members. 
These areas of the lake were seen to have more fish than other parts. 
The fee also was imposed when the communities needed to raise 
funds to pay for community needs, such as the construction of 
churches and irrigation tunnels.  
6.5.4 Monitoring and graduated sanctions 
Manahoro had the main responsibility for monitoring and enforcing hohorok 
rules. Manahoro undertook monitoring daily without difficulty because of the 
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small size of fisheries and their adjacency to the community’s settlement. The 
Forum Secretary confirmed: 
Monitoring was easy as the size of most hohorok resources were 
small. In hohorok fisheries located near community settlements and 
other public areas, manahoro could rely on local people for 
information about activities of fishers in hohorok areas. Thus, 
lawbreakers could be easily identified. 
 
Interviewees explained that sanctions (nggero) varied across hohorok 
resources. Hohorok associated with the Tua Lake did not recognise graduated 
sanctions, but other hohorok practices did. Sanctions were imposed on both 
those who broke hohorok for the first time and repeat offenders. Sanctions were 
adjusted to local contexts and were determined during the declaration of 
hohorok. In most hohorok areas, transgressors were required to pay penalties 
with animals, such as pigs or goats, and rice, which were shared among 
manahoro and community leaders. The Tua Lake manahoro commented:  
The type of sanctions and fine amounts imposed on a law-breaker 
had been specified during the hohorok’s declaration. We just 
inherited it without making any changes to it. It [the fine] was 
equivalent to the value of the animal sacrificed on the day of 
declaration. This value was applicable to both first-time and repeat 
offenders. However, to the best of my knowledge, there was never a 
law-breaker in the Tua Lake during my tenure as manahoro. People 
complied with hohorok rules. I am sure that this compliance was 
because we did not close hohorok at all; we allowed people to catch 
fish using certain tools at all times. 
 
Marine fisheries hohorok recognises a graduated sanction. Offenders would be 
punished according to adat with different types of fines, and the infringement 
fines differed between a first-time and repeat offender. The fine would be 
shared among customary public leaders and attendants of the court. A 
customary fisher in Oetefu fishing community explained: 
If someone was found guilty, he or she would be fined but the 
amount of the fine for the first-time offenders was different from a 
repeated one. A second time law-breaker, for example, would be 
fined twice as much as the amount of the fine imposed on a first-time 
law-breaker. 
6.5.5 Customary-based court 
Hohorok adopted tribe-based law enforcement with different roles for law 
enforcers. If there were a case of law breaking, the manahoro, who served as the 
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keeper of hohorok, would bring (known as klak) offenders of hohorok to be 
tried in an open customary court, which was presided by manenggero (see 
Figure 6.5). According to a customary fisher in Oetefu village: 
Both marine and terrestrial hohorok were regulated according to 
adat. Thus, there was an adat sanction. Whenever someone broke 
hohorok, the manahoro would bring the case to an adat court. It 
would be the manenggero who presided over the court to sentence 
the offenders. The trial was an open process, allowing all villagers to 
attend and provide testimonies and receive fines paid by an offender. 
 
The time for holding trials differed between a first-time offender and a repeat 
offender. In most cases, trials for a first-time offender were undertaken in the 
evening. It was not because the villagers were busy working during the day, but 
because the court avoided bringing shame to the offender. However, trials for a 
repeat offender were undertaken during the day and involved more 
eyewitnesses. This arrangement was meant to avoid unnecessary conflicts 
involving family members of the offender and to bring more shame to the 
offender.  
6.5.6 Nested institutional arrangement 
Hohorok recognises a nested system in its rule provisions, monitoring, trials, 
and enforcement. Hohorok was organised at several nested managerial levels 
(manahoro, maneleo, and manek) with an autonomous and clearly defined 
domain of decision-making at each level (Table 6.4). According to the Forum 
Coordinator: 
Manahoro oversaw natural resources management at the lowest 
level. He managed small size forests, lakes and sounds. Maneleo 
oversaw a wide variety of collective adat affairs, along the lifecycle of 
human and natural resources within a tribe; it can start from birth to 
the death of the people. And manek was the king. There were 









Table 6.4: Hierarchical structure of hohorok within informal institutions 
 





Manahoro Hohorok  Specific natural resource 




Maneleo Adat  Customary rules about 




Manek Informal governance  The entire management of 
informal public affairs  
 
Source: The RNFAC coordinator and manahoro of the Tua Lake 
 
This nested system enabled an integrated management of hohorok across 
customary and administrative jurisdictions on Rote Island. In controlling access 
to fisheries, for example, manahoro discussed the open period of hohorok 
across tribes and domains to avoid users overlapping. According to manahoro 
of the Tua Lake, the time for lifting hohorok was adjusted to that of Ana Lake, 
which is situated in Lidor village to the north of Lalukoen village in a different 
domain (see Figure 6.5). Under the leadership of manek and maneleo, 
manahoro of these lakes collaborated to discuss the management of these lakes, 
including the duration of the lifting period. This suggests that hohorok 
recognised a horizontal coordination. 
 
The jurisdiction of manahoro over some resources, including the Tua Lake, was 
across administrative jurisdictions. In the case of the Tua Lake, the manahoro 
explained that while the southern part is situated in the Thie domain under the 
control of the Nallefeo tribe, the northern part is situated in the Dengka domain 
under the Elo tribe’s control. However, the lake management was collectively 
undertaken by manahoro of both leo and domains. The management did not 
submit to the authority of either Manek Thie or Manek Dengka; instead, 
manahoro from both domains managed the lake as a single resource unit. They 
agreed on similar access methods and the duration of fishing, which enabled 
them to control both users and fisheries. This suggests that hohorok recognised 
some principles of an ecosystem approach to natural resource management. 
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6.5.7 Government recognition of hohorok 
The district government began to become involved in hohorok management in 
the 1980s. The government’s intervention originated from the involvement of 
manek in government affairs. The district government appointed manek to act 
on behalf of it in managing some government affairs. There were several 
maneleo who also worked in the district government at the same time. The Tua 
Lake manahoro commented: 
Hohorok was independent of the government. The rules about access 
and management of hohorok did not need government support to 
enforce them.  
 
The independence of hohorok can be seen from local people’s opposition to sub-
national government intervention. Local elites (some maneleo), who also 
worked at the district government, supported the government’s plan to 
commercialise fisheries by applying entrant fees, but local people rejected the 
idea. An independent researcher of Rote adat explained: 
In the 1980s, the district government started to intervene in hohorok. 
It strengthened the rules of hohorok fisheries, which were upheld by 
the manahoro and maneleo. Later on, the government introduced 
and managed entrance fees to hohorok fisheries. This intervention 
got support from the manek; however, it brought resistance from 
some members of local communities. Thus, the government revoked 
the entrance fee. 
 
Manek involvement in the government’s affairs strengthened the roles of 
manahoro and maneleo. These elites gained government support to enforce 
hohorok rules and secure their privileges as keepers and protectors of hohorok. 
The Forum Coordinator stated:  
Manek themselves did not want to lose their power by opposing the 
sub-national government’s policies. They support these government 
policies because it secured their traditional power. At the same time, 
the manek’s involvement provided protection and support for the 
manahoro and maneleo to manage hohorok.  
 
Overall, hohorok conforms to all Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design 
principles. However, some aspects of hohorok are not only different from but 
also absent in the design principles (Table 6.5). The aspects closely relate to the 
local culture that emphasises social collectiveness and solidarity making 
hohorok different from the practice of community-based natural resource 
management in western contexts. 
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The environment units under hohorok, for example, are collectively managed. 
Hohorok was used not only for managing marine fisheries, but also for 
freshwater fisheries and other terrestrial-based natural resources. All natural 
resources are seen as an integral unit. This approach was influenced by the 
focus of hohorok on people, instead of on resources; hohorok adopts an 
equitable food distribution principle to achieve social solidarity and harmonious 
principles of relationships among communities. For this reason, hohorok did 
not recognise permanent closure of access to resources and allowed access for 
neighbouring communities.  
 
The collectiveness characteristics of hohorok influence benefit sharing, which 
can involve several communities in a tribe and across tribes. Sometimes, where 
a biophysical environment unit stretches across several communities, the 
management and benefit sharing involved several communities and tribes. The 
focus of benefit sharing was in the equity, instead of equality as the case with 
Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principle. This focus on the solidarity was 
obvious in the sanctions imposed on law-breakers where fines were paid in-kind 
and shared among community members. The sharing served as a reminder to 




Aspect Hohorok Ostrom (1990) 
1. Environment 
units 
Collectively managed Separately managed  
2. Spatial scale Large Small  
3. Boundary 
definition 
Tribe & kinship-based   Community-based  
4. Closure of 
access 
Temporary  Permanent  
5. Focus People Resources 
6. Benefit sharing  Equity among community 
members  
Collectively-based 
Equality between costs and 
benefits  
Individually-based 
7. Sanctions/ fines In-kind; shared among 
community members 
Vary across communities  
 155 
6.6 The marginalisation and revitalisation of 
hohorok 
Since independence, several factors have contributed to diminishing the roles of 
adat and hohorok on Rote. Increasing the role of the formal government and 
constitutional denial of customary communities’ rights in natural resources 
management have been the main factors decreasing the role of adat and adat 
governance (See Chapter 5). Fox (1968) found that changes to the governing 
system in the twentieth century diminished the role of adat governance in many 
aspects of life, particularly the role of the customary court that enforced rules in 
adat and hohorok. This is more obvious since president Soeharto took power in 
1967 and introduced a centralised and uniform mode of governance for all 
customary communities (Antlöv, 2003). He also boosted economic growth 
through natural resource extraction, leading to privatising tribe-owned 
resources such as land and forests belonging to customary communities (See 
Chapter 4). In recent decades, privatisation has been influenced by increasing 
numbers of migrants and tourists (Kewa Ama, 2011).  These people have not 
only brought different norms and values for managing natural resources, but 
also are economically better-off and have better access to decision making in 
natural resource management influencing local norm and culture (Wright & 
Lewis, 2012).  At the same time, many more young people are less interested in 
adat and hohorok as they found new opportunities for work, education and 
travel that rely less on natural resource extraction compared to traditional 
sectors. These have implications for adat and hohorok among young 
generations: decreasing knowledge and awareness about the practice and 
importance of hohorok among young people.  
 
Efforts to revitalise adat on Rote Island began in the 1990s, mainly by 
customary public leaders, such as the Maneleo (tribal chief) in several Leo 
(tribe). Rote Island (at that time part of Kupang district government) did not 
become involved in the revitalisation of adat until 2002, when the Rote Ndao 
district was established and separated from the Kupang district. The local 
people elected a mayor who had close connections with and understanding of 
adat and became involved in and supported its revitalisation. The district 
government mostly focused on supporting ceremonial activities, such as the 
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declaration of customary rules and the inauguration of the younger generation 
as maneleo and other customary officials. The district government did not 
establish any law regarding this informal governance and its roles.  
 
The establishment of the Rote Ndao Forum for Adat and Culture (Forum) in 
2009 assisted the revitalisation of customary rules and practices across Rote 
Island. This forum involves customary figures, such as maneleo across the 
nineteen former Nusak (domains) on Rote Island, in order to establish and 
pursue its agenda. Its main goal is to strengthen adat as was previously 
practised to manage both community and natural resources. According to the 
coordinator of the Forum: 
The revitalisation [adat] gained momentum across all tribes in the 
nineteen Nusak on Rote Island, after the establishment of the 
forum in 2009. The forum serves as a communication and learning 
platform for maneleo in revitalising adat.  
 
Among other things, adat revitalisation sought to halt the depletion of natural 
resources on Rote Island. The revitalisation of hohorok, however, focused 
mostly on terrestrial-based natural resources, despite an increased depletion of 
fisheries (see Chapter 5). The Forum Secretary commented: 
In the 1990s and 2000s, customary public figures started the 
revitalisation of adat within their leo and then they got support 
from the district government. The goals were to simplify customary 
rules and practices [such as sanctions for adat breakers, a dowry for 
marriages and slaughtering of an animal during burial ceremonies] 
that are financially burdensome and impoverish local communities, 
and to strengthen the solidarity of local communities in undertaking 
collective activities and managing common pool resources [forest, 
spring water, lakes and wildlife]. 
 
There was a widespread awareness among customary public figures that 
hohorok could solve environmental problems on Rote, such as destructive 
farming and fishing practices. The Forum Secretary commented that leo are 
committed to: 
Stopping destructive agricultural practices, such as slashing and 
burning forest and farms - and fishing practices of blasting and 
poisoning.  
 
The Forum has gained wide support due to the involvement of customary public 
leaders at all levels and, more importantly, with the instalment of the Rote Ndao 
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Mayor as Maneleo Ina Huk 25. This position justified the Mayor’s intervention 
in the management of adat and hohorok. At the same time, the forum gained 
access to public policy and management at the district level. The Forum 
Secretary echoed the view of the Coordinator: 
The Forum itself gained acknowledgement and support from the 
Rote Ndao government, especially as the forum inaugurated the 
Rote Ndao Mayor as ex officio maneleo ina huk. Thus, 
organisationally, the forum is embedded in the district government. 
This structure enables the forum to tap resources and support from 
the district government in pursuing its goals.  
 
In undertaking adat revitalisation, maneleo ina huk strengthens the legitimacy 
of maneleo and the programmes of the Forum. There is a close collaboration 
between customary public figures and the district government involving mutual 
benefits. The Head of the Natural Resource Management Bureau stated: 
The Mayor supported the revitalisation because the revitalisation 
strengthened the district government policy of poverty reduction 
and law enforcement. The district government’s involvement also 
strengthened the legitimacy of the Mayor as the maneleo ina huk.   
 
The establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA on Rote Island, in 2009, influenced the 
revitalisation of hohorok for managing fisheries and marine resources. After a 
period of planning, the provincial and district governments, together with the 
Forum, re-implemented hohorok for fisheries management in September 2016. 
The district government has implemented hohorok in marine areas in six 
villages (see Figures 6.7) across Rote Island, because these villages are the main 
fishing communities on Rote Island (Amalo, 2016). The Head of the Natural 
Resource Management Bureau explained: 
With the help of the provincial government and forum, we [the 
district government] have been involved in hohorok revitalisation. In 
September 2016, we implemented hohorok in six villages. We have 
set the target to establish hohorok in all fifty-eight coastal villages on 
Rote Island.  
 
                                                   
 




……… Domain boundary 
 
Hohorok   
Figure 6.7: Map showing areas where hohorok was established in six villages in 2016 
and the eighteen domains on Rote Island. 
Source: Interview with the Coordinator of the Forum and Fox (2017, p. 236) 
 
Figure 6.8:  Hohorok declaration and manahoro inauguration in Rote Island in 2016 




Figure 6.9: Symbolic release of turtles to the sea by members of the provincial and 
district conservation forums in 2016 
 
Source: Dantje Ndoen 
 
Several factors led to the development of initiatives to revitalise hohorok and its 
implementation in marine areas. Customary public leaders and fishers 
acknowledged the impact of marine resource depletion on both local livelihoods 
and the conflicts between small-scale fishers with outside large fishers, which 
were due to the destructive fishing techniques depleting the fisheries. The 
Forum Secretary explained these problems: 
Increasing human pressure and destructive fishing by non-local 
fishers have been our main concerns, but there was nothing we 
could do. Fisheries depletion [caused by illegal fishing by outside 
fishers] brought conflicts within local communities and threatened 
fishers’ livelihoods [some local people work for outside fishers]. We 
used to catch from fisheries along the coastal areas. Now, a much 
greater effort is needed to catch fish and other marine species than 
in the past. 
 
Under hohorok, local communities are entitled to manage fisheries and other 
marine resources according to local rules and practices. Communities agree on a 
list of prohibited activities; allowable fishing methods and the amount offenders 
will be fined. In most cases, the amount of the fine can be as much as IRP. 
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10.000.000 (see Table 6.6), which is equivalent to a six-month salary of the 
monthly minimum pay in Rote Ndao district. 
 
The rules of hohorok were declared during the establishment of hohorok and 
disseminated across communities through written and oral communication (see 
Figures 6 8 and 6.9). However, there are some exceptions to the rules, which 
take the livelihoods of local communities into consideration. Sand mining, for 
example, is allowed when it is taken using traditional methods on a small-scale 
to meet basic needs, such as food. Some manahoro elaborated on the rules and 
the exceptions: 
Local communities can take dry mangrove as firewood, but not on a 
large-scale. In the past, we cut these trees to build boats and ships. 
Now, we realise that the lungs of the earth are in these trees. Also, we 
learned that the forest serves as the ecosystem for fisheries 
(Coordinator manahoro at the former Dengka kingdom).  
 
It is also the case with sand mining. Local communities can take sand 
using traditional mining methods. It takes a long time and a lot of 
effort to collect and carry the sand to the designated place. So, few 
people mine the sand. It is illegal to mine the sand with modern 
equipment and/or for profit (A manahoro in Oelua village).  
 
Table	6.6:	List	of	forbidden	activities	and	fines	
Activities  Fines (IRP) 
Mangrove logging 10,000,000 
Monkey hunting 10,000,000 
Honey harvesting using smoke and fire  10,000,000 
Poison fishing of lobsters and sea cucumbers 10,000,000 
Fishing methods:   
- Blasts 10,000,000   
- Poisons 10,000,000 
- Trawling 10,000,000 
Destroying coral reefs 10,000,000 
Large-scale sand mining using modern equipment 10,000,000 
Taking sea turtles and their eggs 5,000,000 
Sailing within marine culture areas 2,500,000 
Littering the sea 1,000,000 
Repeated violations are tried according to legal laws,  
in addition to these fines  
Source: Information board on Oelua village (Figure 6.10) 
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The main difference between contemporary hohorok rules and earlier practices 
of hohorok is that while the modern rules are written, there is no written rule 
about future harvests of protected marine species. Previously, for both 
terrestrial and marine-based resources, there were unwritten rules for renewed 
harvesting of the protected resources; fisheries access was only closed long 
enough for fisheries to improve. There was no total closure of fisheries access 
for an indefinite period. This practice is not fully applied in current hohorok 
rules in the Sawu Sea MPA, as the government does not clarify the temporal 
closure practice in the current written rules. Manahoro in Oelua explained the 
reason for this absence and a consideration for future changes of rules: 
We have not discussed future harvest, but as we have practised in 
terrestrial hohorok, there is always ‘room’ for discussion. We always 
consider the economic needs of the communities [during difficult and 
festive seasons]. But, harvesting other resources using 




Figure 6.10: An information board showing hohorok rules and fines 





Figure 6.11: Signpost showing papadak boundary on the beach. 
Source: Dantje Ndoen 
 
Manahoro undertook a series of discussions with fishers in Oelua prior to the 
establishment of hohorok, but some participants interviewed in this research 
were not aware of the lack of regulations about future harvests. Indigenous 
fishers knew about the practice of lifting the access ban to fisheries for some 
days to allow local fishers to harvest resources. However, some fishers, 
including non-indigenous fishers who undertake intensive fishing activities, 
were unaware of this practice in the past and did not know if it should be 
applied in Oelua’s marine hohorok. A non-indigenous fisher confirmed: 
I knew that in hohorok, there is a time for no harvest but after a 
while, the ban will be lifted ... I did not know that the current practice 
is different... but at the moment we support it [hohorok]. Perhaps we 
can discuss this practice in the future when the resources have been 
restored. After all, the resources are for us, not for being watched 
only. 
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6.7 Opportunities and Challenges of Hohorok 
The involvement of different tiers of government in revitalising hohorok for 
fisheries and marine resource management creates opportunities for further 
strengthening of hohorok. As the Head of Economic Bureau at Rote Ndao 
district confirmed, the district government, would establish hohorok in all fifty-
eight coastal villages. Marine hohorok have been established in six villages in 
2016 and in another sixteen villages in 2017. The establishment was in line with 
national regulations and was undertaken with institutional and funding support 
from all tiers of government and non-government organisations.  
 
The establishment of Regulation 60/2014 and Regulation 8/2016, Source of 
Funding for Villages from the National Government created further 
opportunities for customary communities to fund natural resource 
management. In these regulations, as a follow-up to Law 6/2014, Villages, for 
the first time in the country’s history, the national government specified the 
sources and amount of budget allocated to all villages in Indonesia from the 
budget of all tiers of government. These regulations have led to an increased 
budget, for all villages, of up to 20% annually since 2015, from an average Rp. 
800 million in 2015 to over Rp. 1.1 billion in 2016 and over Rp. 1.3 billion in 
2017 (Ministry of Finance, 2017, p. 2). 
 
The budget allocated for villages, according to Regulation 60/2014, is based on 
the size of the population, the geographical size of the village and the level of 
poverty. This regulation does not include the size of marine areas under 
hohorok. Similarly, the size of forests in each village, which are managed by 
customary communities, does not alter the budget allocated to the village. The 
national government has been under pressure from provincial and district 
governments to include these criteria in the budget allocation decision process 
since 2012, but the national government failed to do this in the revised Law 
23/2014, Sub-national government. Thus, in the 2017 village document budget 
for Rote Ndao district, no village allocated a budget to customary communities 
for managing natural resources. The Secretary of Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department in Rote Ndao district confirmed that: 
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Unless the government [either national or provincial or district] 
regulates the budget allocation at village level, village governments 
are under no obligation to allocate village budget to manahoro for 
managing hohorok. Similarly, customary fishers no longer 
voluntarily provide resources for manahoro to undertake their 
responsibility. Thus, manahoro undertake their responsibility at 
their own cost and there is no certainty about future benefits for 
them.  
 
Increasing challenges to hohorok arise from the inability of manahoro to 
undertake their responsibilities and enforce the law, due to lack of incentives. 
According to the Secretary of the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department, in 
the past, being manahoro meant a person had a higher social status with 
privileges that were not enjoyed by other community members. These benefits 
served as incentives for manahoro. However, the Secretary of the Fisheries and 
Marine Affairs Department added that being manahoro these days is no longer 
a privilege. The Tua Lake manahoro partly agreed with this view as he 
commented: 
It is true that in the past, manahoro was a crucial position and I was 
proud to be one. I think people of my generation are willing and 
proud of being manahoro. Their main interest is in seeing our 
tradition, culture and practices are preserved. However, it will be 
difficult to expect the same interest of young people. They prefer 
doing jobs that can give them instant cash.  
 
Challenges from privatising natural resources at the community level have also 
increased rapidly. Tribe-based resources such as land, forests and lakes have 
experienced significant changes from increased use, due to the increasing 
market demand and privatisation of land and other resources. National media 
have highlighted the expansion of tourism-based economies including hotel and 
villa construction in coastal areas, which have led to increased purchase of land 
by foreign entrepreneurs on Rote island (Kewa Ama, 2011). Marine-based 
tourism activities along the beaches have contributed to increased pollution of 
fisheries and seaweed farming in some areas that are managed under hohorok. 
 
The increased growth of population has increased the pressures on the island’s 
natural resources. The number of people in Lalukoen village, for example, 
where the Tua Lake is situated was just under 2,000, in 2017, but most of these 
people were born in the village and up to 30% live under the poverty line. 
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Population growth has led to an increasing number of houses with greater land 
occupancy for various private uses (Bureau of Statistics, 2017). There were 440 
houses in Lalukoen village in 2016 (Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The increased 
area of land used for agriculture has naturally led to increased water abstraction 
from the Tua Lake, which in turn poses a threat to hohorok fisheries in the lake. 
According to Tua Lake manahoro, the increased population is the main 
contributor to the conversion of land for houses and farms around the lake. 
Thus, the growing population is an internal challenge to the effectiveness of 
community-based economies under hohorok. 
6.8 Summary  
Most hohorok recognise communal rights-based resource management. There 
was a few hohorok that jointly practised both communal and private rights-
based management. There were different property rights, some of which were 
unique to the roles of parties in hohorok. However, users had limited rights, 
which could not be secured for the future, nor transferred to other users beyond 
local communities. Hohorok recognised transferability, as modern rights-based 
resource management does, but it was limited in both spatial and temporal 
scale.  
 
Fisheries conservation was not a major focus of hohorok. Terrestrial hohorok 
sets limits on methods, time and areas for accessing fisheries, as does modern 
rights-based resource management. During the open period, hohorok adjusted 
the duration of the period to avoid depletion, while taking into account the 
number of catches and the number of fishers. This conservation enabled local 
communities to meet their need for food with equally shared fisheries. Hohorok 
recognised no-entry zones, which were meant to conserve fisheries. However, 
such limits on fisheries access was not recognised in the marine hohorok. It had 
no-entry zones for users, but as privately-owned resources, owners could 
harvest in the no-entry zones.  
 
The Rote Island regime shows that the applicability of hohorok to managing 
natural resources reflects the characteristics of the resource. The hohorok 
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environments are small with a few users, which enabled manahoro to monitor 
the resources. In keeping up with changes, hohorok developed different 
practices for accessing resources to avoid resource depletion and to address a 
fair resource distribution among community members. More importantly, 
hohorok resources are managed according to Ostrom’s (1990) nested 
institutional arrangement, which enabled manahoro to manage fisheries under 
different levels of authoritative territories (domains). 
 
However, hohorok faces several challenges influencing its present effectiveness. 
Internal challenges to terrestrial fisheries relate to increasing privatisation of 
natural resources, such as clearing of land and forest for settlement and 
farming, and the harvesting of fresh water. The main driver is the growing 
number of local people. External challenges are associated with the increasing 
conversion of the coastal zone for tourism-based economies, which influence 
fisheries through pollution and the diminishing marine resources in the 
ecosystem.  
 
Challenges to implementing of hohorok in marine fisheries are equally 
significant. Hohorok characteristics, for example, can be used for managing 
large-scale marine environments in a nested system. However, recognition of 
rights does not enable transfers of rights across communities. Similarly, the 
clearly defined boundary of users and environments was possible when hohorok 
was applied to small-scale marine environments, such as sounds. In large-scale 
marine-based fisheries, the characteristics of users, resources and the 
environment differ from those of small-scale hohorok resources. Therefore, the 
next chapter examines how and to what extent hohorok has been adopted and 
revised to suit the characteristics of large-scale marine-based fisheries.
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Chapter 7 Fisheries Management in the Sawu 
Sea Marine Protected Area 
7.1 Introduction 
The 2009 Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) both crystallised and juxtaposed the 
range of formalised management at the national, provincial and district levels 
and in different Customary Fisheries Managements (CFM) within the Sawu Sea 
Marine Protected Area (MPA). This chapter frames these arrangements, which 
shape the applicability of CFM across management bodies in the Sawu Sea 
MPA, using the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) framework.  
 
It draws on a thematic analysis of documents and interviews with participants 
from all management bodies of the Sawu Sea MPA identified in the institutional 
interaction framework. The management bodies are: The National Management 
Unit of Marine Protected Areas (NMU-MPAs); Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) 
Provincial Conservation Forum; Rote Ndao District Conservation Forum; and 
Manahoro in Oelua Village (see Figure 5.2).  
 
The key themes are covered in sections as follows:  
1)  ‘Roles and selection processes of participants’ looks at the organisational 
functions of the management bodies and representatives of customary 
fishers, their selection and termination processes; 
2) ‘Resource structure’ explores the incentives and disincentives that shape the 
actions and support of stakeholders and customary fishers; 
3) ‘Decision-making’ considers the extent of control the fishers and/or their 
representatives can exercise to voice their practices and rules in the fisheries 
management; 
4) ‘Information provision’ examines the provision of and fishers’ access to 
information about conservation progress, the performance of management 
and the roles of customary fishers in information provision; 
5)  ‘Surveillance and law enforcement’ looks at the commitments, mechanisms, 
opportunities and challenges involved in enforcing the law and the roles of 
customary fishers in law enforcement 
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6) ‘Jurisdictional scope’ describes the extent and challenges of the 
management bodies in managing fisheries across geographical domains. 
7.2 Roles and selection process of the participants 
This section sets out the roles of the participants who undertake the 
organisational functions of the management bodies, customary fishers’ 
representatives, and evaluates their strengths. It also describes their selection 
and termination processes. While the roles of customary fishers’ representatives 
vary from insignificant roles at the national level management body to strong 
roles at the community level, the roles of the management body at the 
community level are weaker than those of higher-level management bodies. 
 
At the national level, Decree 6/2014 established that the responsibility of the 
NMU-MPA is to administer, implement and supervise national MPAs with a 
focus on fisheries conservation, according to existing laws and regulations. 
However, the responsibility of the NMU-MPA in managing the Sawu Sea MPA is 
limited to implementing regulations of the Minister of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries (MMAF); the NMU-MPA cannot make regulations.  
 
According to Decree 6/2014, the functions of the NMU-MPA are to:  
• prepare planning documents for the administration, implementation and 
supervision of national MPAs 
• increase empowerment and awareness of communities in and around 
national MPAs 
• provide secretarial, human resources and financial support. 
 
However, these functions of the NMU-MPA reveal a gap in the policies 
regarding the role of customary fishing communities in managing MPAs. For 
example, the Decree does not specify how the revitalisation of customary 
fisheries in the Sawu Sea MPA should occur, as determined in the Strategic plan 
(Figure 5.3). These functions require the appointment of officials to occupy 
supporting units designed to build relationships with fishers and identify 
indigenous knowledge. However, posts such as fisheries’ consultants were, 
therefore, unoccupied. An NMU-MPA staff planner confirmed that the positions 
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have been vacant since the establishment of the MPA, but that this created no 
significant difficulties, stating: 
It is true that there are several posts, such as planners and analysts, 
which are vacant. No employee has been recruited for [to assume] 
these posts, but we do not have many problems because of this lack.  
 
The NMU-MPA worked closely with other organisations to compensate for the 
lack of staff members. When asked about customary fisheries expertise in the 
NMU-MPA, the NMU-MPA coordinator responded:  
We do not work in isolation from other stakeholders … We work with 
the sub-national governments, customary institutions [such as Rote 
Ndao Forum for Adat and Culture (RNFAC)], NGOs, and local 
universities. Because no one has complete knowledge, we need to 
work together and tap the knowledge and other resources from other 
stakeholders. It helps us to cope with the lack of resources. 
 
This absence of officials in the NMU-MPA to undertake activities related to 
identifying and strengthening customary fisheries, as required by the Strategic 
plan, suggests that MMAF does not see the function as significant. Nevertheless, 
the NMU-MPA coordinator argued that the absence does not mean that the 
NMU-MPA does not undertake the activities. The NMU-MPA works with other 
organisations to undertake the activities. 
 
However, there is no established partnership between the NMU-MPA and 
customary fishers. In MMAF Regulation 21/215, Partnerships in Managing 
MPA, MMAF (2015) requires the NMU-MPA to establish partnerships with sub-
national government agencies, NGOs and local communities. The regulation 
requires NMU-MPA to clarify the rights, responsibilities, funding support and 
the timeline in the partnership, but this was a general regulation rather than 
one specifically for the Sawu Sea MPA. Decree 6/2014, which established the 
Sawu Sea MPA, did not specify this partnership requirement. As a result, the 
NMU-MPA did not establish the partnership and its involvement of customary 
fishers remains general.  
 
Despite the lack of some officials, the NMU-MPA did have an official at the 
district level to facilitate operational activities. MMAF established in Decree 
23/2008 that “the management unit [NMU-MPA] of MPAs can establish 
working units [at the district/city level], taking into account its workload” 
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(Article 16). There are ten districts in the Sawu Sea MPA encompassing five 
islands with varied ecological and social challenges. Thus, these officials could 
facilitate customary fishers’ voices to shape the management of the Sawu Sea 
MPA. Decree 23/2008, however, did not specify the responsibilities of the 
working units nor their relationships with district/city governments and 
customary fishers. The decree focused on administrative activities for 
establishing the Sawu Sea MPA, rather than empowering customary fishers and 
thus, these official positions were terminated after the establishment of the 
Sawu Sea MPA. 
 
The roles of the NMU-MPAs differ from those of the Provincial Conservation 
Forum, as stated in Governor Decree 74/2013 and MMAF Decree 6/2014. While 
the former emphasises building local communities’ involvement in the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA, the latter focuses on incorporating the 
voices of the sub-national governments (see Table 7.1 below). Not one out of the 
eight responsibilities of the forum established by the MMAF is about supporting 
customary fishers to manage fisheries. On the other hand, four out of fourteen 
responsibilities of the forum established by the Governor are about 
strengthening local stakeholders and communities in managing the Sawu Sea 
MPA. The similarity between these decrees is that neither one refers to 
customary fishers or small-scale fishers.  
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Table 7.1: The responsibilities of the Provincial Conservation Forum 
Themes  MMAF Decree 6/2014 Governor Decree 74/2013  
Roles and 
selection 
§ To facilitate and support the 
national government 
policies related to the 
management of the Sawu 
Sea MPA 
 
§ To undertake a variety of activities 
related to the management of MPAs  
§ To support management of MPAs 
§ To strengthen the capacities of 
stakeholders in managing MPAs 
Resource 
structure 
§ To provide assistance to the 
NMU-MPA in planning 
programmes and projects, 
advocating for funds and 
strengthening partnerships 




§ To provide feedback to the 
government at the national, 
provincial and district levels 
in supporting management 
of the Sawu Sea MPA 
§ To apply the voices of sub-
national government in 
implementing management 
plans and planning 
programmes and projects 
§ To provide feedback and submission 
to the government at all tiers and the 
management authority of the MPAs 
Information 
provision 
§ To provide assistance to 
sub-national government in 
monitoring and evaluating 
the management of the 
Sawu Sea MPA 
§ To provide feedback to the 
NMU-MPA in managing the 
Sawu Sea MPA 
§ To assist sub-national governments 
in undertaking monitoring and 
evaluation of MPAs  
§ To facilitate the participation of local 
people in managing MPAs 
§ To facilitate and undertake public 
consultation in order to apply the 
voices of involved parties in the 
management of MPAs 
§ To undertake research and 
development to support the 
management of MPAs 
§ To facilitate and/or undertake 
educative programmes for local 




§ None  § None  
Jurisdictional 
scope 
§ To coordinate cross-sectoral 
programmes in supporting 
the Sawu Sea MPA  
§ To undertake coordination 
activities regularly 
§ To facilitate and/or undertake 
coordinative and collaborative 
activities 
§ To support policies of the 
government at all tiers in managing 
MPAs  
§ To establish district conservation 
forums  
§ To strengthen the managerial and 
institutional capacities of district 
conservation forums 
Source: MMAF (2014) and Governor of NTT (2013) 
 
The absence of a reference to customary fishers does not allow them to be 
involved in the forum. Decree 74/2013 established the 23 members of the 
forum’s board (Figure 7.1) and an executive (Figure 7.2) made up of high-
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ranking officials from diverse organisations. Eighteen members of the board are 
from national and provincial government organisations, with four members 
from local universities, one representing a hotel and travel agency association 
and one member acting on behalf of the provincial fisher association. However, 
there is no representation from customary fishers, and most of the members are 
representatives of government organisations. The provincial government allows 
customary fishers to shape decision-making in the forum. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Provincial Conservation Forum’s board members 
Source: Governor of NTT (2013) 
 
The roles of board members are limited because there is no guidance for their 
selection, allowing them to negotiate with the provincial government. The 
Governor appointed the current board’s members and the executive body in 
2013, before MAAF issued Decree 6/2014. The decree specifies the forum’s 
responsibilities but provides no guidance about the eligibility and tenure of the 
board members. Thus, the board members’ appointment and authority are at 
the Governor’s discretion.  
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Figure 7.2: The Provincial Conservation Forum’s executive unit 
Source: Governor of NTT (2013) 
 
The board members comprise the heads of the agencies or organisations that 
have knowledge, capacity and responsibility related to the Sawu Sea MPA. 
According to a former senior Tourism Department official, some board 
members have been involved in the preparation and establishment of the Sawu 
Sea MPA since the beginning, and others have been involved in the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA. Although there is no customary fishers’ 
representative, some members may have worked with customary fishers. The 
Secretary of the Development Planning Agency confirmed:  
There is no representative of customary fishers in the forum, but the 
beneficiaries of programmes coordinated by the forum are customary 
fishers.  
 
The absence of customary fisher representation in the forum is arguably 
reflected in the lack of support for customary fishers in the forum 
responsibilities. In general, the responsibilities of the forum according to Decree 
74/2013 correspond to the goals of the Sawu Sea MPA. For example, the second 
responsibility (see Table 7.1 above) focuses on strengthening local communities 
in managing the Sawu Sea MPA. However, the responsibility does not 
specifically refer to the roles of customary communities, as mentioned in the 
Strategic Plan of the Sawu Sea MPA (Figure 5.3). Hence, there is a gap in the 
goals of the Sawu Sea MPA and the responsibilities of the forum regarding the 
roles of customary rules and practices.  
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With this in mind, it should be noted that the differences in the written goals of 
the Sawu Sea MPA and the responsibilities of the forum have not shaped the 
programmes of the participating organisations, especially agencies of the 
provincial government. Interviews conducted with some provincial officials 
revealed that the local communities that are involved in these programmes are 
customary communities who are mostly small-scale fishers. This suggests that 
the provincial government focuses more on the small-scale fishers, which differs 
from the national government that tends to target non-customary fishers in its 
programmes (see Chapter 5).  
 
Like the Provincial Conservation Forum, Rote Ndao District Conservation 
Forum has a board (Figure 7.3) and an executive unit (Figure 7.4). Most of the 
board members are government representatives, particularly from national and 
district government organisations, and Nusa Lontar University. Each 
organisation has a member on the board. The Mayor appointed the Deputy 
Mayor as the coordinator of the executive unit. This unit is supported by five 
divisions, which are led by officials from the district government organisations, 
the Nature Conservation and Nusa Lontar University. The Mayor specified the 
responsibility of the divisions in the executive unit, but the Mayor did not 
specify the responsibility of the board members nor the eligibility of both the 
board and executive members. This lack of clarity is also found with board 




Figure 7.3: The Board of the District Conservation Forum 
 
A noteworthy difference between the Provincial Conservation Forum and the 
District Conservation Forum is that customary communities play a more 
significant role in the latter than in the former. The daily coordinator of the 
District Conservation Forum’s executive unit, who leads operational activities, is 
not a government official as with the Provincial Conservation Forum. Rather, 
the District Conservation Forum’s daily coordinator is the coordinator of the 
RNFAC. This adat forum was established in 2009 and has actively promoted 
customary rules and practices for natural resource management. The 
appointment of the adat forum coordinator as the District Conservation 
Forum’s executive unit daily coordinator linked the daily coordinator’s role with 
the roles of the adat forum in strengthening customary rules and practices. A 
senior official commented: 
The appointment of the coordinator of the forum was based on 
advice from the members of the forum and the provincial 
government. However, the main consideration was that the forum 
has previously been involved in marine conservation undertaken by 
international NGOs on Rote and its roles in the revitalisation of 
customary rules and practices since its establishment [2009] 




Figure 7.4: The District Conservation Forum’s executive unit 
 
The role of the District Conservation Forum, according to Decree 274/2014, is 
similar to that of the Provincial Conservation Forum, providing advisory 
functions for the management of Sawu Sea MPA. The board members can 
provide feedback to the executive unit presided over by the Deputy Mayor. This 
executive unit coordinates with involved departments at the district government 
level. The Deputy Mayor has the power to incorporate advisory feedback into 
policies and their implementation, which support the management of the Sawu 
Sea MPA. This arrangement strengthens the roles of the District Conservation 
Forum despite its limited authority.  
 
The role of the executive unit is similar to those of the Provincial Conservation 
Forum. As outlined by Decree 274/2014, the District Conservation Forum’s 
roles relate to facilitating participation and empowerment of local communities 
in general. None of the de jure roles of the District Conservation Forum are 
about revitalisation or enactment of customary fisheries for managing the Sawu 
Sea MPA, which has been undertaken de facto. However, the involvement of the 
forum has enabled customary fishers’ voices to be stronger. Together, the 
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Provincial Conservation Forum and the adat forum have revitalised customary 
fisheries management in several coastal villages. The Head of the Economic 
Bureau, as a member of the District Conservation Forum, elaborated: 
We have been actively involved in hohorok revitalisation. In 2016, we 
reintroduced the implementation of hohorok into six villages. We 
have set the target to establish hohorok in all fifty-eight coastal 
villages on Rote Island. For 2017, we aim to revive and re-establish 
hohorok in sixteen villages. 
 
The adat forum coordinator, who serves as the daily coordinator of the 
executive unit, has access to the district government to address customary 
fishers’ concerns but the coordinator does not play a significant role in decision-
making. The unit lacks authority and resources to take actions addressing 
customary fishers’ concerns. The insignificant roles of the unit are related to the 
legal mandate about the roles of the District Conservation Forum, which only 
serves as a collaborative body, as specified in Decree 274/2014. The adat forum 
coordinator confirmed the role of the unit: 
Our role is very limited. Our roles are about supporting the 
governments and their programmes, which I am not happy about. 
The unit does not have sufficient authority and financial resources to 
carry out its roles in strengthening fishers. 
 
The role of the District Conservation Forum declined after the enactment of Law 
23/2014, which revoked the authority of district governments in managing 
fisheries, particularly after the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA. During the 
first two years, 2015 and 2016, the forum undertook several activities to re-
establish hohorok in several villages. However, since 2017, the district 
government has stopped providing financial support for the forum. The 
Secretary of the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department explained that there is 
no more budget, and there are neither posts nor officials related to fisheries 
management in the department as a result. Local officials view the Sawu-Sea 
MPA related activities as the responsibility of the provincial government. Some 
interviewees confirmed the view of the Secretary: 
For the following year [after 2017], after changes in Law 23/2013 
come to power, it will be the national and provincial governments 
that continue this effort [revitalising customary rules]. We cannot 
any longer be involved in this activity, as the district governments do 
not have authority in fisheries marine resource management (Head 
of the Economic Bureau). 
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I am very disappointed. During the last meeting [2016], key 
government officials did not attend it. Without them, it is useless to 
raise and discuss problems related to implementing hohorok. What I 
have thought about, and I will propose to the national government is 
how to empower manahoro so that they can undertake monitoring 
while they catch fish (The District Conservation Forum daily 
coordinator). 
 
The re-establishment of hohorok in Rote Island strengthens customary fishers’ 
roles in fisheries management. In 2016, the national government re-established 
hohorok in six villages, two villages in each sub-district (see Figure 6.4). There 
are eight manahoro to manage hohorok in each village, instead of just one as it 
had been practised prior to the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA. Manahoro 
serve different voluntary positions in hohorok, such as coordinator, deputy 
coordinator, secretary, treasurer and members. Thus, manahoro play different 
roles, although there are no written instructions regarding the responsibilities of 
these positions. 
 
In addition to these manahoro, there is a coordinator of manahoro responsible 
for managing hohorok in all villages within the same sub-district. These villages 
share the same fisheries and marine resources, and they practise the same CFM. 
Oelua village, where data were collected, was part of the former Dengka domain 
(see Figure 6.4). The coordinator explained the reason for having manahoro for 
individual villages and a coordinator across villages: 
We face different challenges now. The size of marine hohorok is 
large. It includes two villages: Oelua and Netenaen. And more 
villages will apply hohorok in the near future. So, it is not enough to 
have one manahoro at the village level to manage hohorok across 
villages. Also, manahoro do not work full time [as manahoro]. They 
have their main jobs [as part time farmers and fishers] to focus on. 
They need to feed their family. Thus, by involving many manahoro, 
they can divide and take turns in undertaking their responsibilities. 
 
The process for selecting manahoro during the revitalisation of hohorok in 2016 
was open to all community members and transparent. All villagers were 
encouraged to attend the event and were free to nominate several local fishers to 
be selected as manahoro. Manahoro work voluntarily; they are not paid. 
Therefore, selected candidates were fishers that can do the job under this 
condition. The manahoro coordinator elaborated: 
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After agreeing on the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA and its 
zones, we encouraged them to establish hohorok and nominate 
manahoro. It was an open, intensive and voluntary discussion. We 
did not interfere with the processes as we focused on promoting 
awareness, voluntarism and support.  
 
There are no written requirements of eligibility for those nominated to be 
manahoro. The MMAF Decree 6/2014 mentions hohorok, but it does not set 
out requirements for manahoro and their eligibility. However, the coordinator 
of manahoro noted that nominees need knowledge and the ability to carry out 
their responsibilities: 
They are well-experienced and active fishers. They know very well the 
condition of our coastal and marine areas. We did not propose young 
and passive fishers. We also consider their geographical and social 
representation within this village; the manahoro should represent 
the diversity of the community members. 
 
The nomination of manahoro in Oelua village was undertaken before the 
establishment of hohorok in September 2016 (Amalo, 2016). The Mayor of Rote 
Ndao, who is ex officio of maneleo ina huk (see Chapter 5), installed the 
nominees in all six villages during the establishment of hohorok. This multi-
level process, according to the coordinator of manahoro, strengthened their 
legitimacy at both the village and district levels:  
Maneleo ina huk installed us during the declaration of hohorok, but 
it was the villagers who nominated us. The nomination and 
instalment strengthened hohorok and our legitimacy. The villagers 
now know that they need to seek our approval before going fishing 
and inform us of their harvests. It also bound the district government 
to support us in managing hohorok. 
 
The findings on this theme show that customary fishers play limited roles in the 
management bodies of the Sawu Sea MPA. This limited role was not because the 
fishers’ representatives do not assume significant posts in the management 
bodies, but because the management bodies at all tiers of the government play 
insignificant roles. The management body at the community level plays 
autonomous roles in managing local marine areas, but it has a limited capacity. 
The failure of the national government to establish a partnership, which clarifies 
the rights of and empowers customary fishers, contributes to the fishers’ lack of 
capacity.  
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7.3 Resource Structure 
Human, institutional and financial resources are needed to support the 
management bodies to undertake their responsibilities. The availability of these 
resources influences their capacity to apply CFM for managing the Sawu Sea 
MPA. In general, there is a lack of support from all tiers of government for these 
management bodies and customary fisheries to use CFM, due to the unclear and 
changing policy concerning the provision of the resources. 
 
The resources available for the NMU-MPA are insufficient to meet its 
responsibilities. Interviewees highlighted a lack of both supporting staff 
members, particularly for positions relating to customary consultation, and 
financial support for the NMU-MPA. The NMU-MPA tends to see the 
collaboration in terms of sharing resources to address these problems, which 
influences its support for customary fishers. 
 
Through Decree 23/2008 and Decree 6/2014, MMAF allows the NMU-MPA to 
establish working units at the district level. However, the lack of funding 
support has hindered the NMU-MPA in establishing the units in all districts, 
and the decreased financial support has forced it to abolish established units. 
Instead, some interviewees view the benefits of working together with existing 
stakeholders to overcome the shortage; they view collaboration as a sharing cost 
strategy. They argued: 
The main reason for not establishing the working units in the 
districts is because we are not working alone ... There are other 
agencies of the national government, with sub-national governments 
and customary communities to undertake activities such as 
monitoring (The NMU-MPA coordinator). 
 
We [NMU-MPA] have established community-based conservation 
groups to help us to undertake conservation ... We do not pay them. 
We provide them with managerial skills, NGOs focus on technical 
matters, and the sub-national governments train them for writing 
reports (The NMU-MPA staff member). 
 
The lack of funding support for the NMU-MPA is because the national 
government does not clarify it. While Decree 23/2008 does not outline the 
provision of funding for management units of MPAs, Decree 6/2014 outlined 
the amount of the required budget and possible sources of funding for the 
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NMU-MPA. It specifies that the average annual budget required to sustainably 
manage the Sawu Sea MPA is between US$365,000 and $465,000. However, 
this regulation does not specify the sources of the funding. This lack of 
clarification has resulted in decreasing financial support for Coremap	from the 
national government, since 2016. The NMU-MPA staff member clarified: 
The budget [of the NMU-MPA] in 2014 and 2015 was about US$1.2 
million. The budget was significant because there was a programme 
called Coremap that focused on the coral reef rehabilitation 
[400,000 USD]. However, there is no regulation about the amount of 
budget from the national government. As a result, in 2016, the 
programme was discontinued claiming the conservation programme 
did not produce income for the government. 
 
The termination of funding for Coremap had been driven by several national-
based NGOs, such as Kiara that focuses on advocating fishers’ rights in fisheries 
(Susanto, 2013). Kiara called for the president and MMAF to end Coremap for 
several reasons. The Secretariat General of Kiara highlighted that the source of 
the US$80 million funding for the second period (2004-2011) of Coremap, was 
from borrowing, which causes debt. He quoted the report of the State Audit 
Board, Performance review of Coral reef rehabilitation programme in 2011 in 
the Kiara press release, stating that “the programme has not only failed to 
improve the coral reef but has proved burdensome to the state’s financial 
capacity and the money has been subject to corruption” (Kiara, 2014, p. 1). He 
also commented that the project has limited fisheries access for customary 
fishers and failed to apply customary fishery behaviours to fisheries 
conservation. The failure was due to the “lack of fishers’ involvement in the 
planning of the marine conservation programme” (Susanto, 2013, p.2).  
 
The decrease in funding support from the national government has resulted in 
several changes. The NMU-MPA terminated the employment of local staff 
members at the district level. The staff members had a better understanding of 
CFM than non-local staff members. This decision indicated that the NMU-MPA 
did not value local staff knowledge of CFM. The coordinator of the NMU-MPA 
stated: 
We terminated the staff members at the district level in 2017 after the 
national government stopped funding the Coremap.  
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Neither the national nor provincial government provide clear guidance on the 
provision of resources for the provincial-level management body. Decree 
74/2013 outlines that the Provincial Conservation Forum gets funding support 
from various sources in order to undertake its responsibilities. The funding can 
be allocated through national and provincial budgets and other non-binding 
sources. Decree 6/2014 specifies other similar sources of funding support for 
the forum. However, these decrees do not specify the amount of funding from 
these sources (Interview with Former Head of Tourism Promotion Division at 
the Provincial Tourism Department). 
 
The lack of clarity about funding arrangements influences the provincial 
government’s support. Prior to the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, the 
provincial government supported the forum, but it decreased the support 
afterwards. One interviewee revealed that the provincial government learned 
that according to Decree 6/2014, it is the NMU-MPA’s responsibility to manage 
the Sawu Sea MPA, instead of the provincial government, as regulated in Law 
23/2014 for marine areas within 0-12 nm. This change discouraged the 
provincial government from financially supporting the management of the Sawu 
Sea MPA. The Head of the Marine Conservation Section at the Fisheries and 
Marine Affairs Department asserted: 
In the beginning, we provided financial assistance for public 
consultation and needs assessment. However, after the 
establishment, the NMU-MPA manages the Sawu Sea MPA, which is 
an agency of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs. Thus, we 
can no longer support it because there is no longer a legal basis for 
the involvement of the provincial government. 
 
These changes in provincial government support relate to its long-time effort to 
control fisheries and marine resource management in the Sawu Sea. Since 2005, 
the provincial government has proposed that the national government 
acknowledges NTT as an archipelagic province which justified the extension of 
NTT marine jurisdiction beyond 12 nautical miles among its islands (Lewokoda, 
2017; Seldadyo, 2011). The provincial government aimed to manage the Sawu 
Sea MPA with financial support from the national government. As such, control 
over the Sawu Sea MPA will enable the provincial government to regulate 
migratory fisheries and tackle illegal fishing activities in the 12 nautical miles of 
the Sawu Sea that has been managed by the national government. The following 
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comments highlight how some provincial government officials acknowledged 
this motivation:  
Initially [during the preparation and planning stage for the 
establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA], we thought the purpose was to 
undertake conservation, especially for whales. For this purpose, the 
provincial government will be allocated more funds for managing 
fisheries and empowering local fishers. So, we really supported it 
(The Secretary of the Development Planning Agency). 
 
We [the provincial government] only watched them [outside fishers] 
catching and taking fisheries abroad [IUU fishing in the past]. Thus, 
we thought by establishing conservation areas [in the Sawu Sea MPA] 
between islands that serve as the entrance to the fishing grounds, 
which are managed by the national government, we can control 
fishing activities as fishers need to get our [the provincial 
government] approval (The Head of the Marine Conservation Section 
at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department).  
 
One international NGO that has funded and been involved in establishing the 
Sawu Sea MPA and reviving CFM is The Nature Conservancy (TNC). According 
to the coordinator of the NMU-MPA, TNC has actively supported the revival of 
CFM. It has allocated significant funding for the revival. Its coordinator believed 
that the revival is important because formal laws are insufficient to manage 
fisheries. Thus, he did not see any other interest of international NGOs in 
reviving CFM apart from empowering customary fishers. He stated:  
The revival is important because it empowers local fishers. It is not 
undertaken for the interest of the NGOs. The conservation projects 
are not for the interests of changes, but it is the rights of the fishers to 
manage fisheries according to customary practices and to build up 
fisheries compliance with the projects. We discussed all the projects 
in transparent ways and the projects are undertaken after getting our 
approval. 
 
In responding to the decreasing financial support, TNC coordinator highlighted 
the need to clarify the sources of funding and establish sustainable joint 
funding. This would address the need for financial support for the management 
of the Sawu Sea MPA in the long term and compensate losses suffered by local 
fishers. He added: 
The [joint] fund is essential because we need to commit to long-term 
outcomes. Our role here is to facilitate; we are not here to take over 
funding responsibility, which I think is unfortunately what many 
parties [both national and sub-national governments] have been 
hoping. The problem is because the funding responsibilities of the 
participants [government and non-government organisations] are 
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still unclear. At the local level, it is because sub-national governments 
have yet to establish customary communities’ right in a local law. 
 
He stated that such an arrangement has not been established, leaving 
uncertainties in funding support for the management of the Sawu Sea MPA and 
local fishers who have experienced decreases in fisheries accesses: 
There are many stakeholders that shape the success of the Sawu Sea 
MPA. We [TNC] have led and provided resources for coral reef 
restoration here and the recent establishment of the MPA, but I think 
it should be a joint effort … involving all stakeholders. Strengthening 
customary fishers to involve in this project has been also our focused 
for decades. A challenge that needs to be addressed is the short-term 
impacts of the Sawu Sea MPA on the local fishers … We would not 
address this issue. Unfortunately, we have not … discussed and 
solved this issue with other stakeholders. The national government 
has taken an initiative to support customary communities. It 
established a directorate for resolving conflicts on tenure and 
empowering customary adat [under the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry] in 2015. Thus, it has allocated significant funding to 
this directorate, but we have not united our funding support. 
However, sub-national governments have not enacted a law 
acknowledging customary fishers’ rights in fisheries management 
and outlining the responsibility of sub-national government in 
supporting the fishers. 
 
According to MMAF Decree 6/2014, funding support for the District 
Conservation Forum is available through numerous sources e.g. national, 
provincial and sub-national governments’ budgets, yet the decree does not 
specify in detail the amount of support required from each tier of government. 
Although the national and provincial governments provided training for the 
forum members, they do not provide financial support for the forum to manage 
independently. Meanwhile, the district government provided financial, staff and 
secretariat support for the forum only in the early establishment of the Sawu 
Sea MPA.  
 
However, the change in the district government’s marine jurisdiction following 
a new sub-national government law (Law 23/2014), has diminished its support. 
Some interviewees confirmed: 
We have got support from the district, provincial and national 
governments and also from TNC but it was mostly for meetings and 
travel to undertake training, seminars and promotional activities. 
The support was very limited, and we do not manage the fund (Head 
of the Economic Bureau).  
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The district government supported [the management of the Sawu Sea 
MPA] with funding [prior to 2017], but it was insignificant. And now, 
the division and officials [in the Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department] to manage marine conservation has been dissolved 
[shifted to the provincial government]. The head [of the Fisheries and 
Marine Affairs Department] attended meetings in the past, but when 
it comes to distribution of responsibilities, there is no more staff to 
undertake them (Secretary of Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department).  
 
The change in funding support has impacted the District Conservation Forum 
activities. This forum does not have its own budget for reporting and 
monitoring. Thus, the forum relies on the national and provincial governments’ 
support and activities to undertake monitoring and information provision. As a 
result, after the establishment of hohorok, the forum has not always had up-to-
date information about the progress of fisheries management. In some cases, 
the forum cannot thoroughly investigate an incident because of financial 
constraints. The head of the Economic Bureau confirmed this: 
The district government provided some budget for promotional 
activities for the establishment of hohorok at the village level. We do 
not have financial support to undertake activities such as monitoring 
and reporting after the establishment of hohorok. So, we do not have 
first-hand information and cannot provide reports about the Sawu 
Sea MPA’s progress. We often get unwritten reports about a matter, 
such as illegal fishing activities, but we cannot investigate further due 
to the absence of financial support. 
 
An interesting development is that fishing communities have come to strongly 
support the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA on Rote Island, despite the 
unclear resource structure. Their support relates to their concern about 
widespread illegal fishing activities by outside fishers that had depleted fisheries 
in the surrounding marine areas. Some members of these communities not only 
comply with the Sawu Sea MPA rules but also provide financial support for the 
establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA. The Head of the Economic Bureau 
explained that local fishers hope for an improvement in law enforcement 
against illegal fishers through the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA. This 
support, as he believed, is a key to the success of the Sawu Sea MPA: 
I am optimistic [about the effectiveness of customary rules] because, 
for example, in Nggodimeda village, fishing communities have 
voluntarily born some costs to support activities for the 
establishment of hohorok. They have an expectation that the Sawu 
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Sea MPA can benefit them by tackling illegal fishing activities by 
outside fishers. 
 
The establishment of hohorok brought benefits for customary fishers because 
they can exercise not only exclusive access rights but also management rights. 
Decree 6/2014 concerning the indigenous zone in the Sawu Sea MPA specifies 
that where customary fishers establish hohorok, it is only local fishers that can 
access and manage fisheries in the area. The coordinator of manahoro 
confirmed: 
Now, as long as fishers can prove that they are legitimate dwellers in 
Oelua village, then they can fish here. Outside fishers [large-scale 
modern fishers] are not allowed to fish here [indigenous and 
traditional zones]. 
 
The exclusive management rights of local people prevent the transfer of 
fisheries rights to other fishers within the wider community because the rights 
are held collectively. Hohorok focuses on collective ownership; similar to its 
previous practice, it does not recognise an individual quota system nor facilitate 
the transfer of rights beyond communities with the distribution of benefits to 
certain parties. The coordinator of manahoro elaborated on the consideration 
that shapes hohorok: 
Fishers from other villages can fish here, but they need to get our 
permission. We need to manage the fishing time so that all fishers 
can get similar benefits. We do this in order to increase awareness 
and compliance of the fishers in this community. 
 
Inherently, hohorok manages economic sustainability in terms of livelihoods 
but does not consider the environmental sustainability of fisheries; the rules 
focus on the livelihoods of fishing communities, but hohorok limits access to 
fisheries beyond a hohorok environment (see Chapter 6). Hohorok imposes a 
gradual limitation in access rights and a gradual sanction for violators. These 
gradual approaches can serve as incentives for local fishers. They diminish 
resistance and allow local communities to adjust their existing livelihood 
activities to the changes. Nevertheless, hohorok does not adopt these 
approaches for the sustainability of fisheries and marine resources. The 
interviewed manahoro explained some examples of the approach: 
The communities have relied on the activity [sand mining] for a 
living for generations and it requires significant efforts to mine the 
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sand. Thus, we do not totally put an end to sand mining (Manahoro 
in Oelua village).  
 
First time violators are tried according to hohorok rules, but repeated 
violations will be tried according to legal laws, in addition to 
[hohorok] fines (The coordinator of manahoro). 
 
The other benefit in managing hohorok is incentives for manahoro to build 
their commitment. Manahoro cannot fully undertake monitoring and 
supervision of the hohorok area because they have to work to meet their family 
needs for food and it is costly to undertake monitoring regularly. Therefore, 
provision of supporting resources both encourages and facilitates manahoro to 
undertake their responsibilities: 
A marine hohorok differs from a terrestrial one. It requires 
commitment and resources to undertake monitoring and supervision 
regularly. We hope that the national government supports our 
manahoro in undertaking their responsibility (The District 
Conservation Forum daily coordinator). 
 
It may be difficult for the national government to meet the expectations of 
manahoro because the NMU-MPA has not established a partnership with 
customary fishers. The instalment of manahoro, for example, was based on 
Mayor Decree 255/2016, Establishment of Manahoro Tasi Rote Ndao (Mayor 
of Rote Ndao, 2016). The establishment of other customary groups to perform 
particular activities, such as monitoring and conservation of marine species, was 
based on the decree of the Head of Rote Ndao Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
Department (2016). These decrees do not have binding power in the hierarchy 
of Indonesian legislation (Government of Indonesia, 2011), and they do not 
specify the rights of, and funding support for community groups. More 
importantly, these two officials (mayor and Fisheries Department officials) are 
now external to the Sawu Sea MPA; thus, they do not have an obligation to 
support manahoro in managing the MPA. 
 
Overall, there is a lack of resource support for the management bodies that are 
responsible for supporting customary fishers. This problem was affected by 
unclear provision of funding support, a decrease in the national government’s 
funding support and the exclusion of the provincial and district governments 
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from managing the MPA. As a result, the customary fishers’ lack of capacity to 
manage hohorok remains unaddressed.  
7.4 Fishers’ participation in decision-making 
Decision-making relates to the extent of control the fishers and/or their 
representatives exercise to voice their customary practices and rules in fisheries 
management. As presented below, the power of customary fishers and/or their 
representatives varies, but with higher level management bodies, which have 
more power in shaping the management of the Sawu Sea MPA, customary 
fishers have limited power in decision-making. 
 
Decree 23/2008 does not provide a clear mechanism regarding the decision-
making process within the NMU-MPA. It states that in managing the NMU-
MPA, the coordinator is required to lead based on the principles of 
“coordination, integration and synchronisation” (Article 17). However, the 
decree does not specify the methods for implementing these principles nor 
provide guidelines for decision-making and planning processes involving fishing 
communities.  
 
The lack of clarity concerning decision-making by NMU-MPA influences the 
applicability of CFM in the Sawu Sea MPA. The processes for the establishment 
of the Sawu Sea MPA were based more on expert knowledge than on local 
fishers’ voices. Customary fishers were consulted, but they did not have a formal 
role in decision-making. The Governor established a Team for Studying, 
Establishing and Planning of the Management of the Sawu Sea MPA (TSEPM), 
in order to prepare planning documents for the Sawu Sea MPA. In its evaluation 
report, Lessons learned from the Sawu Sea MPA, the team, acknowledged the 
limited roles of customary fishers in decision making: 
The involvement of customary fishers in the establishment processes 
of the Sawu Sea MPA was about consultation; they provided feedback 
about management plans and zoning. They did not have access to 
decision-making (2014, p. 25). 
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A senior fishery official confirmed the TSEPM’s finding of the monopoly of 
experts and the lack of funding in shaping the establishment of the Sawu Sea 
MPA during the initial stages:  
It was during the initiation stage [prior to the establishment of the 
MPA in 2014], we unilaterally decided some issues, including 
delineation. We did not discuss these with fishers because it would 
take a long time and cost too much money. We were competing with 
fisheries depletion (The Head of the Marine Conservation Section at 
the Provincial Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department). 
 
The approach changed following the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA in 
2014. In most communities, the NMU-MPA benefited from fisher’s information 
about the state of fisheries, which shaped zoning delineation. When the Sawu 
Sea MPA’s zones were established, the NMU-MPA consulted customary fishers 
to discuss the delineation. According to the NMU-MPA coordinator, fishers now 
have a significant role in decision-making: 
We worked together; we sat together, drank coffee together; we 
talked heart to heart about the importance of conservation. Even 
after establishing the zones, we still consulted them. If they disagree 
with a zone, we remove it.  
 
The coordinator added further that in undertaking the NMU-MPA’s 
programmes, following the establishment of the MPA, they allowed fishers to 
influence decision-making, but the decisions were not about the management of 
the Sawu Sea MPA. He explained: 
[Similarly], we cannot force our programmes [on them]. For 
example, if they need rowing boats, we adjust to their needs. We do 
not impose our programmes. We carry out the programmes in 
accordance with their needs and activities. We support them so that 
they will support us in managing the MPA. So, basically, we need one 
another. [However], at the moment, our programme is small; it has 
not involved many fishers. Hopefully, it will do in the future. 
 
The lack of customary fishers’ access to decision-making in the Sawu Sea MPA 
is due to the unclear roles of customary fishers in the planning stages. NMU-
MPA did not involve the fishers in the team commissioned to draft the medium-
term planning documents for the MPA, as recommended by MMAF Regulation 
30/2010. Further, the decision-making process is not set out in any particular 
law or regulation. There have been changes in the approaches to allow fishers to 
influence decision-making, but these changes are based on individual initiative 
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instead of a legal provision. Thus, there is no certainty that customary fishers 
can influence decision-making. 
 
The decision-making approach by the Provincial Conservation Forum is 
similarly unspecified in either Decree 74/2013 or Decree 6/2014. When 
interviewed about the approach, both the Head of the Marine Conservation 
Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department and the former Head of 
Tourism Promotion Division at the Tourism Department indicated that the 
forum tends to rely on a collective and consensus-building approach, in which 
matters are deliberately discussed and negotiated by board members. A senior 
official confirmed the decision-making approach, pointing out: 
It is true that we do not have established rules about meetings, 
decision-making, etc. We hold a monthly meeting to evaluate and 
provide feedback for various issues about the management of the 
Sawu Sea MPA. But, in most cases, decision-making is based on 
negotiation for consensus (The former Head of Tourism Promotion 
Division at the Tourism Department). 
 
These comments suggest that the absence of formal rules regarding decision-
making has influenced the forum meeting activities. During the early stages in 
the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, the forum held regular meetings but at 
the time of interviews in mid-2017; the forum had not met since early 2017. In 
previous years, meetings had been mainly initiated by the provincial agencies, 
suggesting that the other members, particularly the NMU-MPA and the Nature 
Conservation, depend on the provincial government to lead the forum. As 
explained by a senior official at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department, 
meetings help board members to harmonise and evaluate their programmes: 
It had a regular meeting schedule. It used to be once a month, on the 
first Friday of a month. So far this year [2017], we have not had a 
meeting. Through meetings, we discuss many things, how we 
[members of Provincial Conservation Forum] synergise and evaluate 
our programmes, including addressing problems of small fishers 
(The Head of the Marine Conservation Section).  
 
Despite the absence of guidelines about decision-making, the forum organised 
several public consultations during the early stages of the Sawu Sea MPA 
establishment (TSEPM, 2014). The consultation involved participants from 110 
villages in ten districts. After the MMAF officially established the Sawu Sea 
MPA in 2014, the TSEPM discussed the management plans and zones with 
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people in 125 coastal villages. Thus, the forum widely consulted the public about 
the management plans and marine zones. 
 
Even though the consultation was undertaken widely, the decision-making 
favoured the interests of local elites such as village officials and customary 
leaders. The TSEPM acknowledged in its 2014 report that the fora took place at 
a sub-district level, instead of a village level, which was more accessible to local 
elites than customary fishers. “The participants were chosen by the head of 
villages” (TSEPM, 2014, p.25), without any guidelines concerning the 
participants’ representativeness. The decision was made based on the feedback 
from elites; “the people did not get involved in decision making processes”, 
“women were involved but at small number” (TSEPM, 2014, p.2). Thus, in its 
2016 report, Evaluating the public’s perception on the Sawu Sea MPA, the 
TSEPM (2016, p. 114) reported that almost 70% of the 159 participants across 
villages in Rote Ndao district had never heard about the Sawu Sea MPA. 
 
The decision-making at the District Conservation Forum is similarly unspecified 
by Decree 274/2014. There is no explanation for this absence. The fact that the 
forum role is about providing advice can imply that it does not make decisions 
that require written rules. In addition, the board members represent different 
tiers of government with different mechanisms for decision-making. Thus, as 
some interviewees clarified, the decision-making within the forum involves 
discussions and negotiations to achieve consensus. The interviewees confirmed: 
We discuss most issues together with the other members of the board 
and other stakeholders in a friendly and voluntary manner. There is 
no compulsion. All decisions are made after getting the agreement of 
the members, including the agreement of the communities regarding 
zoning in the Sawu Sea MPA (Former Head of the Economic Bureau).  
 
I noticed that discussions [during the public consultation] were so 
dynamic. During the initial stages, many fishers rejected the 
conservation plans, especially in marine zones with abundant fish. 
So, we need to spend more effort to get the support of these fishers. 
We are lucky to have hohorok so that people do not see conservation 
as an external idea; instead, they supported the plans (the Forum 
daily coordinator). 
 
The decisions of the forum appear to be made with the knowledge and support 
of involved parties. However, according to the Secretary of the Fisheries and 
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Marine Affairs Department, the forum rarely holds meetings, which suggests 
that the District Conservation Forum does not play a significant role or make 
significant decisions in the management of the Sawu Sea MPA. Despite being a 
significant member of the forum, the secretary, in fact, never attended a 
meeting held by the forum.  
There is no regular meeting. The coordinator [of the executive unit] is 
the Deputy Mayor. So, there will be a meeting if the Deputy Mayor is 
available. We have never attended a meeting. We have never been 
involved [in attending meetings] so we do not know about its 
arrangement (The Secretary of the Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department). 
 
The Head of the Economic Bureau made a similar comment to that of the 
Secretary: 
Prior to 2017, there were some meetings. Since early 2017, we have 
not held a meeting, although we have a plan to hold a meeting this 
year. However, we [members of the forum] often meet [informally] 
when we undertake public consultation for the establishment of 
Hohorok at the village level. 
 
The absence of clear decision-making protocols creates uncertainties about the 
role of the forum in addressing fishers’ problems. Several problems raised by 
customary fishers who have played key roles in the revitalisation of hohorok, 
have not been addressed. The daily coordinator, quoted below, linked the 
unsolved problems to the absence of regular meetings of the forum: 
There are several problems I would like to raise and discuss within 
the forum. Several manahoro have raised problems associated with 
regular patrolling of hohorok … however, these problems will stay 
unsolved if the board of the forum cannot get together [hold a 
meeting to discuss the problems] and find their solutions. I am very 
disappointed. 
 
The establishment of hohorok strengthens the power of customary fishers in 
decision-making at the community level. According to the coordinator of 
manahoro, decisions about the indigenous zone and hohorok rules were based 
on negotiation and agreement between the national government and local 
fishers. Similarly, manahoro were directly nominated and elected by customary 
fishers. A manahoro from Oelua village elaborated on the mechanism: 
We voted manahoro from a list of names that were nominated by the 
participants [fishers]. The one who got the highest number of votes 
became the coordinator, the second became the deputy, the third and 
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the fourth became the secretary and the treasurer and the others 
serve as members. 
 
The process for establishing hohorok in Oelua was open, but it did not involve 
many members of the community. The coordinator confirmed that there was 
only one consultation meeting held by the forum, and this was when fishers 
were away fishing. As a result, there are some members of the communities who 
were not aware of the hohorok rules in detail. An active non-indigenous fisher 
who operated several boats and employed some workers in Oelua village is 
among the fishers who missed the consultation process. Some interviewees 
confirmed this information: 
The consultation was open, but it was held [by the forum] only once 
and attended by just over twenty fishers. Many fishers could not 
attend it because they were away fishing (Coordinator of manahoro). 
 
I knew about hohorok and the recent revitalisation efforts from other 
fishers, but … I did not know if marine areas within 0-4 nm are 
managed under hohorok and are designated only for local fishers (A 
non-indigenous fisher). 
 
Challenges in implementing hohorok rules relate to this lack of fishers’ 
involvement in the decision-making. There was no requirement for a quorum 
for decision-making to establish the rules and select the enforcers (manahoro). 
It seems that customary fishers were not involved and local elites dominated the 
decision-making. There was a lack of representation for customary fishers. The 
coordinator of manahoro explained: 
In hohorok, our [manahoro’s] job is to uphold the rules, while 
decision-making is in the hands of the people. Yes, I agree that 
decision-making involved many ‘big people’ [elites], but the process 
was open to anyone. There was no requirement for the minimum 
number of fishers to attend it. And we don’t see their [elites’] 
involvement as an issue, as long as the decision-making was 
transparent.  
 
Customary fishers’ power in decision-making varies through the tiers of 
government: the higher the tier, the weaker their power. Customary fishers 
provided information, but decision-making tended to be shaped by science-
based information. While there are fishers’ representatives within the provincial 
level management body, and customary fishers’ representatives within the 
district level management body assuming key posts, these two management 
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bodies do not make significant decisions, as their roles are limited to being 
coordinative bodies. Only at the community level management body do 
customary fishers have a control in decision-making without external 
intervention. This enables customary fishers to make decisions autonomously in 
applying hohorok, but the lack of access to decision-making at higher-level 
management bodies does not enable them to address problems beyond this 
level. 
7.5 Information provision 
Rules affect the extent to which information is available for and provided by the 
participants. In this study, rules about information provision for and by 
customary fishers influences the application of CFM within the Sawu Sea MPA. 
However, as presented below, information provision for and by customary 
fishers is limited due to several problems, such as the lack of formal recognition 
of the rights and responsibilities of customary fishers. 
 
There are several mechanisms through which the NMU-MPA provides 
information for the stakeholders. At the planning stages, MMAF (2010) 
specified in Decree 30/2010, Management plan and zoning of MPAs that the 
NMU-MPA must undertake public consultation when preparing planning 
documents. MMAF specified in Decree 23/2008 “copies of reports of its 
programmes [the NMU-MPA], which are submitted to the ministry, should be 
made available to other organisations that have functional relationships” 
(Article 22). These are the organisations that make up the TSEPM, the team that 
prepared the medium-term planning documents for the Sawu Sea MPA. The 
organisations, according to Decree 30/2010, include provincial and district 
governments, NGOs, customary communities, and the private sector.  
 
In the early stages of developing the Sawu Sea MPA, the NMU-MPA exchanged 
information with the stakeholders at both provincial and district levels. The 
information was widely exchanged because the TSEPM (2010) undertook 
consultation processes involving representatives of 125 of the 195 coastal 
villages within the Sawu Sea. The NMU-MPA staff member confirmed: 
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We undertook regular visits and consultation with the fishers. In 
there [communities], we share a variety of information. We do not 
provide special reports to the fishers. In addition, we share 
information including thematic campaigns through newspapers, 
radio, television and the Internet. 
 
The provision of written information to local stakeholders, however, is not 
regular, unlike the required provision of reports to the national government. 
The NMU-MPA staff member explained: 
We provide monthly reports to the national government ... They are 
[only] activity-based reports such as joint training and monitoring 
activities that we share with the provincial government. We also 
provide unwritten reports during regular meetings with the 
provincial government. We have established some community-based 
conservation programmes. We have provided some assistance, but it 
is the community that is managing the conservation. Thus, local 
communities can keep up with the progress of conservation.  
 
MAAF (2015) took further action through Regulation 21/2015 by requiring MPA 
management bodies to involve fishing communities in information provision. 
This regulation states that a partnership between the NMU-MPA and the 
stakeholders, including customary communities can be built (Article 3) through 
a legal agreement (Article 6) to undertake numerous activities, such as 
monitoring and data collection (Article 10). However, the NMU-MPA has not 
established any formal partnership with customary communities. Instead, the 
NMU-MPA relies on informal community groups established by the district 
government: 
They [customary fishers] support [the NMU-MPA] in many ways. For 
example, there are community guard groups ... They are trained with 
monitoring skills and equipped with communication gadgets. If there 
is bombing activity, they will contact us at the first opportunity, 
before they assess its impact on fisheries (The NMU-MPA 
coordinator). 
 
The information provided by the Provincial Conservation Forum uses numerous 
methods, but customary fishers play limited roles. Prior to the establishment of 
the Sawu Sea MPA, the forum organised numerous workshops and training to 
promote conservation plans and seek feedback from local communities. These 
fora enabled the provincial government to interact and exchange information 
with related stakeholders. However, as an interviewee elaborated: 
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Customary fishers were not involved much in the formal fora, such as 
workshops. They have difficulty using a language different from their 
mother tongue and because the government at all tiers used technical 
language; it was difficult for the fishers to understand (the Head of 
the Fisher Empowerment Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department). 
 
The forum tends to be more accountable to the provincial government than to 
customary fishers. The forum does not produce regular printed information 
(such as reports and newsletters) related to its activities for fishing 
communities, as it does for the provincial government. This difference reflects 
the absence of information requirements in the Governor’s Decree 74/2013. The 
forum provides press releases of its activities to the media, as well written 
reports to the provincial government (Interview with Head of the Marine 
Conservation Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department). 
However, while customary fishers have no access to media reports, some 
members of the forum (The Secretary of the Development Planning Agency and 
the Head of the Fisher Empowerment Section at the Fisheries and Marine 
Affairs Department) added that they have never received monthly written 
reports about the forum activities.  
 
An absence of guidance for communication responsibilities influences 
customary fishers’ rights in information provision. The Governor specifies in 
Regulation 74/2013 that the forum, especially the executive body, is responsible 
for undertaking monitoring and providing reports of its activities on a regular 
basis. However, there is no guidance relating to the content of the reports, to 
whom the reports should be provided, or the rights of fishing communities in 
providing information and accessing the reports. There is no clarity about the 
mechanisms by which customary fishers can access information about the 
forum activities. 
 
Customary fishers contributed to information provision in the earlier stages of 
the Sawu Sea MPA’s establishment, according to an interview with the former 
senior official at the Tourism Department. As noted in Chapter 4, for some time, 
Bajo fishers on Rote Island have fished across the country and in neighbouring 
countries, especially Australia. This activity has enabled them to accumulate 
knowledge about fisheries across boundaries. However, neither Decree 6/2014 
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nor Decree 74/2013 recognised these fishers’ knowledge and roles for managing 
the MPA. 
 
A challenge for information provision relates to the risks in undertaking marine 
monitoring and supervision because of the lack of resources for suitable 
surveillance technologies. A lack of marine transport safety hinders officials and 
local fishers from monitoring and providing information. As explained by an 
interviewee, marine monitoring and supervision activities are risky: 
The geographical challenges in undertaking monitoring are great, 
especially during the rainy season. In 2014, the boat that was used to 
undertake monitoring for small islands in Rote sank. As a result, 
some of our friends lost their lives (The former head of the Tourism 
Promotion Division at the Tourism Department). 
 
There are clear mechanisms by which board members get and provide 
information, both internally and externally, at the District Conservation Forum. 
Decree 274/2014 requires the forum to undertake monitoring and provide 
reports of their activities and commissions the executive unit to facilitate 
communication between the forum and fishers. However, the Decree does not 
specify the frequency of the monitoring and reports, nor the particular roles of 
customary communities in undertaking these activities. According to the Head 
of the Economic Bureau, the forum tends to rely on initiatives of the Provincial 
Conservation Forum to undertake monitoring and supervision. This reliance 
can explain the lack of clarity concerning information provision because the 
activity requires financial support from the district government.  
 
In the preliminary stages of the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, the District 
Conservation Forum undertook a series of consultation activities. Together with 
the district government, the forum held meetings at both district and 
community levels involving customary fishers. The forum worked closely with 
customary communities and religious organisations, particularly churches, to 
promote hohorok to local communities. Therefore, as the daily coordinator 
noted, local fishers got both oral and written information about the revival of 
hohorok and its rules.  
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The District Conservation Forum initiated information provision by customary 
fishers, but it has not provided support for customary fishers. Some officials at 
the forum identified the problems of customary fishers in undertaking 
monitoring and supervision, but they saw the national government as the 
solution to the problems. This is because the district government is strongly 
dependent on the national government for financial support. The officials did 
not identify the importance of the district government’s intervention to solve 
the problems: 
I have heard about the difficulty of manahoro undertaking 
monitoring. Thus, I will propose to the national government to 
support manahoro so that they can undertake monitoring when they 
go fishing (The daily District Conservation Forum coordinator). 
 
Information provision at the community level relies on face-to-face interaction. 
The size of Rote Island villages, including Oelua village, is small. This enables 
manahoro and fishers to interact directly by visiting one another. Initial public 
consultation, training and workshops with the local community also relied on 
intensive face-to-face communication between villagers and other stakeholders 
at all government tiers. Now, to facilitate quick communication and responses, 
the NMU-MPA has provided the community/manahoro with communication 
devices, particularly mobile phones, allowing the manahoro to easily contact 
the national, provincial and district authorities. 
 
However, there is a lack of consistency in the information provision involving 
customary fishers. In the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, customary 
fishers, particularly non-indigenous Bajo fishers, provided information on the 
characteristics of fisheries and resource users. This has not been carried forward 
into managing the MPA. The coordinator of manahoro indicated a lack of 
capability among indigenous customary fishers to understand the state of 
fisheries. He also emphasised the need to work with other parties, although the 
management of hohorok did not involve Bajo fishers. He explained: 
We provided information about fisheries [in the surrounding marine 
areas], which was used to establish the [indigenous] zones. However, 
we knew the information about the population of fisheries from 
experts. We can predict the stock of fisheries from our daily catches, 




In undertaking their responsibilities, manahoro, in fact, do not work on their 
own. Manahoro do not undertake monitoring regularly themselves. They rely 
on other fishers for information about suspicious fishing activities. Thus, 
transport limitations, such as seaworthy boats, do not always restrain 
manahoro from guarding the area. This work is possible because, as the 
coordinator of manahoro confirmed, local fishers have strong ownership of the 
conservation effort: 
The communities support hohorok because they got its benefits 
[increased fisheries catch]. We believe that without conservation, 
some fisheries will disappear. We undertake supervision daily. Now, 
we do not have boats to undertake supervision. We get information 
from our fellow fishers, but not always. 
 
A problem that most manahoro highlighted is the difficulty in regularly 
monitoring outside fishers. They have no difficulty monitoring local fishers, as 
there is an integrated fishing harbour to monitor the activities of local fishers 
and their catch. However, manahoro do not have sufficient resources, such as 
boats and fuel, to monitor outside fishers. Manahoro must rely on local fishers 
for information about the fishing activities of outside fishers, but local fishers do 
not approach outside fishers in the sea for further detailed information. Some 
interviewees acknowledged this difficulty: 
It is difficult to undertake monitoring daily without resources from 
the [national] government. We can get information about fishing 
activities by outside fishers from local fishers, but our fishers cannot 
get detailed information about the other fisher’s activities. But again, 
we need fuel and boats to enable us to monitor regularly and to make 
quick responses (A manahoro in Oelua village).  
 
We can easily detect from the fish on the dock in the harbour if it is 
caught by legal or illegal methods (Manahoro coordinator). 
 
Thus, the national government has established regulations about information 
exchanges and provisions. It requires the management bodies, particularly 
NMU-MPA, to provide the same reports it submits to MMAF to other 
organisations, including customary fishers, and to involve customary fishers in 
providing information. However, while the information provided by the NMU-
MPA to customary fishers is mostly about its activities, which is provided 
through local media, it is different from the one it provides to MMAF.  The 
NMU-MPA has failed to empower customary fishers to provide information. 
The NMU-MPA does not fully comply with the regulations, but this problem has 
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been contributed to by a lack of customary fishers’ capability to be involved in 
information provision about fisheries, particularly in large-scale marine 
environments. 
7.6 Surveillance and law enforcement  
Ostrom and Crawford (2005) do not specifically discuss surveillance and law 
enforcement in the IAD framework (see Chapter 3). However, illegal fishing 
activities by outside fishers and the lack of law enforcement have been the main 
contributors to fisheries depletion across Indonesia (Chapter 5), which in turn, 
influences fisheries management and the marginalisation of customary fishers. 
 
Illegal fishing had long been a concern of customary fishers in NTT prior to the 
establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA. After its establishment, several 
newspapers (Amalo, 2014; Bere, 2015; 2016a)  have continued to report that 
local officials and fishers across NTT have complained about illegal fishing and 
insufficient law enforcement by the national government. In its evaluation, 
TSEPM (2016) found that up to 50% of participants saw illegal fishing as the 
main problem. Indeed, the provincial government blames the national 
government for illegal fishing practices (Amalo, 2014), as these practices take 
place in marine areas managed by the national government and with its 
knowledge. 
 
The national government plays a bigger role than the provincial government in 
law enforcement. The former and current Heads of the Marine Conservation 
Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department shared their views that 
illegal fishing practice “happened in the marine areas beyond 12 nautical miles”, 
which fall under the jurisdiction of the national government. Thus, the former 
official further stated that the problem of illegal fishing was due to a lack of the 
national government’s willingness to fight against it: 
In the past, transhipment [unreported fishing] was allowable [by the 
national government]. Most fishing permits [beyond 12 nautical 
miles] are managed by the national government. We only watched 
them [outside fishers] catching and taking fisheries abroad. We do 




Interviewees representing the provincial government shared the same view 
about illegal fishing undertaken by outside fishers. They argued that local 
fishers do not commit illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as they have 
limited fishing capacity and fish mainly to meet their daily needs. The 
interviewees made the following comments: 
Our fishers do not focus on fisheries production. I mean they do not 
set a certain target to be pursued. It is the national government’s 
target, not the local fishers’, which is imposed on the large-scale 
outside fishers (The Secretary of Development Planning Agency). 
 
And: 
Our ancestors have undertaken fishing in sustainable ways … They 
did not catch fish everywhere and at all times because they knew that 
this unlimited fishing would deplete the fisheries (The former Head 
of the Marine Conservation Section at Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department). 
 
The NMU-MPA coordinator acknowledged that national government policy is 
the key to law enforcement. He highlighted the policy of the current MMAF that 
has taken strict action against illegal large-scale fishers and discontinued fishing 
permits for foreign fishers, including NTT. The NMU-MPA coordinator 
explained: 
There is [illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing] but not as 
much as it used to be. The Navy and the Police [members of the 
Provincial Conservation Forum] have repeatedly caught illegal 
fishing vessels in the NTT after getting reports from local fishers. 
Thus, we have seen increased catches by customary fishers in the 
NTT ... The improvement is especially due to the commitment of the 
MMAF [Mrs Susi Pujiastuti] who has taken serious action against 
foreign fishers and discontinued their business in Indonesia. 
 
The NMU-MPA coordinator believed that local fishers are equally important in 
law enforcement. While the fishers have been marginalised, due to the lack of 
law enforcement, they can provide information about illegal fishing activities. 
Media have reported that local fishers have provided information to the national 
government about illegal fishing by foreign fishers. Thus, the coordinator 
stressed that the national government needs to continue building the fishers’ 
compliance and support. This view reflects the government’s awareness of the 
significance of the customary fishers’ role in fisheries management. He added:  
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Because we just established the Sawu Sea MPA, we do not routinely 
conduct supervision. We rely on local fishers for information about 
fishing activities, including illegal fishing. [Thus, we need to] 
continue working with local communities to strengthen them and 
build their trust in law enforcement.  
 
The establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA has led to the establishment of a Quick 
Response Unit with both national government police and navy personnel as 
members. The unit gets managerial and financial support from the NMU-MPA 
to undertake patrols and quickly respond to illegal fishing activities. According 
to a senior official, the unit has contributed to an improvement in law 
enforcement: 
We have achieved [law enforcement] and punished vessels [outside 
fishers] breaking the law in the Sawu Sea MPA. It was the unit that 
caught the transgressors [after getting information from local fishers] 
(Interview with the former head of Tourism Promotion Division at 
the Tourism Department). 
 
In undertaking law enforcement activities such as monitoring and supervision, 
the forum relies on both the unit and customary fishers. The fishers provide 
first-hand information about illegal fishing activities to enable the unit to 
respond quickly. The effort has been more effective since the forum began to 
provide communication devices, particularly mobile phones, to help groups of 
fishers to contact the unit when they detect illegal fishing activities. The NMU-
MPA coordinator explained: 
They [customary fishers] provide support in many ways. For 
example, there are community guard groups. The national, 
provincial, and district governments together with the NMU-MPA 
formed these groups. We have provided some of these groups with 
communication devices to inform law enforcers if they detect 
suspicious legal fishing activities.  
 
This joint effort has resulted in both the increased awareness of some local 
fishers of legal methods of fishing and decreased illegal fishing practices by 
outside fishers. A senior official noted: 
The awareness of the local fishers has increased. If they 
unintentionally catch sea turtles or dugongs, they will let them go. 
They have complied with regulations about protected fisheries and 
marine resources. They have also taken direct action against illegal 
fishing. There is an acknowledgement from the Fisheries and Marine 
Affairs Department, that in general fishers do not go too far to catch 
fish. They just catch in the nearby waters and they can bring home 
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sufficient catch. But, honestly, I do not know the exact figure 
(Interview with the former Head of the Tourism Promotion Division 
at the Tourism Department). 
 
The unit, according to several media reports and as echoed by several 
interviewees, has successfully detained and sanctioned some illegal fishers in 
the Sawu Sea MPA because of information provided by local fishers.  
We have our patrol team in the Sawu Sea MPA. If outside fishers are 
undertaking fishing in the indigenous and traditional zones, we will 
detain them (The NMU-MPA staff member).  
 
There is [illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing] but not as 
much as it used to be. The Navy and the Police [members of the 
Provincial Conservation Forum] have repeatedly caught fishing 
vessels in the NTT, which did not have proper permits (The NMU-
MPA coordinator). 
 
However, the fact that the unit is operated only at the provincial level, despite 
the large-size of the MPA, has proved ineffective in many cases. The unit has 
undertaken surveillance but in unsystematic ways that have been partial and 
incidental. It tends to take actions based on the reports of fishers but in many 
cases, the unit cannot make the quick response its name implies because of the 
large-size of the Sawu Sea MPA. According to some interviewees, the unit 
arrives at the scene after illegal fishers have gone; or they may play ‘cat and 
mouse’ games with the unit (Interviews with Head of Rote Economic Bureau 
and a senior official of FAO). 
 
Since its establishment in 2014, the District Conservation Forum has intensified 
monitoring and marine surveillance within the Sawu Sea MPA. Like the 
provincial governments, the district governments work closely with the navy, 
and police to enforce the law against criminals and impose penalties on them. 
Therefore, the membership of the forum includes these law enforcers. The 
forum daily coordinator emphasised the reason for having law enforcers as 
members of the forum: 
Since the beginning [the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA in 
2014], we have involved customary fishers in undertaking monitoring 
and supervision. We have also involved the police, the navy and 
manahoro because we do not have formal authority [in law 
enforcement] but we have financial resources to support them. 
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The adoption of customary rules has improved law enforcement and 
compliance. The District Conservation Forum, together with other stakeholders, 
has worked with customary figures to raise the awareness and compliance of 
local fishers regarding fisheries conservation. The forum has undertaken several 
activities to revitalise and adopt customary rules for fisheries management in 
coastal villages on Rote Island because of its benefits for conservation. Some 
senior officials at the district government acknowledged the improved law 
enforcement, which has arisen from the adoption of customary rules and 
practices: 
There was a case where a local fisher who had a sea turtle was fined 
according to customary rules (The Secretary of Fisheries and Marine 
Affairs Department).  
 
In Nggodimeda village, a villager was fined for mining sand on a 
large-scale and using modern equipment (The Head of the Economic 
Bureau).  
 
The impact of customary rules on local fishers differs from that of outside 
fishers. While customary rules are more effectively implemented among local 
fishers than outside fishers, the reverse applies to formal rules. Formal rules are 
more effectively imposed on outside fishers than on local fishers. This difference 
is due to the difficulty local communities and law enforcers have in monitoring 
and enforcing the customary law on outside fishers, due to limited marine 
transport, safety and other risks, which are not significant difficulties for formal 
law enforcers. Thus, formal and local rules complement one another in law 
enforcement. The Head of the Economic Bureau elaborated on illegal outside 
fishers and the difficulty that local fishers have in enforcing customary rules on 
them: 
Illegal fishing activities by outside fishers are decreasing, but they are 
often still operating in nearby marine areas. Fishers in Boni Village, 
for example, have detected their activities but due to limited facilities 
and resources, they cannot exclude or force them to submit to the 
law. Local fishers worry about possible risks from approaching them. 
 
Under hohorok, manahoro are responsible for enforcing it, including imposing 
sanctions on violators. With the revitalisation of hohorok, the manahoro’s roles 
have continued to be the same as when hohorok was practised in the past. In 
undertaking their responsibilities, manahoro do not have difficulty enforcing 
the law on local fishers because fishing activities are easily monitored, but 
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manahoro do have difficulty with enforcing the law on outside fishers. 
Manahoro who were interviewed indicated that the law has not been effectively 
enforced due to the lack of resources: 
During a meeting with the District Conservation Forum, we asked for 
resources to undertake monitoring and supervision. We cannot 
enforce the law because we do not have proper seaworthy boats and 
equipment to monitor the area (manahoro in Oelua village).  
 
In 2015, we knew that there was illegal fishing by outside fishers in 
the nearby waters using blasting. We knew after finding dead floating 
fish on the beaches. However, the perpetrators had gone by the time 
we knew. We lack capacity to undertake monitoring (Coordinator of 
manahoro).  
 
Despite the difficulty of law enforcement for outside fishers, this does not 
eliminate the significance of manahoro. Law enforcement applied to local 
fishers is important because their fishing activities contributed to fisheries 
depletion. Historically, local fishers had little impact on fisheries, but they have 
gradually learned about destructive fishing methods, particularly blasting 
fishing, from outside fishers since the 1970s. The coordinator of manahoro 
confirmed: 
Local fishers have learned from outside fishers [in undertaking illegal 
fishing activities]. They did not practice blasting and poisoning fish 
before the arrival of outside fishers [and Bajo fishers] who introduced 
these fishing methods in the 1970s. Thus, both local and outside 
fishers contributed to fisheries depletion. But I think it has been the 
outside fishers who contributed the most to fisheries depletion. 
 
Law enforcement, however, is undermined by the lack of integrated 
programmes across the different tiers of government in support of customary 
fishers. The district government, which has no marine jurisdiction, for example, 
has supported hohorok by building alternative livelihoods for customary fishers. 
In Oelua, for example, the district government provided livestock for fishers but 
due to a lack of food for the livestock, the fishers take the leaves of protected 
mangrove trees to feed the cattle. The district government’s programme to 
provide alternative livelihood activities for fishers can lead to the depletion of 
the mangrove forest that is protected under hohorok. A manahoro in Oelua 
elaborated on this problem: 
It is a violation of hohorok rules. We [manahoro] have discussed this 
problem. We agreed that as long as the people only take the leaves of 
mangrove to feed their livestock, then it should be all right. It will 
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destroy the forest if they cut down the trees. However, in the long run 
and if the district government provides more livestock, it can destroy 
the trees. And, it is hard to take the leaves without cutting the 
mangroves. 
 
On the whole, law enforcement has improved following the establishment of the 
Sawu Sea MPA. The management bodies at all government tiers have worked 
closely with law enforcers to undertake surveillance and enforce the law. This 
effort has resulted in decreased illegal fishing. Similarly, the establishment of 
hohorok has prevented illegal fishing by local fishers, although there were still 
reports of illegal fishing by outside fishers. However, the decline in illegal 
fishing might relate to the policy of the national government in general, which 
has taken strict action against illegal fishers since 2014. The national 
government’s policy and increasing surveillance in the western part of the 
country, discourage, the entry of illegal fishers from neighbouring countries. 
7.7 Jurisdictional scope 
Jurisdictional scope in this study focuses on the geographical domain of the 
management bodies. The domain influences the management bodies’ capacity 
to achieve their goals and to apply CFM within the Sawu Sea MPA. Overall, the 
geographical domain of the management bodies is determined by the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management. However, the application of the ecosystem 
approach at the provincial, district and community levels does not solve the 
institutional misalignment that the national government aimed to address. This 
has complicated the application of CFM. 
 
At the national level, according to Decree 23/2008, the working area of the 
management body (NMU-MPAs) covers sixteen MPAs across twelve provinces 
in Eastern Indonesia (see Figure 4.3). As the Coral Triangle Initiative Support 
Programme (Duanto, 2015; Kaha, 2015) noted in its 2011 report, these MPAs 
possess diverse socio-ecological characteristics, and together they serve as the 
ecosystems for many migratory fisheries. This ecosystem approach enables the 
NMU-MPA to address overlaps and gaps in managing fisheries.  
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However, a senior official of FAO commented during an interview that the 
NMU-MPA faces great challenges that have shaped its efforts to manage MPAs, 
coordinate sub-national government partners and apply customary fisheries. 
The following interviewees acknowledged that the NMU-MPA’s responsibilities 
are not matched with the supporting resources: 
Given the size of the protected areas and because it shares 
boundaries with other countries, the Sawu Sea MPA is managed 
nationally. But I think the responsibility of the NMU-MPA is much 
greater than supporting resources, especially human resources. We 
are managing 16 MPAs in 12 provinces in Eastern Indonesia, 
including the Sawu Sea MPA. The geographical areas influence 
management costs (The NMU-MPA staff member).  
 
[There are] too many [marine areas] to be managed and local 
partners to be coordinated … All MPAs have a diversity of fisheries 
practices and we have to adjust to the diversity … We try our best to 
carry out the programmes in accordance with the characteristics of 
their business. But this is not an easy and costly job particularly in 
reconciling conflicting fishing practices such as the case with 
Lamalera fishers. The negotiation cost is very high (The NMU-MPA 
coordinator). 
 
The NMU-MPA works with other stakeholders across the region to address 
these challenges. The NMU-MPA coordinator emphasised that one challenge is 
to assure a fair distribution of resources across geographical areas in order to 
strengthen collaboration with and among fishers. As he noted, there are many 
units of provincial and district governments and millions of customary fishers 
that are scattered among thousands of islands within its jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the NMU-MPA sets priorities for its programmes to work with customary 
communities. However, the NMU-MPA coordinator acknowledged fishers have 
raised some difficulties in addressing social challenges across the MPAs: 
Indeed, there are voices [customary fishers] that we [the NMU-MPA] 
have never paid attention to them; that we forget to empower 
customary fishers in some islands who mostly involve in marine 
culture [seaweed growing]. Well, it is impossible … to serve all the 
fishers at once. We set priorities because the government’s funding is 
not only to finance conservation projects in the NTT but also in other 
provinces. But I acknowledge that we might have overlooked some 
fishers. There are millions of fishers in thousands of islands. It is 
difficult to meet their needs adequately. 
 
At the provincial level, the geographical domain of the management body (the 
Provincial Conservation Forum) is significantly smaller, although it covers the 
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entire marine area of the Sawu Sea MPA, it does not cover the full marine area 
of the whole Sawu Sea. It comprises only ten districts out of the twenty-two 
districts in NTT and these have different practices of customary fisheries 
management. This jurisdictional scope influences the extent to which CFM is 
applied and the funding and harmonisation of policies at different tiers of the 
government, creating conflicts among communities within and beyond the Sawu 
Sea MPA. 
 
The entire Sawu Sea MPA encompasses over 3 million ha and is divided into 
different zones for different purposes. The zones are: 
§ Core zones for protection of fisheries and for research;  
§ Utilisation zones for marine tourism and research;  
§ Sustainable fisheries zones comprising general zones for commercial 
fisheries, traditional zones for small-scale fishers and cetacean protection 
zones of migratory fisheries; and  
§ Other zones include the indigenous zone and tourism and marine culture 
zones (MMAF Decree 6/2014). 
 
The size of marine zones for customary fishing and for protecting traditionally 
managed marine areas, known as the indigenous zone, is about 0.02% of the 
Sawu Sea MPA (MMAF, 2014a, p.82). In these zones, Hohorok (or Papadak) on 
Rote Island was identified in Decree 6/2014 as one example of CFM practices to 
be adopted. However, as shown in Figure 7.5, the size of the indigenous zone 
within which customary fishers implement CFM is one of the smallest whereas, 
the size of the marine area for commercial fishing is over 40% of the entire 
Sawu Sea MPA. 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Size of marine zones of the Sawu Sea MPA (%) 








Commercially-purposed fishing zones 
Cetacean protection zones 
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The physical characteristics of the large archipelagic province influence the 
priorities of the forum in empowering customary fishers. Some senior provincial 
government officials at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department 
highlighted the high operational costs for deployment, transportation and 
meetings, and the increased responsibility of the provincial government 
following the change in the marine jurisdiction, as established by Law 32/2014. 
The Secretary of the Development Planning Agency echoed the view of the other 
officials, “the archipelagic characteristic costs more for transportation, 
particularly airfares. It’s cheaper if we can drive or go by public buses”. A 
fisheries official added that a significant amount of the forum’s budget goes 
towards transportation and accommodation costs, reducing the budget to be 
allocated for activities related to empowering customary fishers.  
 
A significant challenge for the Sawu Sea MPA’s management is the coordination 
costs incurred in harmonising policies across tiers of the government. The 
exclusion of the district governments from managing fisheries and marine 
resources, as specified in Law 23/2014, solved previously fragmented fisheries 
management under decentralised management (see Chapter 4). This policy 
enables the management of the entire ecosystem within the Sawu Sea MPA to be 
under one authority, reflecting the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management. However, the policy requires the national management body to 
take initiatives and bear coordinating costs, such as holding meetings and 
undertaking public consultation. 
 
Unfortunately, the exclusion of district governments from fisheries 
management has decreased their incentive to support the Sawu Sea MPA in 
managing land-based activities along coastal areas, which fall under their 
jurisdiction. Activities in the coastal areas do not come under the fisheries 
regime, but they can produce spill over impacts that affect fisheries and marine 
resources. At the same time, the revised Provincial Regulation 1/2011, 
Provincial Spatial Plan (Article 1) allows business activities in the coastal area. 
In the previous Spatial Plan, as specified in Article 52 of Provincial Regulation 
9/2005, business activities in the coastal area were not allowed. This change has 
resulted in increased construction of hotels on many coastal areas and many 
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protests by customary fishers in NTT province, due to the denial of the fishers’ 
customary rights over coastal resources (Angrian, 2917; Bere, 2016b). 
 
This exclusion of the district governments from fisheries management has 
produced conflicts among local people over marine zones within the Sawu Sea 
MPA. The policy of the provincial government attempted to gain Rote Ndao 
district support, but their efforts led to further conflicts. The Head of the Marine 
Conservation Section at the Provincial Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department 
acknowledged that in order to build the ownership of the Rote Ndao district 
government, the forum supported existing tourism zones that had been 
established by the district government, despite its proximity to the indigenous 
zone, especially mariculture zones (see Figure 4.3). As a result, a local seaweed 
grower in Nemberala confirmed that the proximity of tourism facilitates to 
mariculture zones causes problems, such as pollution from tourism activities, 
marine sports and transport, drifting into his zone (personal communication). 
Pollution influences the health and growth of seaweed. Thus, the Sawu Sea MPA 
zoning resulted in both vertical conflicts across tiers of government and 
horizontal conflicts among community groups. 
 
The change to the marine jurisdiction has resulted in an increased burden for 
the provincial government and local fishers regarding public services. Following 
the transfer of authority for fisheries management from the district government 
to the provincial government, the latter needed to provide public services 
related to fishing activities. This change increased the costs for both the 
provincial government and the fishers. The change requires the fishers to go 
through longer procedures to get the provincial government’s approval for 
fisheries activities. However, the provincial government does not have sufficient 
resources to manage its increased responsibility. Senior officials at the 
provincial government confirmed these challenges: 
Changes in the law 23/2014 [Sub-national government] for example, 
complicate fishing permits. Under this law, fishers should get fishing 
permits from the provincial government instead of the district 
government, as in the past. The change requires more costs for the 
fishers (The Secretary of the Development Planning Agency). 
 
I think the change was a step back. It put an end to the on-going 
development agenda that the district governments had pursued. At 
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the same time, the provincial government does not have sufficient 
resources [to take over the new responsibilities] (The Head of the 
Fisher Empowerment Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs 
Department). 
 
A member of the Provincial Conservation Forum discussed conflicts related to 
migratory fisheries and problems within the Sawu Sea MPA. Significant 
migratory fisheries in the Cetacean protection zones of the Sawu Sea MPA (see 
Figure 4.3) are protected from local fishers. However, these migratory fisheries 
are not protected beyond the Sawu Sea MPA. She argued that there is no benefit 
in protecting migratory fisheries if other people do not consider the impacts of 
their actions on fisheries and on other fishers. The Former Head of the Marine 
Conservation Section at the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Department stated, 
“We should benefit from them [migratory fisheries]. Otherwise, we just protect 
them for the Chinese … and the Australians”. Similarly, she added, seaweed 
farmers in NTT suffered from the cross-boundary oil spill in 2009, but they got 
no compensation. These are some cross-boundary problems in the Sawu Sea 
MPA.  
 
The application of CFM is similarly limited at both the provincial and national 
levels, due to the change in the fisheries management. The indigenous zone, 
where customary fishers implement CFM, is amongst the smallest zones. 
Despite the small size, during the initial stages in the establishment of the Sawu 
Sea MPA, the provincial government provided support for conservation efforts, 
which were shaped by its goal to take control of fisheries management in the 
Sawu Sea, which was then under the national government’s jurisdiction. 
However, with changes in both the sub-national government law and in the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA in 2014, when fishing communities and the 
NMU-MPA were favoured to manage fisheries, the provincial and district 
governments’ support for customary fishers decreased.  
 
At the district level, the main functions of the District Conservation Forum are 
to provide advice for the management of the Sawu Sea MPA and to coordinate 
the activities of local-level stakeholders. The legal role of the forum is limited, 
but it has encouraged the application of customary fisheries in the Sawu Sea 
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MPA. The forum, together with customary fishers, has revitalised hohorok in six 
villages (see Figure 4.3 & 6.4). As the Head of the Economic Bureau explained: 
In 2016, we reintroduced the implementation of hohorok in six 
villages. We have set the target to establish hohorok in all fifty-eight 
coastal villages on Rote Island. For 2017, we aim to revive and re-
establish hohorok in sixteen villages. 
 
However, the absence of marine jurisdiction prevents the district government 
from imposing regulatory policies on marine-based activities. To address this 
lack of authority, the national agencies such as the Police Department and 
Marine Corps are represented on the board of the forum. These agencies have 
authority to undertake monitoring and supervision in the Sawu Sea MPA. 
However, the change in the district government’s marine jurisdiction authority 
has stopped the forum’s efforts to revitalise hohorok in the other coastal villages 
within the Sawu Sea MPA. An interviewee commented:  
The provincial government manages marine areas from the coastline 
to 4 nm. There is no legal basis for us [the district government] to 
fund activities related to fisheries and marine resources 
management. We hope that the NMU-MPA and TNC can revitalise 
customary rules in the other coastal villages. Without the NMU-MPA 
and TNC, I do not think the forum can do it (Interview with Head of 
the Economic Bureau). 
 
Consequently, the applicability of CFM at the district level has been shaped by 
the role of customary fishers’ representatives in the forum rather than the 
district government. Prior to the declaration of the Sawu Sea MPA in 2009, the 
forum, whose coordinator serves as the daily coordinator of the RNFAC, had 
been actively involved in the adat re-establishment (see Chapter 6). Thus, the 
forum has re-established hohorok in fisheries management. However, as with 
the provincial government, the change in the sub-national government law has 
stopped, the district government from supporting the forum in re-establishing 
hohorok in the other coastal villages.  
 
At the community level, marine hohorok shares similarities with freshwater 
fisheries hohorok. Marine hohorok is located along the coastline, managed and 
accessed by all community members. The hohorok rules vary across 
communities, but in general, as discussed in Chapter 6, the rules include: 
• Protection of coastal zones 
• Prohibition of destructive fishing methods 
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• Protection of endangered species such as sea turtles 
• Adoption of no-entry marine zones 
• Establishment of sanctions 
 
The rules not only include activities within the indigenous zone but also 
activities in the coastal zones. There is an integrated approach to fisheries 
management. However, at the moment, hohorok is only implemented in two 
villages (Oelua and Netenaen) in the North West Rote sub-district. The other 
neighbouring villages in this sub-district have not implemented hohorok. Thus, 
fishers in the other villages operate under a different management regime. This 
difference can diminish collective actions around activities such as sand mining 
and mangrove logging, which have cross-boundary impacts. Some interviewees 
elaborated:  
We have set the target to establish hohorok in all 58 coastal villages 
on Rote Island. Initially, we established hohorok in six villages in 
three sub districts, two villages per sub district. However, there are 
eighteen villages along the southern coast of Rote Island that are 
external to the Sawu Sea MPA. The national government did not 
include them in the Sawu Sea MPA (Head of the Economic Bureau). 
 
Local fishers in neighbouring villages, such as Tolama, that do not 
implement hohorok, are free to mine sand and do other activities in 
their villages. Hohorok rules only apply to Oelua. Tolama village has 
not adopted it (manahoro from Oelua village).  
 
The geographic boundaries of hohorok in Oelua are very clear. The whole 
coastline of Oelua, which is mostly made up of mangrove forest, is included in 
the marine hohorok (see Figure 7.6). The forest enables an accurate 
identification of boundaries with neighbouring villages. These boundaries, 
according to a manahoro in Oelua, aid their supervision of the marine zones to 
exclude illegal fishers. However, a senior non-indigenous fisher, who has several 
boats and employs several workers, noted both the difficulty identifying 
hohorok boundaries in the sea and that many fishers have no knowledge of 
these boundaries.  
We have drawn boundaries with other villages, and we have 
established signs along the boundaries. Thus, it is easy to identify 
trespassers (A manahoro in Oelua village). 
 
I did not know about details of the zoning and boundaries of the 
hohorok in the sea (The non-indigenous fisher). 
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A distinctive feature of the coastal zone in Oelua is its rocky and muddy beaches. 
These beaches serve as the ecosystem for non-migratory fisheries and marine 
resources. Access to these fisheries is confined to local fishers. Thus, there is an 
incentive to build ownership and support from local fishers, especially after 
local fishers have seen increased catches of fish since the implementation of 
hohorok. The changes are linked to the absence of fishing activities by outside 
fishers in the indigenous and traditional zones. The coordinator of manahoro 
explained:  
Fisheries here do not migrate to other regions ... We understand that 
sometimes they migrate. But fisheries here tend to stay on the rocky 
and muddy beaches under mangrove forest. [So] fishers have 
reported increased catches in nearby marine areas. [It is because] 
there are no more outside fishers in the indigenous and traditional 





Figure 7.6: Coastal area of Oelua Village 
Source: Anwar Idris 
 
The application of CFM at the community level enables fishers to manage 
locally based marine areas. This arrangement is in line with the change in the 
sub-national government law. Customary fishers have full control over decision-
making because there is no other official in the management body. They 
nominated their representatives without external intervention, and decision-
making processes are open and transparent. However, CFM is limited to 
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hohorok; the management body does not include the non-indigenous Bajo 
fishers, who have a strong marine culture and ecological knowledge across 
countries. At the same time, indigenous customary fishers have limited 
resources and power to manage hohorok, including managing cross-boundary 
pollution and fisheries and excluding outside fishers. 
 
The application of CFM by the NMU-MPA is influenced by several factors 
related to jurisdictional scope. At the national level, high transactional costs of 
managing large-scale MPAs and coordinating local officials and fishers 
influences the allocation of resources to support customary fishers. At the 
provincial level, institutional misalignment has arisen because of the exclusion 
of some marine areas and fishing communities in the Sawu Sea from the Sawu 
Sea MPA. At the district level, institutional misalignment has been created by 
the exclusion of the district government from managing fisheries. Finally, at the 
community level, challenges in applying CFM arise from this institutional 
misalignment because only a few villages have re-introduced hohorok and 
because of the difficulty in identifying hohorok boundaries when in open seas. 
7.8 Summary 
Seven themes are identified across all management bodies that influence the 
applicability of CFM. The extent of CFM applicability varies across the different 
themes. The extent of applicability is greater at lower-level management bodies. 
However, the lower the management bodies, the less authority they can exercise 
to apply CFM.  
 
Resource structure, law enforcement and jurisdictional scope are the key 
themes that influence CFM application. The national level management body 
has a limited provision of resources to both manage several MPAs and 
coordinate local stakeholders. This limited provision of resources influences its 
support for customary fishers. At the community level, provision of resources 
empowers manahoro to undertake monitoring and enforce the law. Law 
enforcement has improved as the result of navy and police involvement in the 
management bodies and particularly by the commitment of the national 
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government to fight illegal fishers across Indonesia. However, decreased 
funding support by the national government has weakened law enforcement 
and changing jurisdictional scope resulting in several problems, such as 
institutional misalignment and high transactional costs, which weaken the 
applicability of CFM. 
 
Overall, the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA has led to the revival of 
hohorok, self-governing fisheries and increased commitment by the national 
government to fight illegal fishing. However, the decreasing support of the 
government at all tiers and unaddressed institutional misalignments can 
threaten hohorok applicability and efficacy.  
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Chapter 8 The Applicability of Customary 
Fisheries Management Regimes for 
Managing Large-scale Marine 
Resources on Rote Island 
8.1 Introduction 
This research sought to assess the applicability of customary fisheries 
management (CFM) principles for managing large-scale marine resources in the 
Sawu Sea, Indonesia. Hohorok – a traditional property rights regime that 
emphasises communal over individual property rights –was reintroduced to 
Rote Island in 2004 as part of the Indonesian government’s efforts to align 
policy with the CTI, of which it is a signatory. Replacing the previous 
decentralised system at the district level, the national government extended 
hohorok to the wider marine environment, but at the same time the national 
government strengthened its own role.  
 
However, hohorok on Rote Island historically had only been applied to the 
island’s lake fisheries and to a very limited extent to coastal fisheries. 
Management of the large-scale marine fishery has been undertaken within the 
context of modern property rights regimes. Thus, the application of hohorok to 
marine fisheries is a new practice on Rote Island. 
 
It is too soon to observe the full effects of hohorok on the conservation and 
management of the wider fisheries, but there are tensions evident in addressing 
the challenges of marine commons. By design, the revived hohorok differs from 
the customary one. More importantly, the revived hohorok struggles with 
managing large-scale marine commons. These tensions are exacerbated by a 
lack of institutional linkages and by customary fishers’ lack of access to 
information, funding and decision-making.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the tension around applying a traditional regime in a 
contemporary setting to a new resource. I then discuss the drivers for hohorok’s 
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reintroduction, exploring in particular the politics of visibility. I suggest that 
hohorok was reintroduced not so much for conserving marine ecosystems and 
biodiversity but more to enable the Indonesian government to leverage funding 
from international organisations and NGOs. This goal was clear in the national 
government’s dependence on external funding and in its unwillingness to 
collaborate and share power with local officials and fishers to address the 
challenges of large-scale marine commons. Finally, I assess the potential for 
hohorok to address the fundamental problem of marine commons and discuss 
factors influencing its applicability and both the practical and the wider 
theoretical implications of the study. 
8.2 Tensions between Tradition and Innovation in the Application 
of Hohorok  
Hohorok, as presented in Chapter 6, had been in abeyance for decades due to 
the marginalisation by the national government prior to the establishment of 
the Sawu Sea MPA.  More importantly, hohorok had been mostly applied in 
small-scale fisheries. Thus, the application of hohorok to large-scale marine 
environments is a novel and significant departure from traditional practice. It is 
also being applied in a socio-economic context that is quite different to the 
circumstances in which it was originally used. Thus, the new hohorok differs 
significantly from the old hohorok.  
 
Equitable fishing access is the main factor influencing the applicability of 
hohorok in fisheries management but the Indonesian government failed to 
address that in the new hohorok. The national government did not distribute 
access to fisheries inequitably among customary fishers within a community 
and across communities. It has treated diverse groups of communities as 
homogenous, although communities, according to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), 
are heterogeneous in nature. It did not allocate different temporal fishing rights 
to different groups of customary fishers, including indigenous customary 
fishers, within the community as the old hohorok did. The new hohorok 
encourages open fishing access among customary fishers; it does not address 
fair fishing access for customary fishers. This difference is a source of conflict 
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between contemporary western fisheries management and customary rules in 
many countries (Friedlander, 2018).  
 
The partial re-application of hohorok to only some communities on Rote Island 
also contributed to inequitable fishing access across communities. In fact, this 
practice conflicts with the previous hohorok, where all related communities and 
environments were managed in order to ensure an equitable food distribution. 
The application created difficulties for customary fishers in addressing 
migratory fisheries and posed problems across different communities where 
hohorok was not re-applied. It allowed some communities free fishing access at 
the expense of the others. The partial application of hohorok created conflicts 
among neighbouring communities and weakened their collective action to 
pursue collective interests. 
 
The national government failed to address social relations between groups 
within a community, which were among the other goals of the previous hohorok 
that are now missing in the revived form of hohorok. In reviving and managing 
hohorok, indigenous fishers are dominating decision-making although they do 
not have the capacity (resources and knowledge) for monitoring migratory 
fisheries that the non-indigenous fishers have. The Indonesian government does 
not involve non-indigenous customary fishers in managing hohorok. This 
suggests that a fair distribution of benefits to members of communities is not 
the goal of the revived hohorok. These findings show that the study of Lemos 
and Agrawal’s (2006) are also applicable to the context of this study: it is 
difficult to distribute costs and benefits fairly in large-scale marine 
environments with diverse and complex socio-ecological aspects. 
 
Significantly, the national government failed to restore the diminished trust of 
customary fishers in the national government, which arose from the 
government’s denial of customary fishing practices in the previous regimes, and 
which contributed to depleted fisheries at the expense of small-scale fishers 
(Satria & Matsuda, 2004). This lack of trust diminished further from a lack of 
law enforcement by the government on outside fishers. The lack of trust serves 
as a disincentive for customary fishers to respond to the changes introduced by 
the government. In his study of collaboration in fisheries, Jentoft (1989, p. 173) 
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argues, “trust  [an important element in fisheries collaboration] is dependent on 
fishermen’s previous relations with these organisations [the government and 
non-government organisations]”. Restoring trust requires continuous active 
efforts from the national government (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001), but failed to 
stop continuous illegal fishing by outside fishers in the Sawu Sea MPA.   
 
Furthermore, this approach does not take into account more recent changes in 
the wider socio-economic structures of communities on Rote Island, which are 
also the characteristics of developing countries. Contextual changes such as Bajo 
fishers, population growth, foreign fishers, and global markets have led to an 
increase in overall fishing activities (see Chapter 5). Both global market demand 
for marine and fisheries products, and local demand for fish, coastal mangroves 
and sand from coastal areas have increased sharply during the last few years 
(Chapter 5 and 6). These factors influence customary fishers’ livelihoods, the 
depletion of fisheries and fish nurseries and the efficacy of local rules in 
managing fisheries. 
 
This study indicates that the findings of previous studies (for example, Folke et 
al., 2007; Stern, 2011) concerning the roles of external drivers, such as the 
global market, in diminishing the applicability of local rules in managing 
natural resources also apply on Rote Island. This finding is unexpected because 
external drivers, which situate beyond the capacity of local rules, are supposed 
to be addressed by the CTI and/or the national government. It is difficult to 
address this problem, however, as there is a strong sign that the establishment 
of the CTI was not intended to address existing problems facing customary 
fishers because empowering the fishers is not the goal of the national 
government. 
8.3 Drivers for Hohorok Revival 
A feature of Indonesian management of the Sawu Sea MPA has been the donors 
and state-sponsored revival of hohorok resulting in a western-synthetic 
hohorok. Drivers for revival at the local, national and international levels 
include institutional changes at the global level for biodiversity management, 
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domestic political changes, marine conservation projects by international NGOs 
at the local level, and the CTI’s establishment at the supranational level.  
 
Institutional changes in biodiversity management at the global level have 
shaped the Indonesian government’s policies toward strengthening customary 
practices for natural resource management (Chapter 5). International 
agreements and conventions for biodiversity protection, such as the Convention 
in Biological Diversity in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and 2006, have gradually 
shaped domestic policies (Mulyana & Dermawan, 2008; Zakaria, 2018). These 
conventions prioritise biodiversity protection and also emphasise traditional 
and indigenous rights in natural resource management to achieve these goals. 
The government has, as a result, ratified several laws to protect biodiversity and 
the rights of customary communities in natural resources management. The 
two, biodiversity and customary practices have become conflated.  
 
International agreements, particularly the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro, donors and NGOS projects to restore indigenous people’s relationship 
with the nature might have been influenced by the concept of noble savages 
(Raymond, 2007). It is about the idyllic idea of many Europeans about a 
peaceful and harmonic life of indigenous people with nature, and it also serves 
as a critique to the modern life of the Europeans (Rowland, 2004). This concept 
argues that indigenous people’s close relationships with the nature have been 
the key to keep them pure and away from corrupted civilisation and to be in line 
with ecological sustainability (Redford, 1990). This idea is not clearly stated in 
the policy documents of international donors and NGOS that involve in the 
establishment and management of the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA, but the CTI’s 
Plan of Action highlights keywords such as indigenous (Secretariat of Regional 
Coral Triangle Initiative, 2009b). 
 
Concurrently, increased domestic pressures for political change and for an 
improvement of people’ rights in natural resource management over the last 
two decades have been the main driver for strengthening customary practices 
(Zakaria, 2018). The national-level NGOs are among the main advocates and 
institutional entrepreneurs for the national government’s acknowledgement of 
customary communities’ political rights (Kosasih, 2016; Moniaga, 2004; I. 
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Susanto, 2013). As a result, since the 2000s the Indonesian government has 
passed several laws acknowledging people’s rights to review laws in natural 
resource management that conflict with the Constitution (Kusuma Dewi & 
Widodo, 2018) and with the rights of communities. Notably in 2016 the 
president handed over certificates of ownership for managing natural resources 
to customary communities across the country. 
 
At the national level, a bureaucratic agenda and bureaucratic interests have 
influenced the institutionalisation of customary practices for fisheries 
management. In response to increasing pressures to acknowledge customary 
rights in natural resource management, the Indonesian government has 
established an agency and allocated significant resources to support it. 
However, this agency has been working in isolation from other stakeholders in 
the Sawu Sea MPA and has pursued its own agenda. In studies about 
decentralised natural resource management, scholars (Ribot et al., 2006; Satria, 
Sano, & Shima, 2006) confirm that bureaucratic interests in controlling 
resources influence decentralised power. The national government supports 
efforts to establish participatory natural resource management, but the elites 
continue to hold key resources.   
 
At the local level, international and national agendas have impacted natural 
resource management. Together with local NGOs, they have undertaken marine 
conservation projects for decades prior to the establishment of the Sawu Sea 
MPA (Chapter 4). The projects have involved customary fishers, providing them 
with financial and institutional support (Provincial Development Planning 
Agency, 2013). The NGOs have also mediated regulation changes at the local 
level to allow the fishers to participate in fisheries management (Rosen & 
Olsson, 2013). Thus, efforts to strengthen and revive customary fisheries 
management have been advocated at the local level for a long period. 
 
Above all, the interests of the national government in gaining funding support 
are clear in the CTI where the Indonesian government aims to establish 20 
million ha of MPAs by 2020 within which CFM is applied with the support of 
global donors (MMAF, 2014a). The CTI is not binding and provides no 
particular guidelines for member countries to pursue its goals, but these targets 
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of the Indonesian government speeds up the application of hohorok (Rosen & 
Olsson, 2013) and justify funding support from other countries and donors. The 
interest in the funding of global donors can be seen from Von Heland et al.’s 
(2014) study which noted that some member countries have difficulty engaging 
in the negotiation processes due to their lack of financial capacity to attend 
meetings. They argue that without external funding sources, member countries 
will abandon some planned activities. The validity of this argument was evident 
in 2016 when the Indonesian government decreased its support for the 
management of the Sawu Sea MPA due to the lack of global funding support, 
although doing this was inconsistent with higher-level rules.  
 
Together, the Indonesian government can be seen to be instrumental in 
reinstalling hohorok: meeting international obligations, accessing foreign aid 
and defusing local protest. As elaborated below, the effectiveness of hohorok for 
addressing challenges of marine commons is not the main priority of the 
Indonesian government. 
8.4 Effectiveness of Hohorok on Rote Island 
At the planning stage in the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, the early 
effects of hohorok in addressing fundamental problems of commons have 
emerged. Depletion of fisheries (subtractability) and the excludability of fishers 
are used as the main criteria to assess the effectiveness of hohorok (Chapter 2). 
Ostrom (1990; 1999) argued that regardless of the involved property rights, the 
failure of a resource system to address these factors could lead to CPR 
dilemmas, where free-riding puts resources at the risk of overuse.  
8.4.1 Fisheries depletion  
Threats to fisheries depletion remain unaddressed despite the revival of 
hohorok. It might be too soon to determine whether resources are recovering 
because of the revival of hohorok in the Sawu Sea MPA. However, as discussed 
below, this study identifies several factors, as an institutional response across 
levels of jurisdictions that contributed to fisheries depletion. The factors relate 
to the graduated application of hohorok, tensions across tiers of the 
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government, and partial application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management.  
 
At the community level, control of fisheries’ depletion is still difficult because 
the national government only initiated and applied hohorok to a few of the 
communities on Rote Island. Instead, it pushed the sub-national governments, 
external parties to the Sawu Sea MPA, to replicate the application of hohorok, 
which in fact both the provincial and district governments did not do. Thus, the 
fishing activities of communities that have not applied hohorok continue to have 
a direct impact on fisheries because of physical proximity with communities 
that have applied hohorok.  This finding supports a study by Fanning, Mahon, 
and McConney (2009) about the impact and difficulty in addressing cross-
boundary problems on the fisheries of neighbouring countries in the Caribbean 
Sea. 
 
At the district level, threats to fisheries depletion arise from the Indonesian 
government’s effort to claw back the power of decentralised fisheries 
management through the adoption of the CTI’s goal of an ecosystem approach 
to fisheries management. This approach shifted fisheries management that is 
situated at the district level to an ecosystem approach at the national level, 
resulting in the exclusion of the district government and precluding it from 
supporting fisheries management. However, the district government continues 
to manage coastal areas creating problems for fisheries such as pollution and 
deforestation from tourism-based activities. As an external party to the Sawu 
Sea MPA, the district government does not have incentives to address the threat 
to depletion of fisheries in hohorok marine areas.  
 
At the provincial level, the challenge to fisheries depletion comes from the 
national government’s failure to adopt the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management to the whole marine ecosystem. The national government did not 
reconcile conflicting fishing practices and compensate all customary fishers 
within marine areas inside the ecosystem boundaries, leaving some 
communities to continue fishing illegally. This policy reduced negotiation costs, 
but increased coordination costs of marine commons. In addition, it resulted in 
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inequity in fisheries access among customary fishers, diminishing their 
collective action (see, for example, Saunders, Gilek, & Tafon, 2019).   
 
At the national and supra-national levels, the depletion of fisheries shares a 
similar problem with that of the provincial level because some neighbouring 
countries within the same ecosystem do not belong to the CTI. Australia is 
among several neighbouring countries enjoying the benefits of the Sawu Sea 
MPA (Treml et al., 2015). The absence of these countries from the CTI allows 
them to enjoy improved migratory fisheries from the Sawu Sea MPA without 
contributing to the costs of conserving it as customary fishers do in Rote Island. 
8.4.2 Excludability of fishers 
The establishment of hohorok strengthens customary fishers’ ownership of the 
initiative. This can be seen from the increasing willingness of local communities 
to report and punish local fishers involved in illegal fishing practices. Hohorok 
can effectively exclude transgressing local fishers from the fisheries. The small 
size of both the environment and the community enables local people to 
exchange information, to supervise and enforce the law on the local people 
without difficulty.  
 
Customary fishers, however, have difficulty supervising large-scale marine 
areas. They have limited resources to supervise marine areas, while many 
fishers find it too risky and unsafe to sail because the sea is rough with high 
waves.  Furthermore, the fishers lack authority to enforce the law on large-scale 
fishers making it is difficult for customary fishers to exclude outside fishers. 
They can exclude local fishers but not outside fishers. Thus, the re-application of 
hohorok only partially solves the problem of excludability. 
 
The effectiveness of CFM in excluding outsiders in small-scale environments is 
influenced by the geographical characteristics of the marine commons and by 
the social relationships of neighbouring fishing communities. Aswani (2011) 
found that in many South Pacific island states, marine environments are small 
and closed, which naturally facilitates excludability, and there are well-
developed dependant relationships among neighbouring communities that 
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facilitate monitoring and law enforcement.  Excludability is difficult in hohorok 
because hohorok does not possess these socio-ecological characteristics that 
Aswani found in his study of CFM in small island states in the South Pacific.  
 
The inapplicability of hohorok in addressing the problems of commons in Rote 
Island are influenced by the existing lack of customary fishers’ resources and 
capacity to manage local marine areas and by the inappropriateness of the 
national government’s institutional response. However, the physical 
characteristics of marine commons in Rote Island, which is large and open, 
complicate excludability, while the proximity of marine zones and villages 
facilitated depletion of fisheries. 
8.5 Causes of Hohorok Ineffectiveness in Managing Marine 
Commons 
The difficulties of hohorok in controlling fisheries’ depletion and in excluding 
fishers in marine commons have been influenced by scalar challenges of marine 
commons. The challenges, as discussed in this section, can be categorised into 
social, ecological, institutional and political factors. These factors demonstrate 
deficiencies across tiers of the government, hindering the effectiveness of 
hohorok, as discussed in this section. 
8.5.1 Social and cultural diversity, fairness and conflict   
Hohorok rules are based on local socio-ecological conditions, allowing rules to 
be compatible with the fishers’ needs. The rules emphasise the need for a fit 
between costs and benefits for resource users within an environment. They 
enable fairness in the efforts and costs borne by resource users in relation to the 
benefits they enjoy. However, partial application of hohorok and the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management renders this principle ineffective because the 
benefits are also enjoyed by outside fishers who do not necessarily bear the costs 
of conservation. 
 
The other aspect is associated with a lack of indigenous ecological knowledge on 
the part of the fishers about large-scale marine environments. The fact that 
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hohorok was not applied in large-scale marine environments meant that 
customary fishers had no marine ecological knowledge necessary for managing 
large-scale marine commons. This finding is consistent with a study by Stacey et 
al., (2008) which found that indigenous Rote fishers possessed limited marine 
ecological knowledge. This justifies the national government’s reliance on 
scientific knowledge about the Sawu Sea MPA. However, this removed 
autonomy from the customary community back to other holders of knowledge.  
 
This lack of ecological knowledge also resulted from the failure to manage 
diversity within the community. The management of the Sawu Sea MPA tended 
to focus more on indigenous fishers. This has marginalised non-indigenous Bajo 
fishers and weakened collective action. These Bajo fishers have long practised 
and accumulated marine ecological knowledge useful for managing large-scale 
marine commons, but they were not involved in the hohorok. The management 
of local marine areas is only based on hohorok. This failure to manage diversity 
and equity issues, as studies of marine spatial planning (for example, Saunders 
et al., 2019, p. 15) confirm, weakens social cohesion and relationships among 
communities.  
 
The Rote case shows that the way the new hohorok addresses the social inequity 
in fisheries management differs from that of the old hohorok. The new hohorok 
does not discriminate between different groups of customary fishers within a 
community as the old one did in accessing fisheries. The old hohorok enabled a 
fair distribution of fishing benefits by allocating different temporal fishing rights 
to customary fishers; by distinguishing between those with physical limits and 
highly productive fishers. Instead, the new hohorok established a separated 
marine zone for customary fishers to manage and apply CFM within the Sawu 
Sea MPA. The national government distinguished customary fishers from non-
customary fishers in managing fisheries, but it did not address social inequity 
among customary fishers. Social equity, an attribute of social cohesion, 
according to Prell, Hubacek, and Reed (2019), can prevent conflicts within a 
community, which destroy collection action in managing natural resources. 
 
The differences in the temporal scales between formal and informal rules hinder 
their integration and weakening hohorok applicability. Having had a long 
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period with hohorok in abeyance diminishes its capacity and its restoration 
requires a longer time than formal rules allow for. Thus, no hohorok have been 
established by customary fishers on their own initiative since the national 
government revived hohorok in 2016. Studies in other contexts confirm that 
while formal rules are applicable to large spatial scales and can change within a 
short time, informal rules apply locally and change incrementally (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). Thus, changes in hohorok may need a longer time 
than those of formal rules and the changes require the active support of the 
national government to function effectively. This may explain the 
ineffectiveness of hohorok in the short run.  
 
The limited applicability of hohorok in the Sawu Sea MPA is partly influenced 
by conflicting customary fishing practices among neighbouring communities in 
the Sawu Sea. This is the challenge of integrating customary practices into 
modern fishing management in many countries (Aswani, 2005; Friedlander, 
2018). It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting practices, which justify the 
government decision to exclude some fishing communities that rejected the 
inclusion of their fishing areas within the Sawu Sea into the Sawu Sea MPA. 
However, the decision has produced institutional misfits in the fisheries 
management in the Sawu Sea. This condition differs from communities in the 
Pacific island nations, where there are fewer conflicting practices in applying 
CFM in large-scale marine environments (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004; Cinner & 
Aswani, 2007). The diversity of socio-cultural norms among fishers and the 
geographic characteristics of marine environments shape the applicability of 
CFM in large-scale marine environments. 
8.5.2 Ecological and physical scale  
The physical characteristics of large-scale marine environments influence 
hohorok applicability. Hohorok works in small-scale marine environments as 
shown by the example of Oelua, but hohorok boundaries are unclear in the 
large-scale marine zones. The management bodies established hohorok within 
the indigenous zone based on the village’s coastal and marine jurisdiction. The 
fishers have no problem identifying boundaries using coastal vegetation, 
landscapes, and artificial signs. However, at the sea, there are no recognisable 
 230 
signs for fishers to identify the boundaries with neighbouring communities and 
other marine zones. Thus, hohorok inapplicability resulted from the physical 
characteristics of the marine environment that did not enable customary fishers 
to clearly establish the boundaries of marine hohorok in large-scale marine 
commons.  
 
The complexity and dynamics in the spatial scale of marine commons, for 
example, facilitate problems associated with cross-boundary pollution and 
migratory fish from neighbouring villages, land-based activities and other 
zones. The adjacency of marine zones within the Sawu Sea MPA makes it 
difficult for customary fishers to address these problems; such problems are the 
responsibility of different jurisdictions. This finding supports Edgar et al.’s 
(2014) study of MPAs in Australia that found that due to the characteristics of 
marine environments, an isolation of no-take zones from fishing activities is a 
key to successful MPAs. Thus, establishing clearly defined boundaries for 
marine zones does not necessarily facilitate effective hohorok because of cross-
boundary problems. 
 
Beyond the Sawu Sea MPA and the CTI, the adjacency of Rote Island with 
neighbouring countries and international waters complicates hohorok 
applicability. For example, the 2009 oil spill along the border water of Rote 
Island and Australia resulted in widespread damage to seaweed farming for 
customary fishers on Rote Island. Fishers have not been compensated, although 
the national government has sought compensation since 2013 from the 
perpetrator. This is an example of the strong dependence of customary fishers 
on the government, across tiers, in managing large-scale marine environments. 
 
However, this geographical location of the Sawu Sea might have influenced the 
strategy for law enforcement on outside fishers by the national government. The 
fact that Sawu Sea MPA is located in the southern part of Indonesia, while 
outside fishers mostly come from South East Asian countries (see Chapter 5) in 
the northern part of the country can be an explanation for the lack of law 
enforcement. The national government has taken strict action on these illegal 
fishers over the last few years, resulting in increased improvement of fisheries in 
some regions in Indonesia. This might be possible due to the migratory nature 
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of fisheries, which can benefit customary fishers in the Sawu Sea MPA. This 
suggests that locally based law enforcement is not the only key to fisheries 
improvement in the Sawu Sea MPA. 
8.5.3 Institutional and policy discrepancy  
The discrepancies within laws and an absence of institutional linkages between 
the community-level management body and the higher-level management 
bodies have all influenced the implementation of hohorok.   
 
Discrepancy within laws 
At the village level, there is no operation rule enabling customary fishers to 
access the decision-making by the village government in managing natural 
resources. This absence does not enable the village government to address a fair 
distribution of benefits across groups of fishers in a community. The national 
government has devolved significant power and resources to the village 
government, but it has not enacted any operational rules to clarify the village 
governments’ responsibility to empower local institutions. As a result, none of 
the village governments on Rote Island have established village laws clarifying 
customary fishers’ rights in natural resource management. There are 
discrepancies within the laws of the national government. This finding supports 
previous studies (Antlöv et al., 2016; Clement, 2009; Purwanto & Pramusinto, 
2018) about the lack of commitment of the national government to strengthen 
communities in natural resource management.   
 
This discrepancy between laws also exists at the district level. The district 
government’s lack of support for customary fishers is due to the gap in the laws 
between constitutional law passed by the national government and operational 
law passed by the district government to give effect to the former. As established 
by the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (2012), the district government needs 
to establish a local law clarifying the fishers’ rights in fisheries management 
(AMAN, 2016a). Thus, since 2013, the national government has encouraged 
district governments to enact such customary law (Burhani, 2013). However, 
the exclusion of the district governments from managing the Sawu Sea MPA has 
served as a disincentive for the district government. The absence of this local 
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law inhibits the district government from supporting customary fishers in the 
Sawu Sea MPA.  
 
A lack of institutional linkages 
Beyond the village level, the applicability of hohorok suffers from a lack of 
institutional linkages to higher-level management bodies, making it difficult for 
the fishers to access decision-making. The fishers have insignificant roles in the 
higher-level management bodies; decision-making at these bodies relies on 
dialogue and consensus, complicating the ability of fishers’ representatives to 
influence it. There is uncertainty in the meeting arrangements and problems of 
language and communication. These problems restrict fisher representatives 
from attending meetings and voicing their concerns to authoritative 
organisations and responsible officials.  
 
The fishers’ difficulty in accessing decision-making is also due to the limits in 
information provided by and for customary fishers. The management bodies 
provide information about the Sawu Sea MPA through several media and 
methods that the fishers cannot access. The management bodies prioritised the 
government at all tiers rather than the fishers. This confirms studies by Gorris 
et al., (2019) in fisheries governance in Indonesia about the “dark side” of the 
NGOs and by Ribot (2002, 2005) who found that management prioritise 
upward accountability rather than downward accountability. 
 
The fishers’ lack of roles in providing information does not improve their 
understanding and knowledge about the conservation outcomes. Katon et al. 
(1997), for example, found that in many countries, the fishers involvement in 
providing information and monitoring increased their awareness of both 
threatened resources and incentives for supporting conservation. The national 
government, however, relies on experts for information about fisheries, instead 
of integrating CFM with formal management leading to a failure to integrate 
local knowledge with scientific knowledge.  
 
The lack of institutional integration is reflected in the separate management 
regimes for managing the Sawu Sea MPA. Only the national government and 
customary fishers have jurisdiction in the Sawu Sea MPA; the provincial and 
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district governments simply play coordinating roles, without any jurisdictions. 
However, the decision-making of higher-level management bodies is separated 
from that at the community level. Young (2006, pp. 5-6) labels this institutional 
design as separation to refer to regimes across levels that “operate in separated 
jurisdictions with clearly defined spatial boundary and authority”. This finding 
supports Clement’s (2009) study about previous decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia where the national government focused more on a once-off power 
sharing policy than on a continuous institutional building and partnership as 
scholars suggest (Hauck & Sowman, 2001; Pomeroy, Cinner, Nielsen, & 
Andrew, 2011)  and Indonesian law requires. 
8.5.4 Political and economic aspects 
Above all, the national government’s unwillingness to share power and 
resources with customary fishers, as required by the national laws for 
management the Sawu Sea MPA, is the key impediment to the failure of 
hohorok. There is a substantial discrepancy between the policy and practice of 
the national government. This was found in previous studies (Clement, 2009; 
Purwanto & Pramusinto, 2018; Zakaria, 2018) about the lack of commitment 
from the national government to strengthen communities in natural resource 
management. Instead, the national government has relied on the district 
government to involve groups of customary fishers in conservation, but the 
district government is now an external party to the Sawu Sea MPA. The national 
government has avoided committing itself with customary fishers, reflecting a 
kind of free-riding behaviour.  
 
The interest of the national government has shaped the changes it made to the 
jurisdictional scale at which fisheries are managed. Prior to the establishment of 
the Sawu Sea MPA, the Indonesian government had decentralised fisheries 
management to district governments, but this had led to increased exploitation 
of fisheries, the marginalisation of customary fishers and fragmented fisheries 
management (Satria, 2004). This explains the national government policy to 
recentralise fisheries management. However, as Ribot (2005, p. iv) found from 
studies of decentralisation in many countries, the national government controls 
power by delegating authority to “non-representative local institutions” and “by 
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choosing local institutions that serve and answer to central interests” (Ribot et 
al., 2006, p. 1865). The national government, as scholars have found in many 
developing countries (Ribot, 2005; Ribot et al., 2006), established political 
decentralisation, but it did not establish fiscal decentralisation. This may 
explain the lack of support for customary fishers and their dependence on the 
national government in managing hohorok. 
 
In addition to the changes in the jurisdictional scale for managing fisheries, the 
national government’s choice of spatial scales for applying an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management is related to its effort to control economic 
costs from negotiation. As Imperial (1999, p. 452) argues, an ecosystem 
approach aims at “changing institutional arrangements and improving 
coordination between the organisations“, incurring significant costs. Thus, at 
the provincial level, the national government excluded some marine areas 
within the Sawu Sea, where fishers in these areas adopt conflicting fishing 
practices.  
 
This study confirms previous studies (for example, Araral, 2014; Evans & 
Klinger, 2008) conclusions about transactional costs such as information and 
coordination costs in the CTI due to the increased number of different 
participants. However, as a result, this decision diminished not only collective 
action, but, as several studies (for example, Berkes, 2006; Brown, 2003a; Folke 
et al., 2007) point out, it is difficult, if not impossible, for customary fishers to 
enforce the law and exclude non-local fishers, as well as manage fishing quotas 
and cost-benefit sharing. The national government achieved its interests at the 
expense of customary fishers. 
 
There is an expectation of the Indonesian government to gain funding support 
from international donors through the establishment of the CTI and the pursuit 
of its goals, including hohorok re-application. This expectation was based not 
only on the argument that fisheries conservation has global benefits, but also 
because most CTI member countries lack financial and institutional capacity. 
Clifton (2009) highlights the availability of funding support, which is only about 
30% of what is needed for managing the CTI for the first decade. Von Heland et 
al. (2014) found that some member countries have difficulty engaging in the 
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negotiation processes due to their lack of financial capacity to attend meetings, 
and hence they will not commit to pursue the CTI’s goals. The member 
countries do not see the CTI’s goals as their priority; instead it has been left to 
the international donors and NGOs to shape their involvement (Asia 
Development Bank, 2011). Accordingly, they rely on the assistance of 
international donors to establish the CTI and pursue its goals. This helps 
explain the decrease of the Indonesian government support for fisheries 
management in the Sawu Sea MPA after it failed to maintain funding support 
from international donors. 
 
The decrease of the Indonesian government’s support for customary fishers 
could reflect its view about the insignificance of customary fishers within the 
Sawu Sea MPA. At the planning stage, the national government’s interests in 
external funding support have shaped the establishment of the CTI and the 
Sawu Sea MPA more than its concern for empowering customary fishers. This is 
supported by Fidelman’s (2014) study about the lack of local actors and local 
fishers’ roles in the CTI. In pursuing the CTI’s goals, the national government 
included the whole Sawu Sea into the Sawu Sea MPA, the largest MPA within 
the CTI, manifesting its perspective about the lack of the Sawu Sea’s role for 
national economy and for customary fishers compared to other marine regions 
in Indonesia (Chapter 5). Scholars argue that this strategy indicates a residual 
placement, where governments tend to conserve marine areas with less 
significance for economic interest (Joppa & Pfaff, 2009; Rodrigues et al., 2004).  
 
These findings suggest that the inability of hohorok to manage marine 
commons is shaped by deficiencies in social aspects - such as fairness in the 
fisheries distribution and the lack of the fishers’ ecological knowledge of 
fisheries in large-scale marine environments - and the ecological characteristics 
of local marine environments, such as the adjacency of marine zones, which 
facilitate cross-boundary problems. However, the Indonesian government’s 
pursuit of global funding support for conservation has been its focus since the 
establishment of the CTI. This focus shaped the Indonesian government effort 
to claw back power from the district government and devolve it to customary 
communities, which have been marginalised and weakened during previous 
regimes. Thus, by design, the Indonesian government did not aim to build 
 236 
hohorok applicability. Instead, it used marine conservation and hohorok revival 
as justifications to gain global funding support.   
8.6 Practical Implications of Hohorok Revival   
This study has practical implications for Rote fishers and for Rote Island, for the 
Sawu Sea MPA, for the Indonesian government and the CTI. At the local level, 
the implications relate to addressing external problems and fishers’ lack of 
access to decision-making. At the Sawu Sea MPA level, the implications relate to 
the conflicting fishing practice, the incompatibility between costs and benefits 
the fishers share, and diminished collective action among customary fishers. At 
the national and supra-national levels, the implications are associated with 
diminished collective action across tiers of the government and the lack of 
funding support from international donors. 
 
Hohorok re-application has failed to address the issue faced by Rote fishers in 
managing local marine commons. They have autonomy over local marine areas 
and fisheries, but inherently they lack capacity to manage them, particularly 
monitoring the state of fisheries. At the same time, they have difficulties dealing 
with external problems such as pollution. Thus, depletion of fisheries will 
continue to be an unsolved problem in local marine areas. 
 
The implementation of separated management regimes within the Sawu Sea 
MPA implies that customary fishers manage hohorok in isolation from other 
regimes. The exclusion of the provincial and district governments from having 
jurisdiction means that customary fishers now have no access to decision 
making and support from these levels of government. Similarly, the fishers 
cannot access decision-making at the national government level to ensure its 
long-term commitment to support them in the Sawu Sea MPA, particularly after 
the national government’s decision to decrease its funding support for the Sawu 
Sea MPA.  
 
These findings suggest that Rote fishers continue to be the least empowered 
party in managing marine commons. This supports studies of conservation in 
many developing countries (for example, Balmford & Whitten, 2003) that found 
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that local people pay for conservation, with no certainty of receiving benefits. 
These findings also imply that fisheries management on Rote Island cannot be 
managed in isolation from external factors; they need to be managed in 
collaboration with higher-level management bodies. 
 
Within the Sawu Sea MPA, the partial application of the ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management implies that customary fishers continue to adopt 
conflicting fishing practices. The Lamalera fishers whose traditional fishing 
grounds are excluded from the Sawu Sea MPA continue to hunt whales, which 
are protected by customary fishers under hohorok. This policy suggests that 
customary fishers within the Sawu Sea MPA will not enjoy the benefits of 
conservation; outside fishers enjoy the benefit of conservation at the expense of 
customary fishers within the Sawu Sea MPA. 
 
In the long term, the partial application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management will diminish the fishers’ compliance with the rules. The fishers 
within the Sawu Sea MPA will lose their incentive to protect fisheries because 
the conservation benefits other parties. Instead, they will pursue their own 
interests at the cost of the whole ecosystem. As a result, the challenges of 
managing cross-boundary pollution and migratory fisheries that require a 
strong collective action among customary fishers remain unresolved. 
 
The application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries management, a goal of 
the CTI, has diminished collective action among tiers of the government. The 
approach provided a justification for the Indonesian government to claw back 
control over decentralised fisheries management. The Indonesian government 
recentralised fisheries management to place the management of fisheries in line 
with the ecosystem boundaries strengthening its power and thus marginalising 
sub-national governments. The CTI’s goal does not only bring more benefit for 
the national government than for sub-national governments and local fishers, 
but it also weakens collective action across the tiers of government in managing 
fisheries.  
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8.7 Wider Implications of the Revival of Hohorok  
The unsuitability of hohorok to manage fisheries within the Sawu Sea MPA has 
significant implications for state and supra-national resource management 
regimes and marine protected areas. It also has implications for Ostrom’s 
(1990) institutional design principles and her (2011) institutional analysis and 
development framework. 
8.7.1 State and supra-national regimes   
The challenges of managing the marine commons surrounding Rote Island are 
consistent with findings of previous studies (for example, Berkes, 2005) about 
the difficulties associated with large-scale marine commons for governing 
systems whether local level, state or supra-national regimes, or for a 
combination of all three. Rather, the challenges of marine commons are 
particularly about managing cross-scale linkages such as pollution and 
migratory fisheries, which require a multi-scalar institutional arrangement 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Moss & Newig, 2010). 
 
The case of Rote Island supports previous studies (Acheson, 2006; Hardin, 
1998; Ostrom, 1990) that there is no superiority among different management 
regimes, particularly between state and communal regimes. Instead, each 
regime is suited to different circumstances. While hohorok may be ineffective in 
managing large-scale marine commons, it is partly effective in managing local-
level marine commons. By design, the partial applicability of an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management in the Sawu Sea MPA and the CTI suggests 
that the state and supra-national regimes have limitations when managing 
challenges of large-scale marine commons, confirming a similar study by Treml 
et al. (2015). The state and supra-national regimes are ineffective at local-level 
coastal commons, but they are only partly effective at large-scale marine 
commons. 
 
The results of this study indicate that the larger an ecosystem boundary and the 
higher the number of participants, the harder it is for state regimes to reconcile 
participants’ interests. The conflicting fishing practices among communities 
within the Sawu Sea led the Indonesian government to exclude some marine 
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areas in the Sawu Sea from the Sawu Sea MPA. The exclusion helped in 
reducing negotiation costs for the Indonesian government, suggesting that costs 
limit the applicability of state regimes. However, it implied that the state 
regimes shifted the costs to the fishers creating unequal cost and benefits 
sharing among them. This finding supports previous studies (Davis & Ruddle, 
2012; White, 1996) about the misuse of power-sharing initiatives by many 
governments and donors to shift costs of management to local people. Similarly, 
important is that this policy led some fishers to enjoy improved migratory 
fisheries from the Sawu Sea MPA without necessarily bearing the costs of 
protecting them. 
 
The challenges for the state regimes in successfully managing marine commons 
remain unresolved, even when fisheries are managed under the same 
management regime. It is difficult to establish all the cause-effect relationships 
between the degradation of marine resources and management regimes due to 
the multi-scalar characteristics of marine ecosystems. The Rote Island case 
demonstrated that it is possible to identify point sources of pollution from 
neighbouring marine zones, but there are diverse non-point sources of 
transboundary problems across temporal scales with lasting impacts on 
fisheries. These multi-scalar problems not only render communal and state 
property regimes ineffective, but they have also, as Mitchell (2003) found, 
contributed to the failure of many global environmental initiatives.  
 
The findings of this research support Young’s (2002) study that changes in the 
level at which the state manages natural resources does not necessarily 
overcome challenges for natural resource management because there are cross-
ecosystem problems. The CTI’s goal of applying an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries shifts the administrative borders from the district to national borders 
but the change does not remove the borders of an ecosystem. The land-based 
management of the provincial and district governments, which now are external 
parties to the Sawu Sea MPA but continue to have a great impact on the marine 
ecosystem where hohorok is applied. This suggests that even a full application of 
an ecosystem approach to fisheries management cannot be effective, as it does 
not address problems beyond the marine ecosystem. 
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The difficulty in understanding the dynamics and complexities of marine 
commons across temporal and spatial scales contributes to the difficulty of both 
state and supra-national regimes in addressing the problems of commons. Galaz 
et al. (2012, p. 82) maintain that cross-scale “interactions are at present not 
well-understood scientifically; they are difficult to match or ‘fit’ institutionally 
due to their multilevel (local–global) interactions”.  Cash et al. (2006, p. 4) 
argue that institutional responses tend to focus on “a single, correct, or best 
characterisation of the scale and level challenge that applies to the system as a 
whole or for all actors”. This is confirmed in the Sawu Sea MPA, where both the 
terrestrial ecosystem and the marine ecosystem influence the applicability of 
hohorok. 
 
The Rote Island management regime demonstrates that the challenges of 
marine commons are so complex that governing marine commons is not simply 
about finding a property rights regime that does the job better. Rather, it is 
more about establishing multi-scalar institutional linkages within which 
different regimes and levels contribute to fisheries management. However, 
while there is a lack of understanding about effective arrangements, resulting in, 
among other things, the marginalisation of particular regimes and stakeholders, 
the scalar choices that were made by the national government were often to 
serve its interests, instead of addressing the problems of marine commons.  
8.7.2 Marine conservation as ocean grabbing 
The establishment of marine protected areas, particularly large-scale ones, in 
Indonesia has been shaped more by the Indonesian government’s priority about 
conservation and interests in fisheries management than local actors and people 
(Fidelman et al., 2014; Von Heland et al., 2014).  Its priority is obvious in the 
previous failed effort to include the whole Sawu Sea in the Sawu Sea MPA and 
the failure of the Sawu Sea MPA to consider different social aspects practiced by 
customary fishers. The new synthetic hohorok in Rote Island, for example, 
failed to discourage particular parties within customary communities from 
pursuing personal interests in extracting fisheries; it also does not address the 
equitable distribution of fisheries. It created limited open-access fisheries 
 241 
within the community at the expense of marginalised groups, such as the elderly 
and people with disabilities, within the communities. 
 
The western-synthetic customary fisheries management approach gained the 
support of customary fishers, but it marginalised existing values and practices 
of customary communities over fisheries. Its re-application has facilitated the 
national government to gain customary fishers’ consent to establish marine 
conservation and regain control over decentralised fisheries. The establishment 
of the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA can be seen as legitimate efforts to allow the 
national government to regain its hegemony at the expenses of customary 
communities. 
 
Above all, the apparent aim of the national government is to maintain its 
hegemony over the fishers. The difficulties customary fishers face in governing 
the fisheries are understandable given the complexity and dynamics of marine 
environments, resources and resource users. Accordingly, these difficulties can 
justify government intervention. However, as Song et al. (2018) found in New 
Zealand, continuous marginalisation of indigenous fishers happened in a 
governable fishery. Davis and Ruddle (2012) highlight the betrayal by the 
national governments and donors in many countries to small-scale fishers when 
initiating conservation. Instead of sharing conservation costs, the national 
government and international donors delegate the costs to small-scale fishers by 
limiting fishers’ fishing access, but they continually dominate decision-making 
in the name of co-management. In other cases, using the interactive governable 
framework (Bavinck, Chuenpagdee, Jentoft, & Kooiman, 2013) and a Gramscian 
approach (Levy & Egan, 2003), Song et al. (2018) identify intentional efforts of 
the government to  marginalise small fishers through privatisation and marine 
conservation.  
 
These ‘ocean grabbing’ policies have shaped fisheries management in many 
countries. The variety of marine zones in the Sawu Sea MPA, such as no-take-
zone and eco-tourism zones, and changes in the property rights of fisheries, are 
all in line with that of Bennett et al.’s (2015) work. All these policies result in 
dispossessing fishers from managing fisheries and making ways for a legitimate 
privatisation of fisheries.  On Rote Island, for example, the establishment of the 
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eco-tourism zones encourages more visitors, but it resulted in increasing 
pollution on the nearby seaweed farming under hohorok. In the name of raising 
its revenue from the tourism business, the national government sought the 
approval of small-scale fishers to limit their marine access for the sake of 
commercial tourism activities, but this effort resulted in the marginalisation of 
small-scale fishers.  This ‘ocean grabbing’ occurs with the approval of small-
scale fishers. 
8.7.3 Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principles 
Although it is tempting to assess hohorok against Ostrom’s (1990) institutional 
design principles, there are significant differences and similarities between the 
two, particularly in managing marine environments. The differences can imply 
that Ostrom’s design principles do not cover all institutional characteristics of 
local rules required for managing marine commons, while the similarities might 
suggest that Ostrom’s design principles are applicable, but they are not present 
in hohorok.  
 
Hohorok shares several characteristics with Ostrom’s principles in creating 
strong collective action within the communities; thus, hohorok was effective in 
excluding local fishers. These characteristics include the size and boundaries of 
the environments, costs-benefit sharing arrangements, provision of 
information, rule-making, enforcement and change, types and methods of 
sanction, accountability of law enforcers, and acknowledgement of the 
government and a nested system.  
 
With large-scale marine environments, however, hohorok is ineffective in 
managing the excludability of fishers and the depletion of fisheries. The fishers, 
as scholars have confirmed in other studies (Fanning et al., 2009; Folke et al., 
2007; P. C. Stern, 2011), have difficulty in recognising the boundaries of marine 
environments, excluding outside fishers, addressing problems of cross-scale 
linkages (such as pollution) and managing external drivers (such as the global 
market). Ostrom (1990) did not highlight these problems in her design 
principles for managing natural resources. 
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The old hohorok enabled the involvement of higher tiers of the government, as 
Ostrom suggested through a nested system. The system built institutional 
linkages to enable continuous interaction and adaptation across communities 
and tiers of the government. Instead, what currently exists is a situation where 
the national government and the local communities are managing the Sawu Sea 
MPA with other government tiers missing. The new hohorok does not enable a 
nested system suggesting that Ostrom’s design principles might work if a nested 
system had been established, allowing all tiers of government to collaborate in 
the Sawu Sea MPA.   
 
The other differences are related to hohorok’s focus on equity and food goals, 
which are not only absent in Ostrom’s principles, but are also in conflict with 
modern fishing practice. For these goals, as Cinner and Aswani (2007) found in 
the Indo-West Pacific region, hohorok does not recognise the total closure of 
fishing access; it recognises continuous access (the length of the close period 
varied across communities), but it places an emphasis on different fishing 
methods and fishing periods for different groups of fishers in order to prevent 
fisheries depletion and enable a fair fisheries distribution. This practice 
strengthened community cohesion, which is missing in Ostrom’s design 
principles. 
 
Finally, in order to meet the need for food by the people, hohorok recognised 
temporal closures of fisheries. This finding supports Cinner and Aswani’s 
(2007) study about similar practice in the Indo-West Pacific region but it is 
incompatible with modern fishing practices which recognise total closures of 
fisheries. Hohorok also recognised a broad integrated approach across marine 
and terrestrial ecosystems, instead of an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management, enabling it to manage all sources of food. This practice shares 
similarities with CFM practices in many countries, where both terrestrial and 
marine resources are managed in integrated ways (Aswani, 2011; Cinner, 
Basurto, et al., 2012; Friedlander, 2018) enabling a more equitable distribution 
of resources and the compatibility of cost and benefit of managing the 
environment for local people. Although Ostrom did not identify this practice of 
integrated management practice with natural resources, her ‘compatibility 
between cost and benefit principle’, and nested system supports this practice.  
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8.7.4 Ostrom’s (2011) institutional analysis and development 
framework 
This study examined the applicability of CFM using the institutional analysis 
and development (IAD) framework because it provides a tool to analyse various 
contexts that shape rule interaction, individual behaviour and whole outcomes. 
The action arena, comprising an action situation and participants, which was 
the focus of this study, covers various variables conceptualised in seven rules-in-
use.  
 
This study supports previous studies (Clement, 2009; Koontz, 2005) that the 
framework does not enable an examination of institutional changes in order to 
explain the current state of interaction. It does, however, enable an explanation, 
for example, of how CFM has been applied according to different regimes, 
which influence its current capacity for being re-applied. The Rote Island case 
shows that while legislation limits the applicability of hohorok, attempts to 
revive hohorok failed to achieve its integration into fisheries management under 
the CTI. However, the framework does not particularly look at this, namely the 
changes in political and economic regimes across temporal scales that influence 
CFM’s applicability.  
 
This thesis, therefore, provides a different perspective from previous studies 
that have questioned whether CFM can be applied to large-scale marine 
environments. The findings demonstrate that social, ecological, institutional 
and political aspects influence the applicability of hohorok. Thus, this thesis 
suggests that the ineffectiveness of hohorok can relate to its previous abeyance, 
social and ecological characteristics (for example the size and proximity of 
marine areas from fishing communities), and deficiencies in institutional 
responses (for example partial application of an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management). However, the on-the-ground problems and institutional 
responses have been influenced by political and economic regimes prior to and 
after the establishment of the Sawu Sea MPA, matters which are overlooked by 
the framework. 
 
The other challenge to the framework is that it does not set the priority for the 
interaction rules rule, allowing participants to prioritise different rules. 
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Customary fishers prioritise the merits of other rules in the framework for 
applying hohorok, but the national government does not recognise customary 
fishers’ prioritisation. The lack of prioritisation by the national government is 
due to the complexities of the contexts that shape institutions and their 
interaction. Different contexts require a different prioritisation. However, the 
framework fails to provide guidance on how to prioritise the rules in different 
contexts. 
 
Similarly, there are neither indicators nor criteria established for each 
interaction rule of the IAD framework, enabling the participants to pursue 
different mechanisms for implementing the rules. The national government, for 
example, used a mechanism for selecting fishers’ representatives at higher 
management bodies through appointment. This is not the mechanism used by 
the fishers for selecting their representatives at the community level; instead, 
the fishers directly elect their representatives. These conflicting mechanisms 
weaken the accountability and legitimacy of the representatives to the fishers. 
The rules fail to address the need to clarify the indicators and criteria involving 
all the participants in an action situation. 
 
This research also contributes to a theoretical understanding of common-pool 
resources and, in particular, an understanding of how CFM can be implemented 
in marine and other resources management across temporal and spatial scales. 
This study uses the IAD framework to understand the interaction of fisheries 
management regimes, while Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principles 
provide an understanding of how CFM is applied and shape fisheries 
management. The principles enable the assessment of issues such as 
institutional changes and applicability across temporal and spatial scales. They 
are useful to understand and explain the recognition of CFM which had been in 
abeyance for a long period, and why the national government decentralised the 
power over fisheries management to customary fishers after a long period of 
decentralised fisheries management at the district level. These factors explain 
why CFM is applied in particular ways in large-scale marine zones after 
particular changes, which cannot be explained using the interaction rules of the 
IAD framework on its own.  
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This thesis offers a new perspective for re-examining studies and revisiting an 
understanding of CFM’s applicability to managing both small and large-scale 
marine environments. The thesis proposes a way to integrate studies that focus 
on the structure of institutional interactions between government tiers with 
those that highlight the applicability of institutional design principles to explain 
the application of CFM in the large-scale marine environments. Thus, this study 




Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The crowded Sunday beach of forty years ago, with the fish catch landed, is long 
since history. In 2014, the Sunday beach was still deserted, but there was 
renewed hope as customary fishers were allowed to regain their control over 
coastal fisheries. The national government had revived hohorok, with which 
customary fishers manage coastal fisheries. Now, in 2019, this new hope might 
prove illusory without having had much benefit in terms of empowering 
customary fishers. The new hope seemingly failed before it delivered on its 
promises. 
 
This research sought to assess the applicability of customary fisheries 
management (CFM) principles for managing large-scale marine areas. The case 
of Rote Island shows that the Indonesian government has failed to address 
some fundamental problems of marine commons. The failure, by nature, is 
because the revived CFM is incompatible with tradition, the changes to CFM 
require a longer time both for building trust of the fishers in the government 
and building fishers’ capacity to manage CFM, and because customary fishers 
lack of resources and knowledge required to manage the challenges of large-
scale marine commons. By design, the failure is due to the Indonesian 
government effort which appeared to depend more on funding support from 
global donors rather than collaborating with local officials and customary 
fishers, leading to partial application of both an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management and CFM, and partial support for customary fishers. These factors 
pose difficulties for customary fishers to exclude outside fishers and address the 
depletion of fisheries.  
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9.2 The Applicability of CFM within Large-Scale 
Marine Management Regimes 
The complex and dynamic nature of large-scale marine ecosystems had led 
countries in the Indo-West Pacific region to establish the Coral Triangle 
Initiative (CTI) in 2009. Its goals included establishing marine protected areas 
(MPAs) and applying an ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAFM). 
The developing countries in the region tend to have small-scale fishers using 
CFM. Applying CFM was seen as a key to success in managing large-scale 
marine environments because CFM provides incentives for small-scale fishers to 
contribute to fisheries management and strengthen their compliance with 
regulations. 
 
In pursuing the CTI’s goals, the Indonesian government re-established hohorok 
in Rote Island as part of the Sawu Sea MPA. This policy allows customary 
fishers to manage fisheries autonomously, but the new synthesised hohorok is 
different from that in the past in many aspects; for example, the new one 
focused on fisheries conservation, while the old one focused on maintaining 
social justice. In addition, its application has been very limited, extending 
hohorok only to local marine areas in a few communities. At the same time, the 
national government recentralised fisheries management by strengthening its 
regional office and assuming the former provincial and district governments’ 
functions. This policy allows both the community and the national government 
more power than previous decentralised fisheries management regimes.  
 
By design, the applicability of hohorok had diminished prior to its revival. 
Hohorok had been marginalised by a lack of acknowledgements by the national 
government over several decades. It was further marginalised during 
decentralised fisheries management at the district level since the 2000s. These 
policies resulted in fishers’ mistrust of the government and conflicts between 
fishers due to the competition over fishing areas and the depletion of fisheries 
(Chapter 5). Thus, there is a lack of supporting conditions, particularly 
resources and trust, for customary fishers to manage the revived hohorok.  
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By nature, hohorok cannot function effectively in the short run within large-
scale marine commons. Trust restoration requires a substantial time to come 
about after a long period of denial and cannot be expected to quickly return 
simply because of a change to formal rules. Trust is an important element in the 
customary communities. Similarly, hohorok was a small-scale fishery regime 
applied in the freshwater fisheries and in marine fisheries along the coastline; it 
had never been applied to large-scale marine commons (Chapter 6). This 
practice did not enable the fishers to develop their capacity both their fishing 
equipment and knowledge of fisheries in large-scale marine areas because 
changes in customary communities can take generations.  
 
At the implementation stage, the applicability of the revived hohorok is limited. 
The new hohorok created a few difficulties for fishers in terms of their support 
for it because it differs significantly from the traditional version. It does not aim 
to establish fair fisheries distribution, and there have been changes in 
contextual factors such as population growth (Chapter 6 & 7). These matters 
have been exacerbated by the implementation of separate management regimes, 
leading to the difficulties of fishers accessing decision-making across tiers of 
government. Thus, hohorok is inherently flawed in managing the challenges of 
large-scale marine commons that relate to institutional misfits and cross-scale 
linkages such as migratory fisheries, pollution and law enforcement.  
 
The national government has intentionally failed to empower customary fishers 
in managing decentralised fisheries. The implementation of hohorok has 
enabled the excludability of local fishers, but hohorok does not solve the cross-
boundary problems that depleted fisheries as has been the case with many 
communities in small-island states do in the Pacific. This failure, by nature, is 
because of the open nature of marine environments on Rote Island, making it 
difficult to exclude outside fishers and because of the limitation in the funding 
capacity of the national government, a common problem in many developing 
countries. By design, is due to the national government’s focus on serving its 
interests, instead of empowering customary fishers. It relied on international 
donors and NGOs to support fisheries management and customary fishers. The 
Indonesian government tended to shift the responsibility to other stakeholders 
and to the fishers.   
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The reliance of the national government on other stakeholders to support 
fisheries management is evident in its approach in pursing the CTI’s goal of 
adopting the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. The national 
government only partly adopted the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management at the provincial and supra-national levels and only implemented 
hohorok in a few communities due to the limitation in funding.  It relied on the 
sub-national governments, which are external parties to the Sawu Sea MPA, to 
bear the costs and responsibilities of pursuing the CTI’s goals. These policies 
weakened the collective action of different groups of fishers across different 
communities, districts/provinces and countries.  
 
By design, the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA did not fully aim to address 
institutional misfits. Both the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA did not adopt a full 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management. There were some marine areas 
and countries within the same ecosystem that were excluded. This suggests that 
the limited ability of state regimes to govern large-scale marine commons is 
similar to the limited ability of local regimes. However, the main key to hohorok 
effectiveness is the national government’s desire to gain funding support from 
global donors, through the establishment of the CTI and the Sawu Sea MPA. It 
seems an ill-considered idea badly implemented and with other agenda in play. 
The Indonesian government is not interested in ecosystems or the local 
communities. Thus, the inapplicability of hohorok was partly a consequence of 
both institutional and political factors. This new knowledge was not highlighted 
in other studies. 
  
Overall, there are many factors influencing the applicability of CFM within 
large-scale marine management regimes. The Rote Island case demonstrates 
that social-cultural, ecological-physical, institutional-policy, and political-
economic factors at all tiers of government help determine the applicability of 
CFM. There are by nature challenges as well as by design ones. It is important 
to understand these factors.  The application of CFM by customary fishers in 
isolation from the government will fail to deliver its promises because of the 
complexity and dynamics of large-scale marine commons. This suggests that 
one-off political decentralisation is insufficient. The complexity and dynamics of 
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fisheries and fishers require the government to provide on-going support for 
institution building and to deal with any arising conflicts.  
 
Most of all, it is important for the national government to clarify its intention in 
applying CFM within large-scale marine environments managed according to an 
EAFM. The Rote Island case showed that the re-application of hohorok by the 
national government was influenced by the myth of idyllic noble savage, aiming 
to keep the Western romantic illusion of customary fishers with their 
indigenous practises alive and to keep the fishers happy. Through CFM and 
EAFM, the national government gained the fishers’ consent to undertake 
conservation and to recentralise fisheries management. The national 
government’s apparent goal has been to regain hegemony in fisheries 
management, instead of empowering the local government and the customary 
fishers, which enables it to control fisheries for its own interests.  
 
The goals of the national government, however, have also been shaped by the 
presence of the CTI and the previous arrangement of fisheries management. A 
lack of funding is a common problem for developing countries, which explains 
the national government’s reliance on natural resources extraction. The pursuit 
of its goals might have been different under an initiative that does not involve 
external parties (countries, donors and NGOs), which impose particular goals 
on developing country contexts. The national government has used the CTI and 
its goals particularly the EAFM to pursue its goals, which are otherwise difficult 
to achieve because of its previous lengthy conflicts with the natural-resource 
rich provinces. This phenomenon is among several contributions of this study to 
the body of knowledge: national governments, particularly where fisheries have 
been decentralised, use regional regimes to justify the re-centralisation of 
fisheries, re-strengthen its hegemony in fisheries and share costs of fisheries 
management with both customary fishers and global institutions. 
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9.3 A Way Forward for Improving Applicability of 
Hohorok to Managing Marine Commons 
This study highlights several challenges to the applicability of hohorok to 
managing Rote Island’s fishers, and more generally the management of marine 
commons. These include equity in fisheries management, institutional misfits, 
external challenges, and collective action influencing the depletion of fisheries 
and the exclusion of outside fishers. These problems are the result of the 
exclusion of several stakeholders and the unwillingness of the national 
government to establish collaboration, suggesting that power sharing with other 
stakeholders and capacity building are the key responses. 
 
Within the community, equitable fisheries distribution, one of hohorok’s goals, 
should shape fisheries management. Fisheries access can be confined to the 
fishers within the community, but an effort to address equity can take various 
forms beyond fisheries management to include other groups within the 
community. This inclusive principle of hohorok is not only consistent with the 
modern ecosystem approach to fisheries management that addresses 
collectiveness, but it also can strengthen collective action across neighbouring 
communities to manage cross-boundaries fisheries and pollution.   
 
At the community level, the national government needs to apply hohorok in all 
communities in order to address depletion of fisheries due to institutional 
misfits. This policy will strengthen collective action and reduce free-riding 
activities because all customary fishers share similar costs and benefits of 
conserving fisheries. The application of hohorok will enable other communities 
to autonomously manage local marine areas, creating incentives to exclude 
outside fishers and control fisheries’ depletion. Thus, this policy is about 
ensuring a power sharing among all customary communities.  
 
Collaboration of various groups within a community in natural resource 
conservation strengthens shared norms and collective action. The difficulty that 
local Rote fishers have had in enforcing the law might have been able to be 
solved if Bajo fishers had been involved in managing hohorok. The revival of 
hohorok failed to incorporate the whole range of customary fishing practices 
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into the Sawu Sea MPA. Instead, all tiers of government have tended to view all 
groups of customary fishers as homogenous, leading to exclusion of other 
customary fishers in managing hohorok. Bajo fishers can contribute to hohorok, 
particularly in providing information and undertaking monitoring, but they 
were excluded from managing hohorok. The national government failed to 
integrate other customary fishing practices as well into hohorok. 
 
The national government failed to include the village governments to support 
customary fishers. There is a lack of operational regulation to clarify the village 
governments’ responsibility to empower local institutions. Thus, further 
regulations are needed to enable customary communities to access funding 
support from village government, which have had increased budget allocations 
from all tiers of government (Chapters 5 & 6).  
 
A nested system enabling all tiers of the government to have jurisdiction and 
responsibility in managing the Sawu Sea MPA will build their ownership and 
their ability to control fisheries’ depletion. This policy is in line with Ostrom’s 
(1990) institutional design principle for managing the commons. This system 
would allow lower-level jurisdictions to exercise some degree of self-governance 
over an individual localised area leaving higher-level jurisdictions to manage 
cross-jurisdictional affairs with the involvement of lower-level jurisdictions. 
National policies are needed to empower lower-level jurisdictions to take 
initiatives without diminishing their autonomous rights to govern fisheries.  
 
The gap between policy and practice at the district level relates to legal 
acknowledgement of customary fishers’ rights to manage natural resources. 
Rote district government needs to enact a district law acknowledging the rights 
of customary communities to manage natural resources, including fisheries. 
This law would enable customary communities to claim their rights, both in 
managing fisheries and in accessing decision-making and resources at the 
district government level. More importantly, it would clarify the responsibilities 
of all tiers of the government in relation to empowering customary fishers to 
manage fisheries.   
 
The empowerment of customary fishers can happen concurrently with the 
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empowerment of the provincial and district governments. The national 
government needs to involve the provincial and district governments in 
managing fisheries and marine resources without weakening the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management. The district governments’ involvement will 
build their ownership and support for customary fishers. A policy that re-
establishes the Mayor’s role in managing hohorok across Rote Island, as it 
previously did, and bringing both marine and terrestrial fisheries hohorok on 
Rote Island under the Mayor’s leadership as maneleo ina huk will enable 
customary fishers to raise problems of institutional misfits and a lack of capacity 
for consideration by the Mayor. Similarly, the involvement of the provincial 
government strengthens both the district governments and local communities. 
 
At the national and supra-national levels, the Indonesian government, as a 
leading member country in the CTI, needs to clarify its long-term 
responsibilities as well as those of non-member regional countries and 
organisations that benefit from the CTI. Despite the benefits they enjoy from 
migratory fisheries within the Coral Triangle region, many of the countries are 
not involved, they do not bear the costs of pursuing the CTI’s goals. Their 
unclear responsibilities have created uncertainties in funding responsibilities, 
pushing the Indonesian government to decrease financial support for the Sawu 
Sea MPA. 
 
These recommendations potentially change the power-sharing structure among 
participants at all tiers of the government, particularly at the national and 
supra-national levels. At the community level, changes to the management of 
hohorok in order to involve non-indigenous fishers will not bring significant 
resistance due to the long presence of non-indigenous fishers on Rote Island, 
their intertribal relationships and the dependence of indigenous fishers on non-
indigenous fishers to manage fisheries. 
 
Changes to enable both the district and provincial governments to have marine 
jurisdictions in the Sawu Sea MPA may be rejected by the Indonesian 
government. It had successfully clawed back control over fisheries management 
through the establishment of the CTI after almost two decades of decentralised 
fisheries management. These periods were characterised by several problems, 
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such as illegal fishing and the marginalisation of customary fishers in fisheries 
management, upon which the national government made the case for the 
recentralisation of fisheries management. However, with the revival of CFM, the 
potential for building collaboration across tiers of government can be developed 
and previous problems can be solved. Thus, the basis for the national 
government’s rejection of sharing power with the district and provincial 
governments can be negotiated. 
 
New policies that place other marine areas in the Sawu Sea into the Sawu Sea 
MPA will similarly face resistance from customary fisheries. However, the 
involvement of the provincial, district and village governments will enable them 
to manage the resistance. This suggests that the application of an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management requires the application of a nested system 
to enable autonomous fisheries management and collaboration across tiers of 
government. 
 
The main challenge is in applying a nested system because existing laws do not 
allow it. The Indonesian government has to change national law, something that 
is not in its interest. However, at the supra-national level, the Indonesian 
government’s decision to decrease funding support for the CTI can serve as a 
wake-up call for the other participants and neighbouring non-member countries 
to financially support for the CTI. As a leading member of the CTI, any policy 
that the Indonesian government takes or fails to take can influence collective 
action within the CTI and put the CTI at risk of failure. Thus, the Indonesian 
government’s interest in seeing the CTI succeed justifies the effort it takes to 
share power with local stakeholders. 
9.4 Further Research 
This research provides a first step in employing Ostrom’s (1999) institutional 
analysis and development framework to examine the applicability of CFM 
within large-scale marine management regimes. However, the study does not 
use the whole framework to examine the application of CFM. There are several 
areas that warrant further research that fall outside the scope of this research. 
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Firstly, there is a need for studies about the application of CFM within large-
scale marine management regimes for marine protection, but in different 
geographical contexts where customary fishers are migratory fishers.  This is an 
approach that will advance the findings of this study about the applicability of 
CFM in large-scale marine environments. Such research will enrich insights 
about the extent to which customary migratory fishers influence the 
applicability of CFM within large-scale marine environments. 
 
Secondly, research on the application of customary rules in other sectors of 
natural resource management that involve all government tiers would be useful.  
Research of this sort could explore how customary rules and collective action 
can lead to different priorities for customary people, such as a cost-benefit 
sharing arrangement and law enforcement, and by addressing institutional 
conflicts. The research could also show how a nested governing system of 
fisheries can strengthen collaboration and address these priorities. 
 
Thirdly, research in non-fisheries areas that assesses how a single or a uniform 
customary practice can facilitate its application within an ecosystem would be 
valuable. This sort of work could look at how CFM can manage non-migratory 
natural resources within large-scale environments. It would provide different 
insights about managing large-scale environments with fewer problems relating 
to cross-scale linkages.  
 
Finally, a further area for research relates to the interest of the national 
government in fisheries during periods of decentralised fisheries management 
at the district level. Such research would examine the political and economic 
interests or losses of the national government, which shaped the recent changes 
toward devolved fisheries at the community level, and the deconcentration of 







Table 9.1: Areas of future research 
Topic  Question Case 
Applicability of CFM How does fishers’ knowledge 
influence the applicability of CFM 




customary rules and 
practises in natural 
resource management 
How do well-established 
customary rules and practices 
influence local people’s priorities 
in the application of customary 
rules and practices? 
All tiers of 
government  
Applicability of 
customary rules and 
practises in natural 
resource management 
How does a uniform practice of 
CFM within a large-scale 
environment facilitate its 
applicability? 
Large-scale 
environments with a 
single example of 
CFM in practice 
The political and 
economic interests of the 
national government in 
fisheries management 
How does decentralised fisheries 
management influence the 
national government’s political 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1) Interview participants across jurisdictional levels 
Level Organisations  Officials/Persons 
National: 
Indonesia 
Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries 
Former Directorate General of Marine, 






An expert in customary communities 









Current and former Heads of Marine 
Conservation Section  



















Rote Ndao Forum 
for Adat and Culture 
Coordinator and Secretary 




Oelua village Head of Oelua village 
Manahoro coordinator (an indigenous 
fishers) 
An indigenous fisher 
A non-indigenous fisher 
Ndao island A customary figure  
Lalukoen village A manahoro of the Tua lake 
Oetefu village An indigenous customary fisher 
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 6) Agreement Sheet in Bahasa Indonesia 
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 7) Interview Guide in English 
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